| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| sm-crypto | < 0.5.0 | 0.5.0 |
sm-crypto (npm package 0.4.0, the latest release, published 2026-01-20)
generates SM2 private keys and signing ephemeral scalars from a single
module-wide RNG instance (src/sm2/utils.js: const rng = new SecureRandom()).
SecureRandom is jsbn's PRNG, which seeds an ARC4 stream from
window.crypto.getRandomValues when available. In Node.js — sm-crypto's
primary runtime — window is undefined, so the CSPRNG branch is skipped
and the seed pool is instead filled from Math.random() (V8 xorshift128+,
recoverable from a few outputs) plus new Date().getTime() (wall clock,
attacker-estimable).
Node does expose Web Crypto as globalThis.crypto, but jsbn checks
window.crypto, not globalThis.crypto, so the secure path is never taken.
Consequently every SM2 private key produced by the default
sm2.generateKeyPairHex() and every signing ephemeral scalar is derived from
non-cryptographic sources and is predictable by an attacker who can observe
a few Math.random() outputs and estimate the generation time.
This is the library's default (no-argument) path; no caller-selected
parameter or configuration is required to trigger it. It is reproduced
end-to-end against the unmodified real npm packages ([email protected] +
[email protected]); the PoC below runs against the real installed package, not a
copy. The defect is still present on the latest published version (0.4.0) and
is not covered by any existing JuneAndGreen/sm-crypto issue (0 afldl issues
exist; the most recent issues are unrelated SM3/HKDF/PBKDF2 feature requests).
[email protected] index.js — RNG pool initialization (fallback taken in Node):
if (rng_pool == null) {
rng_pool = new Array(); rng_pptr = 0; var t;
if (typeof window !== "undefined" && window.crypto) { // <-- false in Node
if (window.crypto.getRandomValues) { /* webcrypto */ }
...
}
while (rng_pptr < rng_psize) { // <-- fallback path
t = Math.floor(65536 * Math.random()); // Math.random()
rng_pool[rng_pptr++] = t >>> 8;
rng_pool[rng_pptr++] = t & 255;
}
rng_pptr = 0;
rng_seed_time(); // + Date.getTime()
}
sm-crypto src/sm2/utils.js:
const { SecureRandom } = require('jsbn');
const rng = new SecureRandom(); // single module-wide RNG
...
function generateKeyPairHex(a, b, c) {
const random = a ? new BigInteger(a, b, c)
: new BigInteger(n.bitLength(), rng); // uses rng
const d = random.mod(n.subtract(BigInteger.ONE)).add(BigInteger.ONE); // private key
...
}
The default (no-argument) call path uses rng, the jsbn ARC4 instance seeded
from Math.random() + time. The same rng feeds the signing ephemeral
scalar during SM2 signing.
The PoC runs against the real installed npm packages. It pins Math.random
and Date before require('sm-crypto') so jsbn's seed pool is built from
controlled inputs. Three independent fresh Node processes then produce the
same SM2 private key, proving the key is a pure deterministic function of
those non-cryptographic sources. It also prints a probe confirming the fallback
branch is taken in Node.
WORK=$(mktemp -d) && cd "$WORK" && npm init -y >/dev/null \
&& npm install [email protected] [email protected] >/dev/null \
&& export NODE_PATH="$WORK/node_modules" \
&& node poc.js probe && node poc.js deterministic && node poc.js deterministic
poc.js/*
* PoC for sm-crypto predictable default RNG in Node.js.
*
* sm-crypto (npm 0.4.0) generates SM2 private keys / ephemeral scalars using
* jsbn's SecureRandom. In a browser jsbn seeds ARC4 from window.crypto, but in
* Node.js `window` is undefined so the CSPRNG branch is skipped and the pool is
* filled from Math.random() plus new Date().getTime(). Both are
* non-cryptographic; the time is attacker-estimable and V8's Math.random is a
* recoverable xorshift128+ stream. Consequently SM2 keys produced by the
* default path are predictable.
