symfony/ux-live-component: XSS via attacker-controlled child component tag

Description

Symfony\UX\LiveComponent\Util\ChildComponentPartialRenderer::createHtml() interpolates the $childTag argument directly into the HTML output as a tag name, without escaping or validation. The value originates from client-controlled JSON (children[id].tag) parsed by LiveComponentSubscriber and propagated through InterceptChildComponentRenderSubscriber, so an attacker who can reach the Live Component endpoint can inject arbitrary HTML, including <script> tags, on any re-render of a Live Component that contains at least one child component.

In the default configuration, the Live Component endpoint is gated by an Accept: application/vnd.live-component+html request-header check that cannot be set cross-origin without a CORS preflight, so the issue is primarily a defense-in-depth gap. It becomes directly exploitable on applications that have relaxed CORS to allow this header from untrusted origins, or that have been pivoted from another same-origin XSS.

Resolution

ChildComponentPartialRenderer now validates $childTag against a strict HTML tag-name regex before interpolating it, and rejects any value that doesn't match. Anything that wouldn't be a valid HTML tag is dropped before reaching the response.

The patch for this issue is available here for branch 2.x (and forward-ported to 3.x).

Credits

Symfony would like to thank Pascal Cescon for reporting the issue and Hugo Alliaume for providing the fix.