| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| langflow | < 1.9.0 | 1.9.0 |
| langflow | < 1.9.0 | 1.9.0 |
The Agentic Assistant feature in Langflow executes LLM-generated Python code during its validation phase. Although this phase appears intended to validate generated component code, the implementation reaches dynamic execution sinks and instantiates the generated class server-side.
In deployments where an attacker can access the Agentic Assistant feature and influence the model output, this can result in arbitrary server-side Python execution.
The Agentic Assistant endpoints are designed to help users generate and validate components for a flow. Users can submit requests to the assistant, which returns candidate component code for further processing.
A reasonable security expectation is that validation should treat model output as untrusted text and perform only static or side-effect-free checks.
The externally reachable endpoints are:
The request model accepts attacker-influenceable fields such as input_value, flow_id, provider, model_name, session_id, and max_retries:
In the affected code path, Langflow processes model output through the following chain:
/assist
→ execute_flow_with_validation()
→ execute_flow_file()
→ LLM returns component code
→ extract_component_code()
→ validate_component_code()
→ create_class()
→ generated class is instantiated
The assistant service reaches the validation path here:
Running one of these products? Scan your site to see whether it exposes a vulnerable version.
Scan my site freeThe code extraction step occurs here:
The validation entry point is here:
The issue is that this validation path is not purely static. It ultimately invokes create_class() in lfx.custom.validate, where Python code is dynamically executed via exec(...), including both global-scope preparation and class construction.
As a result, LLM-generated code is treated as executable Python rather than inert data. This means the “validation” step crosses a trust boundary and becomes an execution sink.
The streaming path can also reach this sink when the request is classified into the component-generation branch:
Attackers who can access the Agentic Assistant feature and influence model output may execute arbitrary Python code on the server.
This can lead to:
This issue is most accurately described as an authenticated or feature-reachable code execution vulnerability, rather than an unconditional unauthenticated remote attack.
Severity depends on deployment model:
The assistant feature depends on an active user context:
Authentication sources include bearer token, cookie, or API key:
Default deployment settings may widen exposure, including AUTO_LOGIN=true and the /api/v1/auto_login endpoint:
Discovered by: @kexinoh (https://github.com/kexinoh, works at Tencent Zhuque Lab)