| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| motioneye | < 0.44.0 | 0.44.0 |
motionEye v0.43.1 and prior versions create the configuration file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf with 644 permissions (-rw-r--r--), making it readable by any local user on the system. This file contains sensitive data including the admin password hash, which can be leveraged by other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges.
0600 mode to motion.conf and camera-*.conf files)When motionEye writes its configuration, the file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf is created with 644 permissions regardless of the installation method. This file contains the admin password hash in the @admin_password field:
# @admin_username admin
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
Any local user can read this hash without elevated privileges:
$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
Additionally, per-camera configuration files (camera-*.conf) are also created with the same 644 permissions, potentially exposing camera-specific credentials and settings.
The exposed admin password hash enables several attack paths:
The following demonstrates that an unprivileged user can read the admin password hash from the config file and verify it matches the admin's password:
# Verify the file permissions
$ ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 Mar 11 15:42 /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# Read the hash as an unprivileged user
$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf | grep admin_password
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
# Verify the hash matches the admin password (SHA1)
$ sudo -u testuser python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha1(b'testpassword123').hexdigest())"
c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
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Scan my site freeThe following output was captured on a fresh motionEye v0.43.1b4 installation (official motioneye_init method, admin password set to testpassword123):
$ ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 Mar 11 15:42 /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf | grep admin_password
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
$ sudo -u testuser python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha1(b'testpassword123').hexdigest())"
c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
The hash extracted by the unprivileged testuser matches the SHA1 of the admin password, confirming full credential exposure.
This vulnerability has been tested and confirmed with both installation methods described in the official motionEye documentation.
Install motionEye on a Linux system:
sudo pip install motioneye
mkdir -p /etc/motioneye /var/log/motioneye /var/lib/motioneye /run/motioneye
cp /usr/local/lib/python3.12/dist-packages/motioneye/extra/motioneye.conf.sample /etc/motioneye/motioneye.conf
sudo meyectl startserver -c /etc/motioneye/motioneye.conf
Set an admin password via the web UI at http://localhost:8765
Verify the config file is world-readable:
ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 255 ... /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
As an unprivileged user, read the hash:
sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
motioneye_init InstallationInstall motionEye using the official init script:
sudo pip install motioneye
sudo motioneye_init
The motioneye_init script automatically creates the required directories, installs the systemd service, and starts motionEye. Set an admin password via the web UI at http://localhost:8765
Verify the config file is still world-readable:
ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# -rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 ... /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
Note that while the ownership changes to motion:motion (instead of root:root in the manual method), the permissions remain 644, meaning any local user can still read the file.
Confirm as an unprivileged user:
sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
Both installation methods produce the same vulnerable state, confirming this is the default behavior of the software and not a user misconfiguration.
image_file_name, which requires admin authentication. When chained with both this vulnerability and GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3, enables local privilege escalation to rootmotion.conf and camera-*.conf with 600 permissions (-rw-------), readable only by the motionEye service user (addressed in motionEye 0.44.0b1)