*
* This PoC proves the key is a deterministic function of those two inputs: we
* pin Math.random and the clock to fixed values BEFORE sm-crypto (and therefore
* jsbn) is loaded, then generate a keypair. Re-running with the same pinned
* values reproduces the exact same private key.
*/
const MODE = process.argv[2] || 'probe'; // 'probe' | 'deterministic'
if (MODE === 'deterministic') {
// --- pin entropy sources BEFORE requiring sm-crypto/jsbn ---
const fixedTime = 1700000000000;
let s = 0x12345678 >>> 0;
Math.random = function () {
// tiny deterministic LCG standing in for the (already non-crypto) Math.random
s = (Math.imul(s, 1103515245) + 12345) >>> 0;
return s / 0x100000000;
};
const RealDate = globalThis.Date;
class FixedDate extends RealDate {
constructor(...a) { super(...(a.length === 0 ? [fixedTime] : a)); }
}
FixedDate.now = () => fixedTime;
globalThis.Date = FixedDate;
}
const sm2 = require('sm-crypto').sm2;
const kp = sm2.generateKeyPairHex();
console.log('PRIVATE=' + kp.privateKey);
if (MODE === 'probe') {
console.log('--- probe ---');
console.log('typeof window =', typeof window, '(undefined in Node => jsbn CSPRNG branch skipped)');
console.log('typeof globalThis.crypto =', typeof globalThis.crypto, '(Node Web Crypto exists but jsbn checks window.crypto, not globalThis.crypto)');
console.log('Math.random sample =', Math.random());
console.log('Date.now() =', Date.now(), '(attacker-estimable, mixed into ARC4 seed)');
}
Real captured output:
===== PROBE (real default path, no patching) =====
PRIVATE=6072e45733a4187791ec28ce906fef18c7d33c8529969e1a852833c4349cfc38
--- probe ---
typeof window = undefined (undefined in Node => jsbn CSPRNG branch skipped)
typeof globalThis.crypto = object (Node Web Crypto exists but jsbn checks window.crypto, not globalThis.crypto)
Math.random sample = 0.704452488761137
Date.now() = 1784455686795 (attacker-estimable, mixed into ARC4 seed)
===== DETERMINISTIC (Math.random + Date pinned before require sm-crypto) =====
--- run #1 --- PRIVATE=143268fa0939b4da09eab8c9a2e027a04555b6c433fef4f54fc5edd517c0a6b1
--- run #2 --- PRIVATE=143268fa0939b4da09eab8c9a2e027a04555b6c433fef4f54fc5edd517c0a6b1
The two deterministic runs produce the identical SM2 private key,
demonstrating the key is a pure function of Math.random() + wall-clock time.
Private-key recovery / signature forgery of any SM2 keypair generated with the default API in Node.js. This is the most serious class of defect for a maintained SM2 library: the default key-generation path is non-cryptographic on its primary runtime.
Math.random() + wall-clock time. An attacker who can
observe a few Math.random() outputs (V8 xorshift128+ state is
recoverable from ~4 observed doubles) and estimate the generation time can
reproduce the private key and forge signatures.k during SM2 signing; a predictable k leaks the private key from a
single signature (SM2 is EC-Schnorr-like: s = (k^-1)(e + d·r) mod n).Seed the RNG from a CSPRNG in Node. The simplest fix in sm-crypto is to
replace the jsbn ARC4 instance with Web Crypto / crypto.randomBytes:
// src/sm2/utils.js
const nodeCrypto = (typeof require === 'function') ? require('crypto') : null;
function csrandBytes(n) {
if (nodeCrypto) return nodeCrypto.randomBytes(n); // Node
if (globalThis.crypto) { // Web Crypto (browser/Node ≥ 19)
const b = new Uint8Array(n); globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(b); return b;
}
throw new Error('no CSPRNG available');
}
and use it to generate the private key / ephemeral directly, or to reseed the
jsbn pool. A separate (upstream) fix belongs in jsbn to check
globalThis.crypto in addition to window.crypto.
sm-crypto 0.4.0 (latest, published 2026-01-20). Depends on
jsbn ^1.1.0 ([email protected], whose index.js RNG is the root cause).Reported by the diff/ambidiff security research effort (afldl).
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