| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| pydantic-ai | ≥ 1.56.0, < 1.99.0 | 1.99.0 |
| pydantic-ai-slim | ≥ 1.56.0, < 1.99.0 | 1.99.0 |
| pydantic ai | ≥ 1.56.0, < 1.99.0 | 1.99.0 |
When an application using Pydantic AI opts a URL into force_download='allow-local' (which disables the default block on private/internal IPs), the cloud-metadata blocklist could be bypassed by encoding the metadata IP in an IPv6 transition form (IPv4-mapped IPv6, 6to4, or NAT64). Dual-stack and translated networks route the IPv6 wrapper to the underlying IPv4 endpoint, exposing cloud IAM short-term credentials.
This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-2jrp-274c-jhv3 / CVE-2026-25580. The parent advisory's remediation guaranteed that "cloud metadata endpoints are always blocked, even with allow-local." That guarantee did not hold for IPv6-encoded forms of the metadata IPs.
Same impact metrics as the parent CVE, but materially narrower attack surface (AC:H instead of AC:L), because exploitation requires the application to have opted into allow-local on a URL influenced by untrusted input.
Applications are affected only if they explicitly opt for FileUrl (ImageUrl, AudioUrl, VideoUrl, DocumentUrl) into force_download='allow-local' on a URL that is, or could be, influenced by untrusted input.
Applications are not affected if they use any of the bundled integrations to ingest user input, because they do not propagate force_download from external data:
Agent.to_web / clai webVercelAIAdapterAGUIAdapter / Agent.to_ag_uiApplications that only download from developer-controlled URLs are not affected.
Upgrade to 1.99.0 or later. The cloud-metadata and private-IP blocklists now apply to IPv6 transition forms that route to a blocked IPv4 endpoint (IPv4-mapped IPv6, 6to4, and NAT64 well-known prefix). The blocklists have also been extended to cover additional IANA-reserved IPv4 and IPv6 special-purpose ranges.
Avoid passing force_download='allow-local' on any URL that could be influenced by untrusted input. If developers must, resolve the hostname themselves and validate the result against their own metadata blocklist — including IPv6-encoded forms — before constructing the .
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Scan my site freeFileUrlReported by j0hndo.