| パッケージ | 影響を受けるバージョン | 修正済みバージョン |
|---|---|---|
| flowise | < 3.1.2 | 3.1.2 |
| flowise | < 3.1.2 | 3.1.2 |
Type: Mass assignment via Object.assign(entity, body) -> client-controlled workspaceId (and on create, id) overwritten on the Assistant entity -> cross-workspace data takeover and IDOR.
File: packages/server/src/services/assistants/index.ts
Root cause: The Assistant controller/service constructs a new Assistant() and copies the request body into it via Object.assign(...) without an explicit field allowlist. The request body therefore can include workspaceId, id, createdDate, updatedDate. The server only rebinds some of these after the assign (e.g. on create, it overwrites workspaceId but not id; on update, it overwrites id but not workspaceId). The remaining client-controlled values land directly on the persisted row, breaking workspace isolation. Same root pattern as the assistant entity's sibling controllers and as DocumentStore before it was patched in commit 840d2ae.
File: packages/server/src/services/assistants/index.ts
// create (line 303) and update (line 381)
Object.assign(newAssistant, requestBody) // <-- BUG: requestBody.id, requestBody.workspaceId accepted
Why it's wrong: Object.assign(target, source) copies every own enumerable property of source onto target. The TypeORM/SQL persistence layer below it does not strip ownership-bearing columns, so workspaceId set in the request body lands as the new workspaceId of the persisted row. The DocumentStore patch (commit 840d2ae) demonstrated the intended fix shape (explicit field-by-field allowlist) but it has not been applied to this entity.
id.PUT /api/v1/assistants/<id> (or equivalent endpoint) with a JSON body that includes "workspaceId": "<workspace-B-id>" (an arbitrary other workspace's UUID). State at this point: the request reaches the controller as a workspace-A authenticated request.これらの製品をお使いですか？サイトをスキャンして、脆弱なバージョンが公開されていないか確認しましょう。
無料でサイトをスキャンObject.assign(updateEntity, body). The body's workspaceId overwrites the entity's workspaceId field. The persistence layer commits the row.Severity: High. Cross-workspace boundary violation by any authenticated workspace member.
Attacker capability: Any authenticated user with permission to update a assistant can move it to any workspace whose UUID they can guess or enumerate (workspace UUIDs are exposed in many API responses, so enumeration is trivial). Assistants encapsulate LLM configuration, instructions, attached tools, and credentials. Cross-workspace movement via workspaceId overwrite exposes the assistant (including its system prompt and tool list) to the destination workspace.
Preconditions: Authenticated session with edit permission for the source assistant. No second factor required. Workspace UUIDs are exposed via the /api/v1/workspaces listing or via any cross-referenced object's workspaceId field, so target enumeration is trivial.
Differential: PoC-verified by source inspection of the original GHSA-q4pr-4r26-c69r. Patched build (with the suggested fix below) refuses the workspaceId field; vulnerable build accepts it and persists it.
Already fixed in PR https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6128 (allowlist pattern applied).
// Allowlist pattern (matches commit 840d2ae for DocumentStore):
const updatedAssistant = new Assistant()
if (body.<allowed_field_1> !== undefined) updatedAssistant.<allowed_field_1> = body.<allowed_field_1>
if (body.<allowed_field_2> !== undefined) updatedAssistant.<allowed_field_2> = body.<allowed_field_2>
// ...whitelist only the documented fields. Never copy id, workspaceId, createdDate, updatedDate from the client.
Regression tests should assert that a request body containing workspaceId, id, createdDate, or updatedDate is rejected (or at minimum: does not change those columns on the persisted row) for both create and update paths.