| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/coder/coder | ≤ 0.27.3all versions | |
| github.com/coder/coder/v2 | ≥ 2.29.0, < 2.29.13≥ 2.30.0, < 2.30.8≥ 2.31.0, < 2.31.12≥ 2.32.0-rc.0, < 2.32.2≥ 2.33.0-rc.0, < 2.33.3< 2.24.5 | 2.29.132.30.82.31.122.32.22.33.32.24.5 |
| coder | ≥ 2.29.0, < 2.29.13≥ 2.30.0, < 2.30.8≥ 2.31.0, < 2.31.12≥ 2.32.0, < 2.32.2≥ 2.33.0, < 2.33.3< 2.24.5 | 2.29.132.30.82.31.122.32.22.33.32.24.5 |
azureidentity.Validate() verifies that the PKCS#7 signer certificate chains to a trusted Azure CA but never verifies the PKCS#7 signature itself. An attacker can embed a legitimate Azure certificate alongside arbitrary content e.g. {"vmId":"<target>"} and the forged vmId will be accepted returning the victim workspace agent's session token.
No authentication is required. The attacker only needs to know a target VM's vmId which is a UUIDv4.
that's a practical limitation which would typically require prior access to be exploited
In unpatched Coder releases the signature over the PKCS#7 content is not validated - only the signing certificate is checked.
An attacker on any Azure VM or with access to a publicly available Azure IMDS certificate from CT logs can:
POST /api/v2/workspaceagents/azure-instance-identity which is unauthenticated.GET /workspaceagents/me/gitsshkey: push to repositories and impersonate the workspace owner.GET /workspaceagents/me/external-auth: GitHub, GitLab, and Bitbucket tokens in plaintext.All versions of Coder v2 are affected.
Fixed in #25286
The fix was backported to all supported release lines:
| Patched Versions |
|---|
| v2.33.3 |
| v2.32.2 |
| v2.31.12 |
| v2.30.8 |
| v2.29.13 |
| v2.24.5 |
If unable to patch we recommend immediately reconfiguring any Azure templates to use token authentication rather than azure-instance-identity until the patch is released and you are fully upgraded.
coder_agent.auth value to be token.CODER_AGENT_TOKEN=${coder_agent.main.token} to the set of environment variables for the Coder Workspace Agent initialization script.We'd like to thank Ben Tran of calif.io and Anthropic’s Security Team (ANT-2026-22445) for independently disclosing this issue!
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