| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
| open-webui | ≥ 0.6.27, < 0.11.1 | 0.11.1 |
| open webui | ≥ 0.6.27, < 0.11.1 | 0.11.1 |
When more than one external tool server is reachable in the same request, a tool call to a server configured for bearer authentication can arrive carrying the calling user's Open WebUI session cookies alongside that server's own key. The cookie jar is built per connection, but the callable that performs the request reads it late instead of per connection, so every tool callable built in the same pass sends the cookies belonging to whichever connection was processed last. An administrator who configures a server with its own API key has not chosen to send that server anything else, and the operator of that server receives a live session credential for the user who triggered the call.
At least two external tool servers must be attached to the same request, and at least one of them must be set to session or system OAuth authentication, since no cookie jar is assembled otherwise. The connection using that authentication mode must be the one processed last, which follows the order of the tool servers attached to the request rather than anything the receiving party controls.
A deployment with no tool servers, with only one tool server, or where no attached server uses session or system OAuth authentication, is not affected. Tool servers are not configured by default.
The operator of a tool server that was configured with only its own API key receives the session token of every user whose tool call reaches it. That token authenticates as the user against the whole application, so the receiving party can act as that user for the lifetime of the token, which is a full account takeover of anyone whose request lands on that server. Where the affected user is an administrator, the receiving party gains administrative access.
The receiving party is the operator of a server the administrator deliberately registered, so this is a disclosure of user credentials to a partially trusted third party rather than to an arbitrary attacker. It nonetheless crosses a boundary the administrator set, because selecting bearer authentication for a connection states that the connection is authenticated by its own key alone. The leak does not depend on the tool server behaving maliciously to obtain the token, only on it receiving and retaining ordinary request data.
Fixed in 0.11.1 by https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/28630. The tool callable now takes its own connection's cookie jar as a parameter, in the same way it already took that connection's headers, so each request carries only what its own connection was configured to send. Upgrading resolves the issue with no configuration change.
Affected component: the tool loading routine in backend/open_webui/utils/tools.py, which builds one callable per tool across all attached connections; the header and cookie builder in the same module, which populates a cookie jar only for session and system OAuth connections; and the tool server request function, which places the supplied jar on the outgoing request.
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Scan my site freeHeaders were passed into the callable factory as an argument and were therefore fixed per connection, while the cookie jar was left as a variable in the enclosing scope and was read only when the tool was finally invoked. By then both loops had completed and the variable held the last value assigned to it. The two values are produced together by the same builder and were plainly intended to travel together, so this is an oversight in how one of them was captured rather than a forwarding decision. The equivalent code path for terminal tool servers in the same module binds both values per connection and does not carry the defect.
Two tool servers were registered: one using bearer authentication with its own key, and one using session authentication, with the session connection processed last. A tool call was driven to an operation belonging to the bearer server, and that server recorded the incoming request.
The bearer server received its own key in the authorization header, together with the calling user's token and oauth_session_id cookies. The received token matched the calling user's session token.
Control: with the session connection removed and only the bearer server registered, the same tool call arrived with no cookies at all, confirming that the leak depends on a session connection being present and processed last.
Reproduced against a running instance built from the affected snapshot, with the receiving tool servers replaced by recording servers.
Classic298, who reported the issue and demonstrated the cross-connection cookie leak against a running instance.