| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| @xmldom/xmldom | ≥ 0.9.0, < 0.9.10< 0.8.13 | 0.9.100.8.13 |
| xmldom | ≤ 0.6.0 |
Seven recursive traversals in lib/dom.js operate without a depth limit. A sufficiently deeply
nested DOM tree causes a RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded, crashing the application.
Reported operations:
Node.prototype.normalize() — reported by @praveen-kv (email 2026-04-05) and @KarimTantawey (GHSA-fwmp-8wwc-qhv6, via DOMParser.parseFromString())XMLSerializer.serializeToString() — reported by @Jvr2022 (GHSA-2v35-w6hq-6mfw) and @KarimTantawey (GHSA-j2hf-fqwf-rrjf)Additionally, discovered in research:
Element.getElementsByTagName() / getElementsByTagNameNS() / getElementsByClassName() / getElementById()Node.cloneNode(true)Document.importNode(node, true)node.textContent (getter)Node.isEqualNode(other)All seven share the same root cause: pure-JavaScript recursive tree traversal with no depth guard. A single deeply nested document (parsed successfully) triggers any or all of these operations.
lib/dom.js implements DOM tree traversals as depth-first recursive functions. Each level of
element nesting adds one JavaScript call frame. The JS engine's call stack is finite; once
exhausted, a RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded is thrown. This error may not be
caught reliably at stack-exhaustion depths because the catch handler itself requires stack
frames to execute — especially in async scenarios, where an uncaught RangeError inside a
callback or promise chain can crash the entire Node.js process.
Parsing a deeply nested document succeeds — the SAX parser in lib/sax.js is iterative.
The crash occurs during subsequent operations on the parsed DOM.
Node.prototype.normalize() — reported by @praveen-kvlib/dom.js:1296–1308 (main):
normalize: function () {
var child = this.firstChild;
while (child) {
var next = child.nextSibling;
if (next && next.nodeType == TEXT_NODE && child.nodeType == TEXT_NODE) {
this.removeChild(next);
child.appendData(next.data);
} else {
child.normalize(); // recursive call — no depth guard
child = next;
}
}
},
Running one of these products? Scan your site to see whether it exposes a vulnerable version.
Scan my site freeCrash threshold (Node.js 18, default stack): ~10,000 levels.
XMLSerializer.serializeToString() — reported by @Jvr2022lib/dom.js:2790–2974 (main):
The internal serializeToString worker recurses into child nodes at four call sites, each
passing a visibleNamespaces.slice() copy. The per-frame allocation causes earlier stack
exhaustion than normalize().
Crash threshold (Node.js 18, default stack): ~5,000 levels.
All five crash at ~10,000 levels on Node.js 18.
| Function | Definition | Public API entry point(s) | Crash depth (Node.js 18) |
|---|---|---|---|
_visitNode | lib/dom.js:1529 | getElementsByTagName(), getElementsByTagNameNS(), getElementsByClassName(), getElementById() | ~10,000 levels |
cloneNode (module fn) | lib/dom.js:3037 | Node.prototype.cloneNode(true) | ~10,000 levels |
importNode (module fn) | lib/dom.js:2975 | Document.prototype.importNode(node, true) | ~10,000 levels |
getTextContent (inner fn) | lib/dom.js:3130 | node.textContent (getter) | ~10,000 levels |
isEqualNode | lib/dom.js:1120 | Node.prototype.isEqualNode(other) | ~10,000 levels |
Both active branches (main and release-0.8.x) are identically affected. The unscoped xmldom
package (≤ 0.6.0) carries the same recursive patterns from its initial commit.
Tested with Chromium 147 (Playwright headless). Chromium's native C++ implementations of all seven DOM methods are iterative — they traverse the DOM without consuming JS call stack frames. All seven succeed at depths up to 20,000 without any crash.
When @xmldom/xmldom is bundled and run in a browser context the same recursive JS code executes
under the browser's V8 stack limit (~12,000–13,000 frames). The crash thresholds are similar to
those observed on Node.js 18 (~5,000 for serializeToString, ~10,000 for the remaining six).
The vulnerability is specific to xmldom's pure-JavaScript recursive implementation, not an inherent property of the DOM operations.
normalize() (from @praveen-kv report, 2026-04-05)const { DOMParser } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');
function generateNestedXML(depth) {
return '<root>' + '<a>'.repeat(depth) + 'text' + '</a>'.repeat(depth) + '</root>';
}
const doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(generateNestedXML(10000), 'text/xml');
doc.documentElement.normalize();
// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded
XMLSerializer.serializeToString() (from GHSA-2v35-w6hq-6mfw)const { DOMParser, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');
const depth = 5000;
const xml = '<a>'.repeat(depth) + '</a>'.repeat(depth);
const doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(xml, 'text/xml');
new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc);
// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded
The other methods have been verified using similar pocs.
Any service that accepts attacker-controlled XML and subsequently calls any of the seven affected DOM operations can be forced into a reliable denial of service with a single crafted payload.
The immediate result is an uncaught RangeError and failed request processing. In deployments
where uncaught exceptions terminate the worker or process, the impact can extend beyond a single
request and disrupt service availability more broadly.
No authentication, special options, or invalid XML is required. A valid, deeply nested XML document is enough.
The normalize() vector was publicly disclosed at 2026-04-06T11:25:07Z via
xmldom/xmldom#987 (closed without merge).
serializeToString() and the five additional recursive entry points were not mentioned in that PR.
All seven affected traversals have been converted from recursive to iterative implementations, eliminating call-stack consumption on deep trees.
walkDOM utilityA new walkDOM(node, context, callbacks) utility is introduced. It traverses the subtree rooted at node in depth-first order using an explicit JavaScript array as a stack, consuming heap memory instead of call-stack frames. context is an arbitrary value threaded through the walk — each callbacks.enter(node, context) call returns the context to pass to that node's children, enabling per-branch state (e.g. namespace snapshots in the serializer). callbacks.exit(node, context) (optional) is called in post-order after all children have been visited.
The following six operations are re-implemented on top of walkDOM:
| Operation | Public entry point(s) |
|---|---|
_visitNode helper | getElementsByTagName(), getElementsByTagNameNS(), getElementsByClassName(), getElementById() |
getTextContent inner function | node.textContent getter |
cloneNode module function | Node.prototype.cloneNode(true) |
importNode module function | Document.prototype.importNode(node, true) |
serializeToString worker | XMLSerializer.prototype.serializeToString(), Node.prototype.toString(), NodeList.prototype.toString() |
normalize | Node.prototype.normalize() |
normalize uses walkDOM with a null context and an enter callback that merges adjacent Text children of the current node before walkDOM reads and queues those children — so the surviving post-merge children are what the walker descends into.
isEqualNodeOne function cannot use walkDOM:
Node.prototype.isEqualNode(other) (0.9.x only; absent from 0.8.x) compares two trees in parallel. It maintains an explicit stack of {node, other} node pairs — one node from each tree — which cannot be expressed with walkDOM's single-tree visitor.
All seven entry points succeed on trees of arbitrary depth without throwing RangeError. The original PoCs still demonstrate the vulnerability on unpatched versions and confirm the fix on patched versions.