| パッケージ | 影響を受けるバージョン | 修正済みバージョン |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/traefik/traefik | ≤ 1.7.34全バージョン | |
| github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 | < 2.11.32 | 2.11.32 |
| github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 | < 3.6.3 | 3.6.3 |
| traefik | ≥ 3.0.0, < 3.6.3< 2.11.32 | 3.6.32.11.32 |
There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik managing the requests using a PathPrefix, Path or PathRegex matcher.
When Traefik is configured to route the requests to a backend using a matcher based on the path; if the request path contains an encoded restricted character from the following set ('/', '', 'Null', ';', '?', '#'), it’s possible to target a backend, exposed using another router, by-passing the middlewares chain.
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: IngressRoute
metadata:
name: my-service
spec:
routes:
- match: PathPrefix(‘/admin/’)
kind: Rule
services:
- name: service-a
port: 8080
middlewares:
- name: my-security-middleware
- match: PathPrefix(‘/’)
kind: Rule
services:
- name: service-a
port: 8080
In such a case, the request http://mydomain.example.com/admin%2F will reach the backend service-a without operating the middleware my-security-middleware and passing the security put in place for the /admin/ path.
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
<details> <summary>Original Description</summary>### Summary A vulnerability exists in Traefik’s path matching logic that allows attackers to bypass access-control middleware (e.g., blocking rules) by using URL-encoded paths. I found this vulnerability while playing PwnSec CTF 2025 with my team @0xL4ughTraefik evaluates router rules before decoding or normalizing the request path, but forwards the request after decoding to the backend service. As a result, routes meant to block access to sensitive endpoints (such as internal, beta, or admin endpoints) can be trivially bypassed.
Traefik configuration used in this issue :
entryPoints = ["web"]
rule = "PathPrefix(`/report_note`)"
priority = 10
middlewares = ["block-access"]
service = "flask-service"
[http.middlewares.block-access.replacePathRegex]
regex = ".*"
replacement = "/blocked"
</details>これらの製品をお使いですか?サイトをスキャンして、脆弱なバージョンが公開されていないか確認しましょう。
無料でサイトをスキャンThe intention is to block all access to /report_note.
However, the following request bypasses the block:
POST /%2freport_note HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:62814
Access Control Bypass: Any endpoint intended to be blocked (e.g., admin/debug/beta APIs) can be accessed by URL-encoding slashes or other characters.
This could lead to: