| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| openclaw | < 2026.3.24 | 2026.3.24 |
| openclaw | < 2026.3.24 | 2026.3.24 |
Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.
Title: Sandbox Media Root Bypass via Unnormalized mediaUrl / fileUrl Parameter Keys (CWE-22)
Description:
A path traversal vulnerability in the agent sandbox enforcement allows a sandboxed agent to read arbitrary files from other agents' workspaces by using the mediaUrl or fileUrl parameter key in message tool calls. The normalizeSandboxMediaParams function only checks ["media", "path", "filePath"] keys, while mediaUrl and fileUrl escape normalization entirely. Combined with handlePluginAction dropping mediaLocalRoots from the dispatch context, this enables a full sandbox escape where any agent can read files outside its designated sandbox root.
The vulnerability exists in two files within the messaging pipeline:
1. Incomplete parameter key coverage in normalizeSandboxMediaParams:
In src/infra/outbound/message-action-params.ts, the function iterates over a hardcoded allowlist of parameter keys to validate:
// Line 212
const mediaKeys: Array<"media" | "path" | "filePath"> = ["media", "path", "filePath"];
The mediaUrl and fileUrl parameter keys are not included in this array. These keys are actively used by multiple channel extensions (Discord, Telegram, Slack, Matrix, Twitch) for media attachment handling, but they completely bypass the sandbox path validation performed by resolveSandboxedMediaSource.
2. Dropped mediaLocalRoots in handlePluginAction:
In src/infra/outbound/message-action-runner.ts, the handlePluginAction function dispatches actions to channel plugins but omits mediaLocalRoots from the context:
// Lines 684-697
const handled = await dispatchChannelMessageAction({
channel,
action,
cfg,
params,
accountId: accountId ?? undefined,
requesterSenderId: input.requesterSenderId ?? undefined,
sessionKey: input.sessionKey,
sessionId: input.sessionId,
agentId,
gateway,
toolContext: input.toolContext,
dryRun,
// mediaLocalRoots is MISSING here
});
Despite defining (in line 478), plugins receive and fall back to , which permits reads of the entire directory tree — including all agents' workspaces.
Running one of these products? Scan your site to see whether it exposes a vulnerable version.
Scan my site freeChannelMessageActionContextmediaLocalRoots?: readonly string[]src/channels/plugins/types.core.tsundefinedgetDefaultMediaLocalRoots()~/.openclaw/Attack chain:
~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-a/) calls the message tool with { mediaUrl: "~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret.txt" }normalizeSandboxMediaParams skips the mediaUrl key (not in allowlist)handlePluginAction dispatches without mediaLocalRootsloadWebMedia with default roots, which allows ~/.openclaw/workspace/**Prerequisites:
openclaw-gateway:latest)Steps:
cd llm-enhance/cve-finding/Path_Traversal/CVE-2026-27522-Media_Root_Bypass-variant-exp/
docker compose up -d
sleep 5
python3 poc_exploit.py
The exploit writes a secret file to ~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret_key.txt inside the container, then invokes normalizeSandboxMediaParams with Agent-A's sandbox policy and { mediaUrl: <agent-b-secret-path> }. The mediaUrl key bypasses normalization, and loadWebMedia reads the file successfully.
Run the control experiment to confirm sandbox works for checked keys:
python3 control-sandbox_enforced.py
Exploit output:
=== CVE-2026-27522 Variant: Sandbox Media Root Bypass ===
[*] Container 'openclaw-media-bypass-test' is running
[*] Running exploit script with Bun...
[VULNERABLE] mediaUrl bypassed normalizeSandboxMediaParams!
Agent-A sandboxRoot: /root/.openclaw/workspace/agent-a
mediaUrl targets Agent-B: /root/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret_key.txt
args after normalization: {"mediaUrl":"/root/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret_key.txt"}
[EXPLOITED] Agent-B secret file content: AGENT-B-SECRET-API-KEY-sk-12345abcdef
=== EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL ===
Agent-A read Agent-B's secret file via mediaUrl, bypassing sandbox.
[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE — mediaUrl bypasses sandbox enforcement
Control experiment output:
=== Control Experiment: Sandbox Enforcement for 'media' Key ===
[*] Container 'openclaw-media-bypass-test' is running
[*] Running control script with Bun...
[SAFE] normalizeSandboxMediaParams blocked 'media' key as expected!
Error: Path escapes sandbox root (/tmp/sandbox-ZKvGQX): /tmp/victim-2cuAOO/secret.txt
=== CONTROL EXPERIMENT PASSED ===
The 'media' parameter IS correctly checked by sandbox enforcement.
Only unchecked keys (mediaUrl, fileUrl) bypass the sandbox.
[+] CONTROL PASSED: 'media' key is correctly enforced by sandbox
This is a sandbox escape vulnerability. An attacker who can influence an agent's tool calls (via prompt injection, multi-agent interaction, or malicious plugin instruction) can read arbitrary files from other agents' workspaces. This includes:
~/.openclaw/ directory treeThis completely defeats the purpose of the multi-agent sandbox isolation feature, which is documented as a security boundary in the project's Docker and sandboxing documentation.
| Permalink | Description |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-params.ts#L206-L227 | The normalizeSandboxMediaParams function with incomplete mediaKeys allowlist — mediaUrl and fileUrl are not checked. |
| https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-runner.ts#L684-L697 | The handlePluginAction dispatch call that omits mediaLocalRoots from the context passed to dispatchChannelMessageAction. |
| https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/channels/plugins/types.core.ts#L478 | The ChannelMessageActionContext type that defines mediaLocalRoots but never receives it from handlePluginAction. |