| パッケージ | 影響を受けるバージョン | 修正済みバージョン |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/360EntSecGroup-Skylar/excelize/v2 | ≥ 2.3.1 | |
| github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 | ≥ 2.3.1, < 2.11.1-0.20260915055537-22f76f9acb94< 2.11.1-0.20260915055537-22f76f9acb94 | 2.11.1-0.20260915055537-22f76f9acb94 |
| excelize | ≥ 2.3.1, ≤ 2.11.0 |
Any file whose first 8 bytes are the OLE compound-file signature (D0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1) is routed by OpenFile/OpenReader/OpenBytes → openReaderAt → Decrypt. The version dispatch only guarantees len(EncryptionInfo) >= 4 before handing attacker-controlled EncryptionInfo/EncryptedPackage buffers to standardDecrypt/agileDecrypt, and no callee validates structure. Malformed but version-valid content therefore fails as an unrecovered runtime panic instead of an error, terminating the calling process.
All panic classes below were execution-confirmed against pristine master (ecd99d761fe0, 2026-09-08). excelize.go:211-213 maps Decrypt errors to ErrWorkbookFileFormat, but panics bypass that path and kill the process.
| # | Malformed input | Panic | Site |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | standard, len(EncryptionInfo) 4–11 | slice bounds [:12] | crypt.go:238 |
| 2 | standard, attacker-controlled headerSize uint32 | slice bounds [12:12+headerSize] / fixed-offset header reads | crypt.go:238-249 |
| 3 | standard, verifier remainder < 72 (AES) / 60 (RC4) bytes | slice bounds in standardEncryptionVerifier | crypt.go:282-295 |
| 4 | standard, header.KeySize = 0xFFFFFFFF | slice bounds [:536870911] with capacity 48 | crypt.go:321 |
| 5 | standard, EncryptedPackage stream missing/short | slice bounds [8:0] | crypt.go:268 |
| 6 | agile, len(EncryptionInfo) 4–7 | slice bounds [8:4] | crypt.go:407 |
| 7 | agile, valid XML without <keyEncryptors> | index out of range with length 0 |
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| 8 | agile, saltValue decoded length ≠ AES block | cipher.NewCBCDecrypter: IV length must equal block size | crypt.go:425 → 512 |
| 9 | any, keyData blockSize="0" | integer divide by zero | crypt.go:539 |
Note the asymmetry pinpointing the missing constraint: the agile path already checks len(EncryptedPackage) >= 8 (crypt.go:520-523) but the standard path does not (#5). Existing tests only cover the error paths (short <4 bytes → ErrUnknownEncryptMechanism, bad XML, base64 errors), never these panic paths.
Standalone programs (public API only, inputs built in memory) were provided to the maintainer by email: 1-decrypt-panic builds seven malformed CFB containers and shows each panic escaping the public Decrypt API plus one end-to-end OpenReader crash. All cases print PANIC on master and BLOCKED with the proposed patch. A regression guard proves legitimate decryption is unaffected: a workbook encrypted with the package's own Encrypt() still opens through the same code path.
(A separate advisory covers the unbounded/negative allocation in extractPart.)
Any service that calls OpenFile/OpenReader/OpenBytes on untrusted input (upload processing, mail scanning, spreadsheet conversion) can be killed remotely and without authentication by a file of ~100 bytes to ~3 KB. No password is required — panics occur during structural/parameter handling before successful decryption. Site variety means filtering one pattern does not help.
A recover() boundary in Decrypt mapping any panic to ErrWorkbookFileFormat (restores the documented error-routing contract; legitimate standard/agile decryption unaffected). A complete patch has been provided to the maintainer; per-site length validation is recommended as defense in depth.