| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| code.vikunja.io/api | < 2.6.0all versions | 2.6.0 |
The 50-megapixel decode guard exists only on the task-attachment preview path. Avatar and project-background uploads decode uploaded images with no pixel cap. Worse, the avatar resize fixes the output height at 1024 and derives the width from the aspect ratio, so a tiny extreme-aspect-ratio PNG expands to an enormous output image — an input-side pixel cap would not catch it.
The only maxPixels check (50MP) is in TaskAttachment.GetPreview (pkg/models/task_attachment.go ~lines 332-338). No such check guards:
pkg/modules/avatar/upload/upload.go (~lines 82, 137, 141)pkg/modules/background/handler/background.go (~lines 174, 269, 289)imaging.Resize(img, 0, 1024, imaging.Lanczos) (upload.go ~line 141) fixes height=1024 and derives width from the aspect ratio: a 20000x10 input yields a ~2,048,000 x 1024 output (~2.1 billion pixels), so a few-hundred-byte file drives huge CPU and memory.
PUT /api/v1/user/settings/avatar/upload avatar=8000x8000 PNG (64MP, 192KB) -> 200 (accepted; exceeds the 50MP attachment cap)
PUT /api/v1/user/settings/avatar/upload avatar=20000x10 PNG (681 bytes) -> 200 after ~19.6s of server processing
Contrast (guard present): uploading the 64MP PNG as a task attachment and requesting its preview returns in ~1ms without decoding — GetPreview rejects it via maxPixels and falls back to the raw file.
A small crafted upload drives disproportionate CPU and memory on the avatar and background paths. Repeated or concurrent requests can exhaust server resources. Amplification comes from both the missing input pixel cap and the height-fixed resize, so an input-side cap alone is insufficient.
Apply a pixel-dimension cap (as on the attachment path) to the avatar and background decode paths, and bound the resize output dimensions (cap width as well as height).
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