| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/rancher/fleet | ≥ 0.11.0, < 0.11.13≥ 0.12.0, < 0.12.14≥ 0.13.0, < 0.13.10≥ 0.14.0, < 0.14.5≥ 0.15.0, < 0.15.1 | 0.11.130.12.140.13.100.14.50.15.1 |
| rancher fleet | ≥ 0.11.0, < 0.11.13≥ 0.12.0, < 0.12.14≥ 0.13.0, < 0.13.10≥ 0.14.0, < 0.14.5≥ 0.15.0, < 0.15.1 | 0.11.130.12.140.13.100.14.50.15.1 |
Fleet's Helm deployer did not fully apply ServiceAccount impersonation in two code paths, allowing a tenant with git push access to a Fleet-monitored repository to read secrets from any namespace on every downstream cluster targeted by their GitRepo.
Helm lookup bypass: The Helm template engine ran Kubernetes API queries with the fleet-agent's cluster-admin credentials instead of the impersonated ServiceAccount. A chart template could therefore access resources beyond the tenant's RBAC scope.
valuesFrom bypass: Secret and ConfigMap references in fleet.yaml helm.valuesFrom were read using the fleet-agent's cluster-admin client. A tenant could reference resources in namespaces the impersonated ServiceAccount has no access to.
Both issues break Fleet's multi-tenant impersonation boundary. The leaked credentials may belong to external services, making the full impact non-deterministic.
Single-tenant deployments where all users are trusted are not affected.
Important:
Please consult the associated MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Account Access Removal for further information about this category of attack.
Both issues are fixed by ensuring the Helm action configuration consistently uses the impersonated ServiceAccount credentials throughout all Helm operations.
Patched versions of Rancher include releases v2.14.1, v2.13.5, v2.12.9, and v2.11.13. For Rancher v2.10.11, users must manually update their Fleet deployment to versionv0.11.13.
No workaround fully mitigates the issue for multi-tenant deployments. The patches should be applied as soon as they are available.
The following measures reduce the attack surface but do not close either vulnerability:
GitRepoRestriction resources to limit which ServiceAccounts each namespace is allowed to use, restricting the set of users who can configure impersonation at all.lookup calls and fleet.yaml files for cross-namespace valuesFrom references as a detective control.If there are any questions or comments about this advisory:
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