| パッケージ | 影響を受けるバージョン | 修正済みバージョン |
|---|---|---|
| jupyterlab-git | < 0.51.1 | 0.51.1 |
On many platforms, a third party can create a Git repository under a name that includes a shell command substitution 1 string in the syntax $(<command>). These directory names are allowed in macOS and a majority of Linux distributions 2. If a user starts jupyter-lab in a parent directory of this inappropriately-named Git repository, opens it, and clicks "Git > Open Git Repository in Terminal" from the menu bar, then the injected command <command> is run in the user's shell without the user's permission.
This issue is occurring because when that menu entry is clicked, jupyterlab-git opens the terminal and runs cd <git-repo-path> through the shell to set the current directory 3. Doing so runs any command substitution strings present in the directory name, which leads to the command injection issue described here. A previous patch provided an incomplete fix 4.
This issue allows for arbitrary code execution via command injection. A wide range of actions are permitted by this issue, including but not limited to: modifying files, exfiltrating data, halting services, or compromising the server's security rules.
We have scanned the source code of jupyterlab-git for other command injection risks, and have not found any at the time of writing.
This issue was reproduced on the latest release of jupyterlab-git, v0.51.0. The steps taken to reproduce this issue are described in the "Proof-of-concept" section below.
Create a new directory via mkdir test/ && cd test/.
Create a new Git repository under test/ with a command substitution string in the directory name by running these commands:
mkdir '$(touch pwned.txt)'
cd '$(touch pwned.txt)/'
git init
cd ..
test/ by running jupyter lab.$(touch pwned.txt) in the file browser.pwned.txt is created under . This demonstrates the command injection issue described here.これらの製品をお使いですか？サイトをスキャンして、脆弱なバージョンが公開されていないか確認しましょう。
無料でサイトをスキャンtest/The issue can be mitigated by the patch shown below.
diff --git a/src/commandsAndMenu.tsx b/src/commandsAndMenu.tsx
index 3779a6c..71ddcea 100644
--- a/src/commandsAndMenu.tsx
+++ b/src/commandsAndMenu.tsx
@@ -164,31 +164,13 @@ export function addCommands(
label: trans.__('Open Git Repository in Terminal'),
caption: trans.__('Open a New Terminal to the Git Repository'),
execute: async args => {
- const main = (await commands.execute(
- 'terminal:create-new',
- args
- )) as MainAreaWidget<ITerminal.ITerminal>;
+ const cwd = gitModel.pathRepository;
+ const main = (await commands.execute('terminal:create-new', {
+ ...args,
+ cwd
+ })) as MainAreaWidget<ITerminal.ITerminal>;
- try {
- if (gitModel.pathRepository !== null) {
- const terminal = main.content;
- terminal.session.send({
- type: 'stdin',
- content: [
- `cd "${gitModel.pathRepository
- .split('"')
- .join('\\"')
- .split('`')
- .join('\\`')}"\n`
- ]
- });
- }
-
- return main;
- } catch (e) {
- console.error(e);
- main.dispose();
- }
+ return main;
This patch removes the cd <git-repo-path> shell command that causes the issue. To preserve the existing behavior, the cwd argument is set to <git-repo-path> when a terminal session is created via the terminal:create-new JupyterLab command. This preserves the existing application behavior while mitigating the command injection issue.
We have verified that this patch works when applied to a local installation of jupyterlab-git. We have also verified that the cwd argument is available in all versions of JupyterLab 4, so this patch should be fully backwards-compatible.
We recommend that users upgrade to the patched versions listed on this GHSA. However, if a user is unable to upgrade, there are 3 different ways to mitigate this vulnerability without upgrading to a patch.
Disable terminals on jupyter-server level:
c.ServerApp.terminals_enabled = False
Disable the terminals server extension:
jupyter server extension disable jupyter_server_terminals
Disable the lab extension:
jupyter labextension disable @jupyterlab/terminal-extension