SiYuan: Non-administrator responses from /api/system/getConf omit three secrets that the configuration-export path explicitly strips, disclosing the session-cookie signing key and the OS username to anonymous readers

Each stage names fields explicitly, so any field nobody thought to add is returned by default.

1. CookieKey: the live session-signing key.

The value is passed straight into the session store at startup:

cli/cmd/serve.go:67          go server.Serve(false, model.Conf.CookieKey)
kernel/server/serve.go:152   sessionStore = cookie.NewStore([]byte(cookieKey))
kernel/server/serve.go:159   ginServer.Use(sessions.Sessions("siyuan", sessionStore))

gin-contrib/sessions/cookie.NewStore constructed with a single key uses that key as the gorilla/securecookie HMAC key. The siyuan session cookie is signed with the value this endpoint hands out, so an attacker holding it can mint and modify session cookies the server accepts as authentic.

Escalating a forged session to administrator additionally requires the forged SessionData to carry the matching AccessAuthCode which is masked or the instance to have no access-auth code configured, which is a common deployment. The unconditional impact, present on every instance, is disclosure of a persistent cryptographic secret to an unauthenticated party. Rotating it invalidates every active session, so it cannot be quietly refreshed.

2. Export.PandocBin: bypasses a shipped privacy control.

The field is an absolute path that embeds the OS username by construction:

conf/export.go:35        PandocBin string `json:"pandocBin"`
model/conf.go:430-431    if "" == Conf.Export.PandocBin { Conf.Export.PandocBin = util.PandocBinPath }
util/pandoc.go:154       PandocBinPath = filepath.Join(tempPandocDir, "bin", "pandoc.exe")
util/pandoc.go:134       tempPandocDir = filepath.Join(TempDir, "pandoc")
util/working.go:359      TempDir = filepath.Join(WorkspaceDir, "temp")
util/working.go:312      defaultWorkspaceDir = filepath.Join(userProfile, "SiYuan")

→ C:\Users\<username>\SiYuan\temp\pandoc\bin\pandoc.exe

This one is notable beyond the disclosure itself, because a control was shipped specifically to prevent it. kernel/api/system.go:630 adds, for browser requests:

if util.IsBrowserRequest(c) {
    maskedConf.System.WorkspaceDir = ""
    maskedConf.System.AppDir = ""
    maskedConf.System.ConfDir = ""
    maskedConf.System.DataDir = ""
    maskedConf.System.HomeDir = ""
}   // 避免泄露用户名等敏感信息

The comment states the goal plainly: avoid leaking the username and other sensitive information. The block enumerates only System.* and misses Export.PandocBin, which carries the same username through the same response. A publish reader is a browser request, so the System paths are blanked while export.pandocBin passes through intact. Where an administrator has configured a custom pandoc location, that path is disclosed instead still a filesystem-layout disclosure.

3. NotebookCrypto. Encrypted-notebook key material is likewise absent from HideConfSecret while exportConf sets it to nil. Reported previously and included here only because it is the third instance of the same root cause; the fix below closes all three together.

The root cause is the blocklist itself. exportConf (kernel/api/system.go:299) clones the configuration and clears each secret before returning it CookieKey, NotebookCrypto, Export.PandocBin, Account, Stat, System.ID, the AI keys. That cloner is the project's own working inventory of what must not leave the server. getConf's non-administrator path maintains a separate, shorter list that has now diverged from it in three places. Any future secret added to the config will default to exposed on the reader path unless someone remembers to extend the blocklist.

Proof of Concept

Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when Publish.Auth.Enable is false, otherwise any publish reader account.

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/system/getConf
{}

→ 200. The conf object contains:
     cookieKey          — the session-signing key, cleartext
     export.pandocBin   — absolute path containing the OS username
     notebookCrypto     — encrypted-notebook key material

Differential check against the endpoint that strips them, same instance:

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/system/exportConf

→ cookieKey is empty, export.pandocBin is empty, notebookCrypto is null

The same three values are withheld by one endpoint and returned by the other.

Impact

An anonymous reader in publish mode or any publish RoleReader obtains the server's session-cookie signing key, permitting forgery and tampering of session cookies the server validates as authentic, with administrator authentication reachable on instances that have no access-auth code configured. The same response discloses the operating-system username and workspace layout, defeating a control added specifically to prevent that disclosure, and encrypted-notebook key material.

Suggested fix

Route non-administrator getConf responses through the exportConf cloner rather than extending HideConfSecret field by field. The cloner already handles every field named here and is the list the project actually maintains; keeping two divergent inventories of the same secrets is what produced all three gaps. If a targeted patch is preferred in the interim, clear CookieKey and NotebookCrypto in HideConfSecret and add Export.PandocBin to the IsBrowserRequest block, then audit the config struct for any remaining absolute-path or secret-bearing field.