| パッケージ | 影響を受けるバージョン | 修正済みバージョン |
|---|---|---|
| fast-jwt | < 6.3.4 | 6.3.4 |
cacheSet only derives its exp cache deadline inside hasIat (src/verifier.js:127-140). JWT iat is optional. For a valid token with exp but no iat, cacheSet substitutes clockTimestamp + clockTolerance + cacheTTL (src/verifier.js:142-146). Later, the cache path returns the saved payload before decoding or invoking verifyToken (src/verifier.js:372-388). Since expiration validation is in verifyToken, the expired token remains accepted until the cache deadline.
The bug is an expiration-check bypass caused by caching.
Normally, verification works like this:
With caching enabled, fast-jwt saves successful verification results so it can avoid repeating crypto work for the same token.
The intended invariant is:
A cached token must stop being accepted at the same time as a non-cached token.
But the cache computes its expiration incorrectly.
In fast-jwt/src/verifier.js:127, the code first checks whether the payload has an iat (“issued at”) claim:
const hasIat = payload && typeof payload.iat === 'number'
if (hasIat) {
if (!ignoreExpiration && typeof payload.exp === 'number') {
cacheValue[2] = payload.exp * 1000 + clockTolerance
}
}
That means exp is considered only when iat exists.
However, iat is optional in JWT. A perfectly valid JWT may contain:
{
"sub": "alice",
"exp": 1700000001
}
with no iat.
For that token, the expiration-based cache deadline is never set. The code falls back to the generic cache TTL—10 minutes by default:
const maxTTL = clockTimestamp + clockTolerance + cacheTTL
cacheValue[2] = cacheValue[2] === 0 ? maxTTL : Math.min(cacheValue[2], maxTTL)
Later, cache lookup happens before decoding and expiration validation:
const [value, min, max] = cache.get(cacheKeyBuilder(token)) || [undefined, 0, 0]
if (typeof value !== 'undefined' && (max === 0 || now <= max)) {
return handleCachedResult(value, callback, promise)
}
これらの製品をお使いですか？サイトをスキャンして、脆弱なバージョンが公開されていないか確認しましょう。
無料でサイトをスキャンSo the timeline is:
12:00:00 Token has exp = 12:00:01, no iat.
12:00:00 Server verifies it successfully and caches its claims.
12:00:01 Token expires.
12:00:02 Attacker replays the identical token.
12:00:02 Cache hit returns old claims; exp is never rechecked.
12:10:00 Cache TTL finally ends; normal expiration rejection resumes.
An attacker cannot forge a token through this issue. They need a valid token first; typically their own, or a stolen bearer token. But they can keep using it after its intended expiration if all of these are true:
cache.exp but no iat.Impact depends on the application. For a short-lived access token, it can extend access by up to the configured cacheTTL of 10 minutes by default, or more if the application configured it that way. This undermines expiry as an authentication/session boundary.
The minimal repair is to calculate the cache deadline from exp independently of iat. iat should only matter for maxAge, because max age is inherently defined relative to issuance time.
const assert = require('node:assert/strict')
const { createSigner, createVerifier } = require('fast-jwt')
const key = 'audit-only-secret'
const originalNow = Date.now
try {
const initialNow = 1_700_000_000_000
const exp = Math.floor(initialNow / 1000) + 1 // expires one second later
// noTimestamp intentionally omits iat, while exp is retained.
const sign = createSigner({
key,
algorithm: 'HS256',
noTimestamp: true
})
const token = sign({ sub: 'alice', exp })
const verify = createVerifier({
key,
algorithms: ['HS256'],
cache: true,
cacheTTL: 60_000
})
Date.now = () => initialNow
assert.equal(verify(token).sub, 'alice') // Valid; stores cache entry.
Date.now = () => exp * 1000 + 1
assert.equal(verify(token).sub, 'alice') // BUG: should throw FAST_JWT_EXPIRED.
console.log('VULNERABLE: expired exp-without-iat token served from cache')
} finally {
Date.now = originalNow
}
This is an authentication/session-expiration bypass caused by incorrect cache validation. The following are impacted: