| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/minio/minio | ≥ 0.0.0-20220724015452, < 0.0.0-20260414213245all versions | 0.0.0-20260414213245 |
| minio | ≥ 2022-07-24t01-54-52z, < 2026-04-14t21-32-45z | 2026-04-14t21-32-45z |
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
A path traversal vulnerability in MinIO's ReadMultiple internode storage-REST
endpoint allows a caller holding the cluster root JWT to read files from
outside the configured drive roots, bounded only by the MinIO process UID.
Distributed-erasure (multi-node) MinIO deployments are impacted. Single-node
standalone deployments do not register the route and are not affected. The
attack requires an HS512 JWT signed with MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD and carrying
accessKey = MINIO_ROOT_USER — the same secret every peer in the cluster
holds to authenticate internode traffic, so a compromised peer or any actor in
possession of the root credential can mint one.
The ReadMultiple handler (cmd/storage-rest-server.go) decodes a msgpack
ReadMultipleReq body containing Bucket, Prefix, and Files fields and
forwards them to xlStorage.ReadMultiple (cmd/xl-storage.go) without
validation:
volumeDir := pathJoin(s.drivePath, req.Bucket) // traversal resolves here
for _, f := range req.Files {
fullPath := pathJoin(volumeDir, req.Prefix, f)
data, mt, err = s.readAllDataWithDMTime(ctx, req.Bucket, volumeDir, fullPath)
}
pathJoin calls path.Clean, which resolves .. components and produces an
absolute path anywhere on the filesystem — it is not a root jail. The global
setRequestValidityMiddleware rejects .. in r.URL.Path and r.Form but
does not inspect request bodies, so msgpack-encoded traversal bypasses it.
Sibling storage methods (StatInfoFile, ReadFileHandler, ReadVersion)
validate their volume argument through s.getVolDir(volume), which rejects
..; ReadMultiple skips this call.
The attacker sends POST /minio/storage/{drivePath}/v63/rmpl with a
msgpack-encoded body carrying ../ sequences in the Bucket field. The
server opens the resulting path via os.OpenFile with O_RDONLY|O_NOATIME
and returns its contents in the msgpack response stream.
Impact by deployment:
Bare-metal with User=minio in the systemd unit — the
ownership check bounds the read to files owned by the MinIO UID. Reachable
secrets include TLS private keys, KMS/KES key material, systemd credentials,
and data belonging to other tenants sharing the same UID on the host.
Secrets leaked this way persist across cluster credential rotation.
Running one of these products? Scan your site to see whether it exposes a vulnerable version.
Scan my site freeO_NOATIMEContainerized running as UID 0 (the historical default for the official
Docker image, docker-compose examples, and Helm charts without
securityContext.runAsNonRoot) — the primitive escalates to arbitrary
host-filesystem disclosure: /etc/shadow, /root/**, Kubernetes
service-account tokens, cloud-init metadata caches.
Affected components: cmd/storage-rest-server.go (ReadMultiple handler),
cmd/xl-storage.go (xlStorage.ReadMultiple).
CWE: CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory — 'Path Traversal')
CVSS v4.0 Score: 6.9 (Medium)
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
All MinIO releases from RELEASE.2022-07-24T01-54-52Z through the final
release of the minio/minio open-source project, RELEASE.2025-09-07T16-13-09Z.
The vulnerability was introduced in commit
f939d1c18
("Independent Multipart Uploads",
PR #15346), which added the
ReadMultiple storage-REST endpoint as part of the multipart upload
redesign. The first affected release is RELEASE.2022-07-24T01-54-52Z.
Fixed in: MinIO AIStor RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z (recommended
upgrade target). The fix — which removed the ReadMultiple handler, the
corresponding storage-driver method, the msgpack datatypes, the REST-client
wrapper, and the route registration — first shipped in MinIO AIStor
RELEASE.2024-10-23T19-38-07Z. Every AIStor release from
RELEASE.2024-10-23T19-38-07Z onward is unaffected; users should upgrade to
RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z or later to pick up the accumulated fixes and
improvements shipped since.
| Platform | Architecture | Download |
|---|---|---|
| Linux | amd64 | minio |
| Linux | arm64 | minio |
| macOS | arm64 | minio |
| macOS | amd64 | minio |
| Windows | amd64 | minio.exe |
| Platform | Architecture | Download |
|---|---|---|
| Linux | amd64 | minio.fips |
| Linux | arm64 | minio.fips |
| Format | Architecture | Download |
|---|---|---|
| DEB | amd64 | minio_20260414213245.0.0_amd64.deb |
| DEB | arm64 | minio_20260414213245.0.0_arm64.deb |
| RPM | amd64 | minio-20260414213245.0.0-1.x86_64.rpm |
| RPM | arm64 | minio-20260414213245.0.0-1.aarch64.rpm |
# Standard
docker pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z
podman pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z
# FIPS
docker pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z.fips
podman pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-04-14T21-32-45Z.fips
brew install minio/aistor/minio
If upgrading is not immediately possible:
Rotate the root credential and restrict who holds it. The exploit
requires a JWT signed with MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD. Treat the root credential
as the host-filesystem disclosure primitive that it is: rotate it after any
suspected exposure, store it only in the secret manager that bootstraps the
cluster, and do not hand it to applications or operators who only need
object-level access.
Do not run the MinIO container as UID 0. Set
securityContext.runAsNonRoot: true (and a non-zero runAsUser) in
Kubernetes manifests, or add --user to docker run. This reduces the
blast radius from arbitrary host-filesystem disclosure to MinIO-UID-owned
files only.
Restrict the internode storage-REST port at the network layer. In
distributed deployments, the storage-REST route is served on the same port
as the S3 API by default. Where feasible, use --internode-port to expose
internode traffic on a separate interface reachable only from other cluster
peers, and block that interface from client networks.