| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| praisonai | < 4.6.59 | 4.6.59 |
PraisonAI Code's agent-compatible CODE_TOOLS wrappers keep a global workspace root initialized to None. If an application uses CODE_TOOLS, code_read_file, code_search_replace, or code_apply_diff before calling set_workspace(), the wrappers pass workspace=None into lower-level helpers that only enforce path containment when a workspace is truthy. Absolute paths outside the intended project workspace are then read and modified.
The official examples correctly call set_workspace() before CODE_TOOLS, and this report does not claim configured workspaces are ineffective. The issue is the fail-open default. PraisonAI's security documentation describes workspace boundaries as the path-traversal protection mechanism, and the already-published Python API arbitrary file write advisory (GHSA-hvhp-v2gc-268q) was fixed by defaulting an unset workspace to os.getcwd(). The adjacent read and edit paths reached through CODE_TOOLS still fail open.
praisonai2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1v4.6.57src/praisonai/praisonai/code/agent_tools.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/code/tools/read_file.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/code/tools/search_replace.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/code/tools/apply_diff.pyagent_tools.py initializes _workspace_root to None and passes it directly to lower-level helpers:
_workspace_root: Optional[str] = None
...
result = _read_file(..., workspace=_workspace_root)
...
result = _search_replace(..., workspace=_workspace_root)
The lower-level helpers only enforce containment if workspace is set:
if workspace:
if not is_path_within_directory(abs_path, workspace):
return {"success": False, ...}
The already-hardened write_file() path uses effective_workspace = workspace or os.getcwd(). Current tests assert that must stay inside the current working directory. The same fail-closed default is missing from , , , and the agent wrappers that call them.
Running one of these products? Scan your site to see whether it exposes a vulnerable version.
Scan my site freewrite_file(workspace=None)read_filesearch_replaceapply_diffRun:
PYTHONPATH=/path/to/PraisonAI/src/praisonai:/path/to/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents \
python poc_code_tools_workspace_bypass.py
Expected vulnerable result:
[poc] HIT: CODE_TOOLS wrappers read and edit outside workspace when workspace is unset
The PoV creates a temporary workspace and a temporary file outside that workspace. With get_workspace() == None, code_read_file() reads the outside file, code_search_replace() modifies it, and code_apply_diff() modifies it again. After set_workspace(workspace), the same outside path is rejected by all three wrappers.
No external services, model providers, or network access are used.
If an application exposes PraisonAI Code's agent-compatible CODE_TOOLS to an LLM before setting a workspace boundary, prompt-influenced tool calls can read and modify files outside the intended project workspace. The practical attack shape matches the existing PraisonAI prompt-content advisory pattern: untrusted content influences an agent that has been given file-editing tools.
Practical impacts include:
code_search_replace or code_apply_diff;code_read_file to first learn file content and then code_apply_diff to produce an exact modification;set_workspace() first.This issue does not claim set_workspace() is ineffective. The control works when configured. The vulnerability is the fail-open default for the advertised agent-tool bundle and adjacent read/edit helpers.
The same behavior was reproduced on:
2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1v4.6.57v4.6.56v4.6.10v4.6.9v4.5.128v4.5.126v3.9.26v3.9.24Recommended fix:
effective_workspace = workspace or os.getcwd() before resolving paths.code_read_file, code_list_files, code_apply_diff, code_search_replace, and code_execute_command use os.getcwd() as the default workspace when _workspace_root is None.set_workspace().CODE_TOOLS is used before a workspace is configured, or log a warning when the default current working directory is used.PraisonAI's official security documentation lists GitHub Security Advisories as the preferred reporting method and asks reports to include reproduction steps, affected versions, impact, and suggested fixes. The repository security policy page currently shows no configured SECURITY.md, but private vulnerability reporting is available.