| パッケージ | 影響を受けるバージョン | 修正済みバージョン |
|---|---|---|
| decidim-admin | ≥ 0.31.0.rc1, < 0.31.5≥ 0.32.0.rc1, < 0.32.0< 0.30.9 | 0.31.50.32.00.30.9 |
The admin organization user search uses the untrusted term value inside raw SQL ORDER BY expressions. Because the value is interpolated before Rails sanitization is applied, a crafted search string is executed by PostgreSQL as part of the sort expression.
The vulnerable endpoint is exposed as GET /admin/organization/users in decidim-admin/config/routes.rb:
resource :organization, only: [:edit, :update], controller: "organization" do
member do
get :users
end
end
That route reaches Decidim::Admin::OrganizationController#users, which forwards the current organization's available users into search:
def users
search(current_organization.users.available)
end
Inside search, the attacker-controlled source is params[:term]:
if (term = params[:term].to_s).present?
The query has two branches. In both branches, the WHERE predicates use bind parameters and are not the injection sink. The vulnerability is in the subsequent .order(Arel.sql(...)) calls, where the untrusted value is interpolated directly into SQL string literals.
Nickname branch:
nickname = term.delete("@")
relation.where("nickname LIKE ?", "#{nickname}%")
.order(Arel.sql(ActiveRecord::Base.sanitize_sql_array("similarity(nickname, '#{nickname}') DESC")))
Name/email branch:
relation.where("name ILIKE ?", "%#{term}%").or(
relation.where("email ILIKE ?", "%#{term}%")
)
.order(Arel.sql(ActiveRecord::Base.sanitize_sql_array("GREATEST(similarity(name, '#{term}'), similarity(email, '#{term}')) DESC")))
.order(Arel.sql(ActiveRecord::Base.sanitize_sql_array("(similarity(name, '#{term}') + similarity(email, '#{term}')) / 2 DESC")))
This use of sanitize_sql_array does not make the code safe. The interpolation happens first, so Rails receives an already-built SQL string rather than a statement with bind placeholders. As a result, a quote in term can terminate the intended string literal and inject attacker-controlled SQL into the ORDER BY expression.
For example, a payload such as slpleak '), COALESCE((SELECT 1 FROM pg_sleep(21)),0)) -- produces a fragment equivalent to:
GREATEST(similarity(name, 'slpleak '), COALESCE((SELECT 1 FROM pg_sleep(21)),0)) --'), similarity(email, 'slpleak '), COALESCE((SELECT 1 FROM pg_sleep(21)),0)) --')) DESC
これらの製品をお使いですか？サイトをスキャンして、脆弱なバージョンが公開されていないか確認しましょう。
無料でサイトをスキャンThe injected subquery is therefore evaluated by PostgreSQL as SQL, not treated purely as data. Because the sink is in ORDER BY, the endpoint can still return a normal 200 OK response while exposing the issue through measurable timing differences.
Source-to-sink chain:
params[:term]term = params[:term].to_s.order(Arel.sql(... "#{term}" ...)) and .order(Arel.sql(... "#{nickname}" ...))Reproduction steps:
name, email, or nickname matches the probe string.GET /admin/organization/users?term=test with Accept: application/json and record the response time.GET /admin/organization/users?term=slpleak%20%27%29%2C%20COALESCE%28%28SELECT%201%20FROM%20pg_sleep%2821%29%29%2C0%29%29%20-- with Accept: application/json.ORDER BY clause.ORDER BY clause and use timing differences as a blind SQL oracle.pg_sleep provide a reliable blind side channel.Review your administrator accesses and not give access to untrustworthy users
OWASP SQL Injection
This issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the Decidim Association and made by Radically Open Security against Decidim financed by NGI.