| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| lemur | < 1.9.2 | 1.9.2 |
lemur.users.service.update() writes a user's new password as plaintext to the users.password column. The User model wires bcrypt hashing to SQLAlchemy's before_insert event but registers no equivalent listener for before_update, and service.update() does not call user.hash_password() after assigning the new value. Every password change performed through the admin-gated PUT /api/1/users/<id> endpoint persists the user's password to the database in cleartext.
lemur/users/models.py:
# line 38
class User(BaseModel):
__tablename__ = "users"
id = Column(Integer, primary_key=True)
password = Column(String(128)) # plain column, no setter, no Vault descriptor
# line 74
def hash_password(self):
if self.password:
self.password = bcrypt.generate_password_hash(self.password).decode("utf-8")
# line 111
listen(User, "before_insert", hash_password) # only before_insert is wired
lemur/users/service.py:
# line 46
def update(user_id, username, email, active, profile_picture, roles, password=None):
...
user = get(user_id)
user.username = username
user.email = email
user.active = active
user.profile_picture = profile_picture
if password:
user.password = password # raw assignment
update_roles(user, roles)
return database.update(user) # commits, no hashing
No before_update listener exists. User.password is a plain Column(String(128)) with no property setter that hashes on assignment. The bcrypt code path is bypassed entirely on every UPDATE statement that touches this column.
| Method | Path | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PUT | /api/1/users/<id> | lemur/users/views.py:274 (gated by @admin_permission.require) |
lemur/auth/views.py:323 also calls user_service.update() during SSO/OAuth login, but passes only six positional arguments. password defaults to None on that path and the if password: guard short-circuits. The bug is triggered only through the admin-only PUT handler.
When an administrator changes a user's password via , the cleartext password is persisted to . Subsequent login attempts for that user will fail ( calls against an unhashed value), pushing operators toward workarounds.
Running one of these products? Scan your site to see whether it exposes a vulnerable version.
Scan my site freePUT /api/1/users/<id>users.passwordcheck_passwordbcrypt.check_password_hashThe more serious consequence is a defense-in-depth bypass. Bcrypt is the protection that prevents a database compromise from yielding usable credentials. With plaintext rows present, an attacker who exfiltrates the users table, a backup, a read replica, or query logs obtains directly usable login credentials — no offline cracking required. Because users reuse passwords across services, the blast radius extends beyond Lemur.
The bug specifically affects admin-driven password resets, which are the normal post-incident workflow and exactly when plaintext storage is most harmful.
Install Lemur with default config. Create an admin user and a target user 'alice' (created via the standard flow, password will be hashed correctly on insert).
Verify the initial hash: psql lemur -c "SELECT password FROM users WHERE username='alice';"
As admin, change alice's password via the API:
curl -X PUT https://lemur.local/api/1/users/<alice_id>
-H "Authorization: Bearer <admin_jwt>"
-H "Content-Type: application/json"
-d '{
"username": "alice",
"email": "[email protected]",
"active": true,
"profile_picture": null,
"roles": [{"name": "operator"}],
"password": "ProofOfConcept_2026"
}'
Read the column again: psql lemur -c "SELECT password FROM users WHERE username='alice';"
Confirm the failure mode: 'alice' can no longer log in with 'ProofOfConcept_2026' because check_password runs bcrypt.check_password_hash() against the cleartext column.
Register the listener for both events:
# lemur/users/models.py
listen(User, "before_insert", hash_password)
listen(User, "before_update", hash_password)
Alternative, equivalent fix in the service layer:
# lemur/users/service.py, in update()
if password:
user.password = password
user.hash_password()
The listener fix is preferred because it closes the gap for any future code path that mutates user.password.
A one-time migration is recommended to detect and re-hash any rows already stored in cleartext. Bcrypt hashes begin with $2b$, $2a$, or $2y$. Any cleartext credential should be treated as compromised — rotate it, do not just re-hash it — since it has been at rest in plaintext and may exist in backups, audit logs, and replicas.