| パッケージ | 影響を受けるバージョン | 修正済みバージョン |
|---|---|---|
| praisonai | < 1.5.113 | 1.5.113 |
| praisonai | < 1.5.113 | 1.5.113 |
The path validation has a critical logic bug: it checks for .. AFTER normpath() has already collapsed all .. sequences. This makes the check completely useless and allows trivial path traversal to any file on the system.
The path validation function also does not resolve the symlink wich could potentially cause path traversal.
_validate_path() calls os.path.normpath() first, which collapses .. sequences, then checks for '..' in normalized. Since .. is already collapsed, the check always passes.
Vulnerable File:
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/file_tools.py
Lines: 42-49
class FileTools:
"""Tools for file operations including read, write, list, and information."""
@staticmethod
def _validate_path(filepath: str) -> str:
# Normalize the path
normalized = os.path.normpath(filepath)
absolute = os.path.abspath(normalized)
# Check for path traversal attempts (.. after normalization)
# We check the original input for '..' to catch traversal attempts
if '..' in normalized:
raise ValueError(f"Path traversal detected: {filepath}")
return absolute
Severity: CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1: 9.2 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N
CWE: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Prerequisites:
Steps to reproduce: poc.py
from praisonaiagents.tools.file_tools import FileTools
print(FileTools._validate_path('/tmp/../etc/passwd'))
# Returns: /etc/passwd
print(FileTools.read_file('/tmp/../etc/passwd'))
# Returns: content of /etc/passwd
Why this works:
# Current vulnerable code:
normalized = os.path.normpath(filepath) # Collapses .. HERE
absolute = os.path.abspath(normalized)
if '..' in normalized: # Check AFTER collapse - ALWAYS FALSE!
raise ValueError(...)
これらの製品をお使いですか?サイトをスキャンして、脆弱なバージョンが公開されていないか確認しましょう。
無料でサイトをスキャン/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, ~/.ssh/id_rsaread_file, write_file, list_files, get_file_info, copy_file, move_file, delete_file, download_file'..' in filepath BEFORE calling normpath(), not after_validate_path uses os.path.normpath and os.path.abspath, which don't resolve symlinks, making it vulnerable to path traversal via symlink if attacker can control the symlink.