| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| chainguard.dev/melange | ≥ 0.32.0, < 0.43.4 | 0.43.4 |
| melange | ≥ 0.32.0, < 0.43.4 | 0.43.4 |
An attacker who can influence a melange configuration file — for example through pull-request-driven CI or build-as-a-service scenarios — could set pipeline[].uses to a value containing ../ sequences or an absolute path. The (*Compiled).compilePipeline function in pkg/build/compile.go passed uses directly to filepath.Join(pipelineDir, uses + ".yaml") without validating the value, so the resolved path could escape each --pipeline-dir and read an arbitrary YAML-parseable file visible to the melange process. Because the loaded file is subsequently interpreted as a melange pipeline and its runs: block is executed via /bin/sh -c in the build sandbox, this additionally allowed shell commands sourced from an out-of-tree file to run during the build, bypassing the review boundary that normally covers the in-tree pipeline definition.
Fixed in melange v0.43.4 via commit 5829ca4. The fix rejects uses values that are absolute paths or contain .., and verifies (via filepath.Rel after ) that the resolved target remains within the pipeline directory.
filepath.CleanOnly run melange build against configuration files from trusted sources. In CI systems that build user-supplied melange configs, gate builds behind manual review of pipeline[].uses values and reject any containing .. or leading /.
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