| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 | ≥ 2.8.1, < 2.11.1-0.20261003002531-6258dcebc4e2 | 2.11.1-0.20261003002531-6258dcebc4e2 |
| excelize | ≥ 2.8.1, ≤ 2.11.0 |
extractPivotTableFields builds order := pc.getPivotCacheFieldsName() from xl/pivotCache/pivotCacheDefinitionN.xml's <cacheFields> list, then indexes it with values taken from a separately parsed xl/pivotTables/pivotTableN.xml part with zero cross-validation: order[field.Fld] where field.Fld is a raw attacker-controlled int from the <dataField fld="N"> attribute, and order[fieldIdx] where fieldIdx is a loop index over pt.PivotFields.PivotField that need not match the cache's field count. I executed two independent PoCs against the current HEAD: (1) trimmed the pivot cache's <cacheFields> to count=0 while leaving the pivot table's 2 pivotFields untouched -> runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0 at pivotTable.go:1431; (2) left the 2 cache fields completely intact and only changed one attribute, fld="1" -> fld="99999", in xl/pivotTables/pivotTable1.xml -> runtime error: index out of range [99999] with length 2 at pivotTable.go:1443. Both stack traces confirmed via non-recovered go test runs: extractPivotTableFields -> getPivotTable -> GetPivotTables.
Unauthenticated: any application that opens an untrusted .xlsx containing a pivot table and calls the public File.GetPivotTables(sheet) API. excelize has no recover() anywhere, so this crashes the host process (CLI/worker) or surfaces as an unhandled 500 in a request-scoped-recover HTTP service. Deterministic, single small crafted file, no user interaction beyond the service's normal open-and-read flow.
Method:
git status clean except the new PoC files I added): read pivotTable.go:1425-1454 and confirmed verbatim: order := pc.getPivotCacheFieldsName() (1428), loop for fieldIdx, field := range pt.PivotFields.PivotField indexing order[fieldIdx] at axisRow/axisCol/axisPage (1431/1434/1437), and Data: order[field.Fld] (1443) inside the pt.DataFields.DataField loop -- zero bounds checks anywhere. Confirmed xmlPivotTable.go:271 Fld int xml:"fld,attr"`` on xlsxDataField (raw attacker-controlled int, no validation) and the sibling Fld field at line 252. Ran go build ./... -- compiles clean. Both citations are accurate.Running one of these products? Scan your site to see whether it exposes a vulnerable version.
Scan my site freego test -run 'TestPivotTableDataFieldFldIndexPanic|TestPivotTableDataFieldFldAttributeOutOfRangePanic' -v .gen/gen-trim (attacker: build a legit pivot-table workbook via the public API, then rezip with one XML part tampered -- either dataField fld="1"->fld="99999", or the pivot cache's <cacheFields count="2"> collapsed to count="0" -- writing the crafted .xlsx to disk) and run (victim: a fresh OS process that does exactly what any consumer service does -- excelize.OpenFile(path) then f.GetPivotTables("Sheet1") -- with zero recover() anywhere in the file or the call chain). Executed as four separate go run process invocations: gen, run, gen-trim, run.Evidence:
Test run (pre-existing PoC file, re-executed by me, both PASS):
--- PASS: TestPivotTableDataFieldFldIndexPanic (0.00s) logging CONFIRMED: GetPivotTables panicked ... runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0
--- PASS: TestPivotTableDataFieldFldAttributeOutOfRangePanic (0.00s) logging CONFIRMED: GetPivotTables panicked ... runtime error: index out of range [99999] with length 2
ok github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 0.114s
Standalone process-crash run #1 (go run ./cmd/pivotcrash run pivotcrash_malicious.xlsx, fld="99999" tamper, cache untouched with 2 fields):
[victim] file opened successfully, workbook parsed with no errors
[victim] now calling f.GetPivotTables("Sheet1") on the untrusted workbook...
panic: runtime error: index out of range [99999] with length 2
goroutine 1 [running]:
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).extractPivotTableFields(...)
.../pivotTable.go:1443 +0xb9b
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).getPivotTable(...)
.../pivotTable.go:1379 +0x7f6
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).GetPivotTables(...)
.../pivotTable.go:1278 +0x2f7
main.runVictim(...) / main.main() -> exit status 2
Standalone process-crash run #2 (go run ./cmd/pivotcrash run pivotcrash_malicious_trim.xlsx, cacheFields trimmed to count=0, pivot table's 2 pivotFields untouched):
panic: runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0
goroutine 1 [running]:
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).extractPivotTableFields(...)
.../pivotTable.go:1431 +0xc15
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).getPivotTable(...)
.../pivotTable.go:1379 +0x7f6
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).GetPivotTables(...)
