| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel | < 0.0.0-20260628153353-2d5d72223df4 | 0.0.0-20260628153353-2d5d72223df4 |
The patch for CVE-2026-41894 ("Path Traversal via Double URL Encoding") sanitized the /export/ route but the
identical root cause remains in the /assets/*path route. In publish mode (anonymous read-only HTTP endpoint,
default port 6808), an unauthenticated remote attacker can read arbitrary files inside WorkspaceDir — including
conf/conf.json (which contains the AccessAuthCode SHA256 hash, API token, and sync keys), temp/siyuan.db,
temp/blocktree.db, and siyuan.log — by double-URL-encoding .. segments.
Verified against siyuan v3.6.5:
GET /assets/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/conf/conf.json → HTTP 200, 10349 bytes (conf.json served)GET /export/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/conf/conf.json → HTTP 401 (patched)GET /assets/%2e%2e/conf/conf.json → HTTP 404 (single-decode handled correctly)Step 1 — route & first decode (kernel/server/serve.go:587-626):
The router registers GET /assets/*path for the publish listener. Gin performs one URL decoding pass on URL.Path,
so a request for /assets/%252e%252e/... yields context.Param("path") == "/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/conf/conf.json" — literal
%2e%2e strings, which path.Clean cannot collapse.
Step 2 — second decode via fallback (kernel/model/assets.go:536-563, GetAssetAbsPath):
p, err := getAssetAbsPath(relativePath)
if nil != err {
// fallback
decoded, e := url.PathUnescape(relativePath) // ← line 548, second decode
if nil == e {
p, err = getAssetAbsPath(decoded)
}
}
After the fallback decodes %2e%2e to .., filepath.Join(DataDir, "../../conf/conf.json") is Clean-ed to
WorkspaceDir/conf/conf.json, an existing file.
Step 3 — publish-mode access gate fall-through (kernel/model/publish_access.go:288,
CheckAbsPathAccessableByPublishAccess):
if !filelock.IsSubPath(util.DataDir, absPath) {
return true // ← fall-through allows anything outside DataDir but inside WorkspaceDir
}
Because the resolved file is (it's in ), the gate returns and is never invoked — / / denylists do not apply to the route at all (unlike the patched route, which additionally checks ).
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Scan my site freeDataDirWorkspaceDirtrueIsSensitivePath().db.logconf//assets//export/IsSubPath(exportBaseDir, ...)Step 4 — file served (http.ServeFile): the request URL.Path contains literal %2e%2e, not .., so Go's
containsDotDot guard passes and the file is sent.
Preconditions: siyuan kernel running with publish mode enabled (conf.publish.enable = true). Publish mode is the
documented anonymous read-only endpoint for sharing notebooks.
$ curl -i "http://victim:6808/assets/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/conf/conf.json"
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 10349
Content-Type: application/json
...
{"appearance":{...},"editor":{...},"system":{...},"accessAuthCode":"<sha256>","api":{"token":"<api token>"}, ...}
Compared with the patched route:
$ curl -i "http://victim:6808/export/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/conf/conf.json"
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
Three independent flaws combine:
GetAssetAbsPath performs a second url.PathUnescape as a "compatibility" fallback, re-introducing the
double-decode primitive that the CVE-2026-41894 patch eliminated on /export/.CheckAbsPathAccessableByPublishAccess returns true for any path outside DataDir, even when that path is still
inside WorkspaceDir (which contains conf/conf.json, temp/*.db, siyuan.log).IsSensitivePath() denylist applied to /export/ is not called from the /assets/ handler.Unauthenticated remote arbitrary file read inside WorkspaceDir. Confirmed-readable files include:
conf/conf.json — accessAuthCode SHA256 (offline crackable), API token, S3/WebDAV sync credentials.temp/siyuan.db, temp/blocktree.db, temp/asset_content.db — full notebook content (SQLite).siyuan.log — internal paths, OS username, plugin info.Compromise of accessAuthCode / API token escalates to authenticated kernel API access (full read/write of all
notebooks). Compromise of sync credentials escalates beyond the host.
url.PathUnescape fallback in GetAssetAbsPath (assets.go:548), matching the /export/ patch.CheckAbsPathAccessableByPublishAccess, replace the IsSubPath(DataDir, ...) fall-through with an explicit
allowlist (only DataDir and its publishable subtree) and always call IsSensitivePath().IsSensitivePath() inside the /assets/*path handler in serve.go as defense-in-depth.Privately reported via GitHub Security Advisory. PoC reproduced locally against v3.6.5 (publish port 6808): GET /assets/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/conf/conf.json returned HTTP 200 / 10349 bytes.