In short
- CVE-2026-27004 is a MEDIUM (CVSS 5.5) vulnerability affecting openclaw (openclaw), openclaw.
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (EPSS): 0.12%, higher than 1.7% of all vulnerabilities.
- Fix: update to 2026.2.15 or later.
| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|
| openclaw | < 2026.2.15
| 2026.2.15
|
| openclaw npm | < 2026.2.15
| 2026.2.15
|
Description
Vulnerability
In some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (sessions_list, sessions_history, sessions_send) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted.
In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account webhookSecret when only the account-level secret was configured.
Typical Use Case Context
Most regular OpenClaw deployments run a single agent, or run in trusted environments. In those setups, practical risk from this issue is generally low.
Impact
- Shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions.
- Single-agent or trusted environments: practical impact is limited.
- Telegram webhook mode: account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: npm
openclaw
- Affected versions:
<= 2026.2.14
- Patched version:
2026.2.15 (planned next release)
Remediation
- Add and enforce
tools.sessions.visibility (self | tree | agent | all) across session tools, defaulting to tree.
- Keep sandbox clamping behavior so sandboxed runs can be restricted to spawned/session-tree visibility.
- Resolve Telegram webhook secret from account config fallback in monitor webhook startup.
Fix Commit(s)
c6c53437f7da033b94a01d492e904974e7bda74c
Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
NVD description
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, in some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted. In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured. In shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. In single-agent or trusted environments, practical impact is limited. In Telegram webhook mode, account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided. Version 2026.2.15 fixes the issue.
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