| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| praisonai | < 4.5.113 | 4.5.113 |
| praisonai | ≤ 4.5.112 |
PraisonAI's recipe registry pull flow extracts attacker-controlled .praison tar archives with tar.extractall() and does not validate archive member paths before extraction. A malicious publisher can upload a recipe bundle that contains ../ traversal entries and any user who later pulls that recipe will write files outside the output directory they selected.
This is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability on the client side of the recipe registry workflow. It affects both the local registry pull path and the HTTP registry pull path. The checksum verification does not prevent exploitation because the malicious traversal payload is part of the signed bundle itself.
The issue is caused by unsafe extraction of tar archive contents during recipe pull.
.praison bundle whose manifest.json is benign enough to pass publish, but whose tar members include traversal entries such as:../../escape-http.txt
LocalRegistry.publish() in src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:214-287 only reads manifest.json, calculates a checksum, and stores the uploaded bundle. It does not inspect or sanitize the rest of the tar members before saving the archive.
When a victim later pulls the recipe from a local registry, LocalRegistry.pull() in src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:289-345 extracts the tarball directly:
recipe_dir = output_dir / name
recipe_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with tarfile.open(bundle_path, "r:gz") as tar:
tar.extractall(recipe_dir)
HttpRegistry.pull() in src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:691-739 downloads the bundle and then performs the same unsafe extraction:recipe_dir = output_dir / name
recipe_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with tarfile.open(bundle_path, "r:gz") as tar:
tar.extractall(recipe_dir)
recipe_dir and create files elsewhere on disk.Verified vulnerable behavior:
evil-httpRunning one of these products? Scan your site to see whether it exposes a vulnerable version.
Scan my site free/tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/victim-output/tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/escape-http.txtowned over httpThis demonstrates that a remote publisher can cause filesystem writes outside the pull destination chosen by another user.
Run the single verification script from the checked-out repository:
cd "/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/PraisonAI"
python3 tmp/pocs/poc2.py
Expected vulnerable output:
[+] Publish result: {'ok': True, 'name': 'evil-http', 'version': '1.0.0', ...}
[+] Pull result: {'name': 'evil-http', 'version': '1.0.0', ...}
[+] Outside artifact exists: True
[+] Artifact also inside output dir: False
[+] Outside artifact content: 'owned over http\n'
[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE - pulling the recipe created a file outside the chosen output directory.
Then verify the created file manually:
ls -l /tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/escape-http.txt
cat /tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/escape-http.txt
find /tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc -maxdepth 3 | sort
What the script does internally:
.praison bundle containing the tar entry ../../escape-http.txt./tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/victim-output.This is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability in the recipe pull workflow.
Impacted parties:
Security impact:
Replace raw tar.extractall() with a safe extraction routine that validates every TarInfo member before extraction. Reject absolute paths, .. segments, and any resolved path that escapes the intended extraction directory.
Apply the same archive member validation in both LocalRegistry.pull() and HttpRegistry.pull() so that local and remote registry clients share the same safety guarantees.
Consider validating tar contents during publish as well, so malicious bundles are rejected before they ever enter the registry and cannot be served to downstream users.