| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| apostrophe | < 4.34.0 | 4.34.0 |
ApostropheCMS lets a module expose an anonymous read API by setting publicApiProjection, which whitelists the document fields unauthenticated callers may see. The public REST GET handler applies every launderable query builder from the query string before forcing that projection. Two of those builders, search and sort, operate on the underlying documents rather than the projected output, and neither is checked against the projection. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore:
?search=<word> as a value oracle to confirm and locate documents by the content of a field the projection was meant to hide, and?sort[hiddenField]=1 as an ordering oracle to rank documents by a hidden field's value.This is the same confidentiality-bypass class already patched for the choices/counts builders (gated by choicesFieldAllowedByProjection). That gate was never applied to search or sort.
For an anonymous caller, getRestQuery (piece types: modules/@apostrophecms/piece-type/index.js:1142; pages: modules/@apostrophecms/page/index.js) does:
const query = self.find(req).attachments(true);
query.applyBuildersSafely(req.query); // (1) apply ALL launderable builders from the query string
...
query.project({ ...self.options.publicApiProjection, cacheInvalidatedAt: 1 }); // (2) force read projection
query.set('publicApiProjection', self.options.publicApiProjection); // (3) used only by the choices/counts gate
applyBuildersSafely (modules/@apostrophecms/doc-type/index.js:3327) runs any builder that has a launder method. search and sort both have one (doc-type/index.js:2288 and 2127), so ?search= and ?sort[...]= are honored for anonymous requests.
Search vector. The search builder adds { $text: { $search: <user input> } } (doc-type/index.js:2282). The $text index covers highSearchText / lowSearchText / title / searchBoost (modules/@apostrophecms/doc/index.js:612). highSearchText / are built at save time by → (), which indexes every schema field where (the default for string/text fields). does not imply . Step (2) narrows the output but not the filter, so the response returns the projected of exactly the documents whose hidden field contains the searched word.
Running one of these products? Scan your site to see whether it exposes a vulnerable version.
Scan my site freelowSearchText@apostrophecms/search:getSearchTextsapos.schema.indexFields(schema, doc, texts)modules/@apostrophecms/search/index.js:377searchable !== falsepublicApiProjectionsearchable: false$text{title, slug, _id}Sort vector. finalizeSort (doc-type/index.js:3526) forwards raw user sort keys to MongoDB (it only rewrites fields flagged sortify: true). ?sort[hiddenField]=1 orders results by a projection-excluded field. Combined with perPage/page, an attacker can page through the fully ordered set.
Neither builder consults publicApiProjection, whereas choices/counts are gated at doc-type/index.js:2807 via choicesFieldAllowedByProjection.
Preconditions: the piece/page type sets publicApiProjection, and its schema has at least one searchable (default) or sortable field not included in the projection.
Test type: article exposes only title, slug, _id, but has hidden secret (integer) and secretNote (searchable string):
export default {
extend: '@apostrophecms/piece-type',
options: { publicApiProjection: { title: 1, slug: 1, _id: 1 } },
fields: { add: {
secret: { type: 'integer' },
secretNote: { type: 'string' } // searchable by default; NOT in the projection
} }
};
Five articles were inserted and published via the authenticated REST API:
A.secret=50, secretNote="zzsecretalpha"; B=10/zzsecretbravo; C=90/zzsecretcharlie; D=30/zzsecretdelta; E=70/zzsecretecho.
The insert responses confirm the hidden secretNote value is written into the search index, e.g. for A: "highSearchText": "... zzsecretalpha", "lowSearchText": "... zzsecretalpha".
Anonymous requests (no credentials, no session):
# [1] Baseline: projection hides secret/secretNote on direct read
curl -s 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?perPage=1'
# [2] Search oracle: value exists ONLY in hidden secretNote
curl -s 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?search=zzsecretalpha'
curl -s 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?search=zznotpresentxyz'
# [3] Sort oracle: order by hidden integer field
curl -s 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?sort%5Bsecret%5D=1'
curl -s 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?sort%5Bsecret%5D=-1'
# Negative control: projection override is blocked
curl -s 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?project%5BsecretNote%5D=1&perPage=1'
Results (verified on ApostropheCMS 4.32.2, MongoDB 7.0):
| Request (anonymous) | Observed | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
GET /api/v1/article | _id,title,slug,type,metaType,cacheInvalidatedAt | projection works on direct read |
?search=zzsecretalpha | only Article A (with textScore) | leak: locates doc by hidden field |
?search=zznotpresentxyz | 0 results | oracle confirmed |
?sort[secret]=1 | B, D, A, E, C (= 10,30,50,70,90) | leak: full hidden ordering |
?sort[secret]=-1 | C, E, A, D, B | reverse confirmed |
?project[secretNote]=1 | secretNote absent | gated (projection override blocked) |
Unauthenticated, network-reachable partial disclosure of fields the developer explicitly restricted with publicApiProjection:
title/slug/_id of matches.No authentication or user interaction required. Not a full field dump, but a targeted oracle over exactly the data the projection is meant to conceal. Affects sites that configure publicApiProjection on piece types or pages, up to and including 4.32.2 (same code path present on current main).
Gate search, sort (and autocomplete, which feeds search) on the public API path the same way choices/counts are gated. When publicApiProjection is in force:
choicesFieldAllowedByProjection.search builder when the projection excludes any searchable field.