.../pivotTable.go:1278 +0x2f7
main.runVictim(...) / main.main() -> exit status 2
In both standalone runs the "GetPivotTables RETURNED NORMALLY" print statement that follows the call was never reached -- the OS process itself terminated via an unrecovered Go panic (exit status 2), for a crafted .xlsx that excelize.OpenFile accepted without any error. Both stack traces terminate at the exact claimed sink lines (pivotTable.go:1443 and :1431) via the exact claimed call chain (extractPivotTableFields -> getPivotTable -> GetPivotTables). This is a real, unhandled crash of a real process running unmodified excelize code -- not a mock, not a simulated/hypothetical trace.
Ran all 5 requested checks in full, plus extra verification. (1) Pulled the complete, paginated GHSA list via gh api (16 advisories, all state=published, no hidden drafts) and grepped full descriptions, not just summaries, for "pivot" -- only one incidental, non-overlapping hit (GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r cites pivotTable.go:538 as an AddPivotTable call site for an unrelated formula-recursion stack-overflow bug). (2) Ran ~15 targeted GitHub issue searches (extractPivotTableFields, getPivotCacheFieldsName, GetPivotTables panic, dataField fld, BaseField, ShowValuesAs, "index out of range", cacheFields count mismatch, PivotFields panic, DataField, plus a broad "pivot" query returning 30 issues/PRs all individually triaged by title) and full-text-read the 5 most plausible (#2161, #1937, #2183, #1954, #1945) -- none match; the closest (#2161) is a nil-pointer bug in a different function/field, detailed above. (3) Checked PRs both by keyword (is:pr pivot = 10, is:pr "pivotTable.go" fld = 0, all reviewed; read PR #2168's full diff) and exhaustively (pulled all 31 currently-open PRs on the repo and reviewed every title) -- none touch pivot field indexing. (4) Ran 5 WebSearch queries combining the mechanism with "excelize"/"pivot table"/"CVE", and independently cross-checked OSV.dev's API (which mirrors NVD/GHSA/GO vuln DB) -- turned up only the already-ruled-out GHSA-fx5j (shared-string) and GHSA-h69g (row allocation) advisories, and a non-upstream automated "task"-tracking repo (windyswe/q ...[truncated for brevity]
Closest prior art considered: qax-os/excelize issue #2161 + merged PR #2168 ("This closes #2161, fix panic on read unsupported pivot table cache source types", merged 2025-07-05). That bug: pivotCacheDefinition.xml's <cacheSource type="external"/> has no <worksheetSource> child, so pc.CacheSource.WorksheetSource is a nil pointer, and getPivotTable() (then pivotTable.go:875) dereferenced .Sheet/.Ref on it -> nil-pointer-dereference panic, reached via GetPivotTables (then line 803). Fix was an early type-validation error return in getPivotTable, not any bounds check. SAME-FIX TEST: would that fix also close the candidate bug? No. The candidate's panic is index-out-of-range (not nil-deref) inside a different function, extractPivotTableFields, on a different data structure: order := pc.getPivotCacheFieldsName() (length = count of <cacheFields>) indexed by (a) a loop counter over pt.PivotFields.PivotField (a separate, unrelated count from pivotTableN.xml) at lines 1431/1434/1437, and (b) the raw unvalidated int field.
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Tried hard to kill this and it holds. Independently re-read current HEAD (e81f05008b3, fetched and diffed against origin/master to confirm it's current) rather than trusting the report: pivotTable.go:1427-1454 (extractPivotTableFields) has zero bounds checks on order[fieldIdx] (axisRow/Col/Page branches, lines 1431/1434/1437) or order[field.Fld] (line 1443) — confirmed by direct Read, matching the claim's line citations exactly. This is a genuine oversight, not a designed invariant: the very next function in the same file, extractPivotTableShowValuesAs (lines 1476, 1486) and extractPivotTableField (line 1508), DO bounds-check structurally identical order/slice indices before using them — the developers clearly know this pattern needs guarding and simply missed it in extractPivotTableFields. Confirmed xmlPivotTable.go:271 Fld is a bare unchecked int XML attribute, and confirmed getPivotTable/pivotCacheReader/pivotTableReader perform no count-vs-actual-length cross-validation between the independently-parsed pivotTable and pivotCache XML parts. Grepped the entire repo for recover() — zero hits outside the researcher's own test file, confirming "no recover anywhere" is accurate. Re-ran both provided PoCs myself in a throwaway test file against this exact HEAD (go test -run TestPoC_PivotCache -v): both panic exactly as claimed, with byte-identical messages — "index out of range [0] with length 0" (truncated-cache-fields PoC, line 1431) and "index out of range [99999] with lengt
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